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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
Trust is a ubiquitous part of social life. In this regard, it is not surprising that 
the issue of trust has been on the forefront of research agendas across a variety of 
disciplines in social sciences including psychology, sociology, organizational 
behavior, economics, and law (e.g., see Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Tyler & Huo, 2002). This multidisciplinary approach 
highlights that trust is among the most important aspects of human social life, as it 
pervades almost all domains of society (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012; Rield & Javor, 
2012). In fact, almost any decision or exchange that a person engages in includes 
some sort of trust evaluation, which emphasizes the notion that trust represents a 
necessary ingredient to coordinate and facilitate social life (Bohnet & Croson, 2004; 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 2007).  
Across these disciplines a wide range of trust definitions exists, but a 
common understanding has grown that “trust is a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p 395). The presence of trust has been 
shown to offer numerous benefits to individuals, organizations, and even society as a 
whole. At the level of the individual trust has, for instance, been linked to love and 
happiness in close relationships (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Trust has also 
been identified as a trademark of effective organizations as it fosters cooperation and 
increases performance (Bromiley & Cummings, 1996; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; 
Dirks, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001, 2002). Moreover, according to sociologists trust 
is a key component of social capital, which in turn is important for social integration, 
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economic efficiency, and democratic stability (Coleman, 1998; Fukuyama, 1995; 
Newton, 2001). These findings underscore the notion that trust is an essential 
ingredient of social life. 
The violation of trust 
A common theme of most prior trust studies is that they primarily focus on 
understanding what happens when trust is present. It is noteworthy, however, that 
despite the importance of trust, it has been relatively silent on what happens when 
trust is violated and has to be restored again (Hardin, 2004). Indeed, hardly any 
scientific attention has been devoted to understand the moving from a state of 
distrust to a state of regained trust (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012). This conclusion is 
regretful, particularly because trust is fragile and people’s everyday actions and 
decisions offer numerous opportunities to violate trust (see Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, 
& Murnighan, 2002; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & 
Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Such violations emerge when 
the victim’s positive expectations about the transgressor are disconfirmed, like in 
cases of romantic betrayal or when a friend does not repay a loan.  
Prior research has indicated that the negative consequences of trust 
violations are detrimental. The violation of trust, for instance, results in an 
immediate decline of cooperation (Bottom et al., 2002; Haden & Hojjat, 2006). 
Moreover, in the aftermath of a trust violation victims will often actively seek 
revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1996). Trust breaches can also poison relationships with 
suspicion and distrust, which has adverse effects for the relation in the long run 
(Elangovan, Auer-Rizzi, & Szabo, 2007). These negative consequences highlight 
that it is crucial to develop a better understanding of the psychology of trust repair 
(Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). So, the central question that comes up here is: If and 
how can broken trust be repaired? 
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The repair of broken trust 
The strong emphasis on the presence and benefits of trust has led scholars to 
leave the issue of violated trust and, more importantly, the question how broken trust 
can be repaired remained in an empirical shade (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012). In 
light of the different strategies that transgressors can employ in order to enhance 
victims’ trust, a central distinction has been made between verbal trust repair actions 
and non-verbal (tangible) trust repair actions. 
Most prior trust repair studies largely focused on verbal accounts such as 
apologies, denials, and excuses (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Kim et al., 
2004, 2006; Schweitzer at al., 2006). Ample research has shown that offering a 
sincere apology might indeed be an effective strategy to enhance trust (e.g., see 
Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Schwartz, 1978; Tomlinson, Dineen, & 
Lewicki, 2004). Specifically, these studies found that transgressors who apologized 
were rated more favorably than transgressors who did not apologize. However, 
evidence is growing that apologies do not always facilitate the repair of trust (De 
Cremer & Desmet, 2012). Indeed, researchers have found that apologies may fail to 
ameliorate the negative consequences of a trust violation because they involve an 
acknowledgement of guilt (see Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983; Schlenker, 1980). 
In this vein, Sigal, Hsu, Foodim, and Betman (1988) found that a denial of 
misconduct is a more effective strategy to obtain votes for a political candidate than 
the provision of an apology. Similarly, Kim and colleagues (2004, 2006) reported 
that when a trust violation reflects a lack of integrity, attributing blame to external 
factors by offering an excuse or a denial generates the best outcomes. Empirical 
research has shown that apologies can even backfire and lead to a further decline of 
trust (Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). It can thus be concluded that prior research 
regarding the effectiveness of verbal trust repair strategies reached contradictory 
conclusions.  
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Given that there is nothing tangible to lend credibility to such verbal 
response strategies, scholars have argued that they may be discounted by victims as 
“cheap talk” (Bottom et al., 2002), and this should especially be the case when the 
trust violation results in monetary loss for the victim, which are not addressed by 
verbal responses. In such situations, actions may speak louder than words. 
Accordingly, when a trust breach results in some sort of monetary loss for the victim 
a non-verbal response, such as the offer of a monetary reimbursement, may be 
necessary to validate and strengthen the claim that the perpetrator will behave 
trustworthy in the future (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011).  
 
Trust repair: The effectiveness of financial compensation 
The most prominent non-verbal (tangible) response is the provision of a 
financial compensation. Monetary compensation is an often used restoration 
response that is manifested in various policies ranging from worker compensation to 
the court-based tort system. Previous research has indicated that financial 
compensation can be an effective tool for restoring a victim’s trust (see Bottom et 
al., 2002; Desmet, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2010, 2011). Importantly, most prior 
compensation studies only explored compensations that are smaller than or 
equivalent to the damage suffered by the victim. However, scholars have argued that 
effective trust repair may ask more from the transgressor than just exactly restoring 
the damage (Kim et al., 2006). In other words, to fully repair trust to its pre-
transgressive state it may be necessary that the transgressor goes the extra mile by 
providing the victim additional compensation. In real-life transgressors often offer 
victims a compensation that is larger than the damage suffered, which is generally 
referred to as overcompensation. Overcompensation, for example, occurs when 
insurance companies overpay material losses or when stores provide additional 
compensation that goes beyond mere failure restoration. Because overcompensation 
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literally entails extra costs for the provider of the compensation, the question arises 
whether overcompensation is more effective to repair broken trust than 
compensation that exactly covers the inflicted harm (i.e., equal compensation). 
This question was the ground for Chapter 2. In this chapter we started from 
the assumption that overcompensation represents an interesting case in terms of the 
“paradigmatic struggle” between economics and psychology. More specifically, 
from an economic perspective overcompensation represents the best situation for the 
victim because of the high profits it entails, whereas from a psychological 
perspective overcompensation installs inequality as it violates fairness concerns. We 
conducted four studies in order to investigate whether overcompensation is more 
effective (as predicted from a self-interest account) or less effective (as predicted 
from a fairness account) than equal compensation.  
In Chapter 3 we investigated if the effectiveness of overcompensation as a 
way to make up for a financial transgression depends on the role of the actor. 
Importantly, all previous compensation studies merely focused on the target of the 
compensation, thereby overlooking the potential positive influences that 
overcompensation may have on non-involved observing parties. Indeed, 
transgressors often offer victims an overcompensation, not only to repair their 
relationship with the victim but also to positively influence others. Therefore, in the 
present chapter we examined whether overcompensation is indeed seen as positive 
through the eyes of observers. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 4 we examined the role of violation type. Trust 
violations can often be ascribed to either a lack of competence or a lack of integrity 
on part of the transgressor (see Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Competence violations occur 
when the transgressor violates positive expectations about his or her technical and 
interpersonal skills required to perform a certain task. Integrity violations, on the 
other hand, arise when the transgressor adheres to a set of moral principles that are 
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considered as unacceptable by others. Here, we conducted two studies in which we 
investigated whether the effectiveness of overcompensation changes in function of 
the violation type. We predicted that after a severe transgression in terms of an 
integrity violation overcompensation might be needed more in order for trust repair 
to occur. 
In Chapter 5 we next investigated, in consumer settings, how the magnitude 
of an overcompensation influences its effectiveness. We predicted that the 
relationship between overcompensation and customer loyalty is generally 
characterized by an inverted U-shaped function: As the level of overcompensation 
increases, customer loyalty also improves, but only to a certain point beyond which 
an increase in overcompensation generates a drop in customer loyalty. Furthermore, 
in this study we also aimed to identify the optimal compensation level that results in 
the highest level of recovery. Although we expect that the curve between 
overcompensation and customer loyalty is inverted U-shaped, it is possible that there 
are individual differences in how customers respond to various overcompensation 
levels. Therefore, in this chapter we have also explored if there are individual 
differences in how customers respond to different levels of overcompensation. 
In Chapter 6 we subsequently focused on the effectiveness of 
overcompensation as an advertisement strategy. In this context, promising customers 
to pay them more than the difference when another store sells the exact same item 
for a lower price is a commonly employed advertisement strategy by companies 
(i.e., a price-beating guarantee, cf. overcompensation). In a first study we examined 
if marketers and shop owners believe that beating price differences is an effective 
advertisement strategy and compensation policy. In four subsequent studies we 
investigated whether the announcement of a price-beating refund is indeed an 
effective strategy to attract new and retain existing customers. 
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Trust repair: The effectiveness of apologies 
In Chapters 2 through 6 we focused on the effectiveness of financial 
(over)compensation as a means to enhance trust (and other trust-related outcomes) 
after a tangible trust violation. However, in the literature it is increasingly 
acknowledged that even in cases of tangible harm, non-financial motives are also 
important (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; De Cremer, 2002; Lax & Sebenius, 
1986). In this respect, trust breaches do not only violate tangible concerns, but often 
also constitute a violation of relational concerns (Bies & Moag, 1986). This notion 
suggests that trust repair may also be facilitated by verbal repair strategies that 
address relational harm. One prominent way in which transgressors can appeal to 
these relational concerns is by offering an apology to the victim (Lazare, 2004; Kim, 
Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). Apologies address the harmed relational needs of the victim 
because they restore the victim’s dignity and affirm respect for the victim (Barclay 
& Skarlicki, 2008; Scher & Darley, 1997). 
In Chapter 7 we started from the observation that although prior research 
has revealed that financial compensations and apologies can be effective to enhance 
broken trust, research to date has neglected to study the effects of financial and 
relational strategies on trust repair simultaneously (for a notable exception, see 
Okimoto & Tyler, 2007). Therefore, we conducted two studies in which we focused 
on the combined effects of financial compensations and apologies. Specifically, we 
examined whether in the aftermath of a tangible harm an apology offers an 
additional value in enhancing trust on top of the impact of a monetary compensation. 
In Chapter 8 we switched our focus to investigating the effectiveness of 
apologies in relationships at work. More specifically, we examined the impact of 
decision timing on the effectiveness of leaders’ apologies to repair followers’ trust in 
the aftermath of leader failure. On almost a daily basis leaders have to make 
decisions that can harm their followers in cases of incorrect decisions. However, no 
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previous studies investigated how the timing of an incorrect decision influences the 
effectiveness of apologies as a trust repair strategy. In five studies we investigated 
how a negative decision outcome generated by a leader in a hasty, timely, or delayed 
manner impacts upon the need for and the effectiveness of apologies to repair 
followers’ trust. 
A neuropsychological perspective on trust repair 
In the previous chapters of this dissertation the trust repair process was 
investigated using behavioral methods. Importantly, the neurosciences offer new 
tools and an anatomical guide for further exploring the process of trust repair. 
Indeed, information about the nature of connectivity among neural systems can serve 
as a useful complement to behavioral methods for advancing theories of social 
behavior (Amodio, 2010; Kosfeld, 2007). Important in this regard is the observation 
that prior neuroimaging research has revealed that the human brain has evolved 
mechanisms that are capable of evaluating the trustworthiness of others without 
conscious deliberation (see Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000; Todorov, 2011; 
Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 
2002). Because trust seems to take place in the brain, it is surprising to see that the 
issue of trust repair has not yet been studied by means of looking into the brain.  
To address this lacuna in the literature, in Chapter 9 we conducted an fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) study in which we investigated the neural 
correlates of trust repair through equal financial compensation. By doing so, we are 
the first to look at the trust repair process from a neuroscientific perspective. We 
predicted that trust repair by equal compensation would activate brain areas that 
have previously been associated with forgiveness and social reward experiences, and 
that these activations would mediate the link between compensation and trust repair. 
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Chapter 2  
 
What Money Can’t Buy: The Psychology of 
Financial Overcompensation 
 
Abstract 
When a financial damage has been inflicted, perpetrators can satisfy victims’ 
outcome related concerns by providing a financial compensation. Few studies have 
investigated, however, whether overcompensation (i.e., compensation that is greater 
than the damage suffered) is more beneficial than equal compensation (i.e., 
compensation that covers the exact damage suffered). The results of four studies 
show that overcompensation offers no effects in addition to the impact of equal 
compensation, and that it even provokes negative outcomes. More specifically, 
overcompensation is attributed to occur because of a lower level of moral orientation 
(Studies 2 through 4), leads to less favorable perceptions of the perpetrator (Studies 
2 and 4), and lower levels of trust in the perpetrator (Studies 3 and 4) than equal 
compensation. No significant differences between overcompensation and equal 
compensation appeared for relationship preservation and cooperation (Study 4). 
These results show that while overcompensation may rebuild cooperation (albeit not 
more effectively than equal compensation), it does so at a monetary and relational 
cost that limits its effectiveness as a tool to promote true interpersonal trust. The 
present studies thus show that a large financial compensation does not provide any 
surplus value in terms of psychological outcomes and relationship continuation, 
even though such compensation best satisfies a victim’s economic needs. 
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., Van Hiel, A., Reinders Folmer, C., & De Cremer, D. 
(2014). What money can't buy: The psychology of financial overcompensation. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 42, 83-95. 
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Introduction 
After a financial damage has been inflicted, like in case of a damaged 
property or an unequal division of resources, victims’ outcome-related concerns are 
violated (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Previous studies have 
shown that a violation of these concerns is often perceived as unfair, and 
consequently may lead to a host of negative reactions, such as anger and spite 
(Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), reduced interpersonal trust (Desmet, De Cremer, & 
Van Dijk, 2011a), lower intentions to preserve the relationship (Haesevoets, 
Reinders Folmer, De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013), and decreased cooperation 
(Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002).  
One way to settle for the outcome-related violations is to provide a financial 
compensation, a monetary reimbursement to be paid by the perpetrator as a 
compensation for the victim’s financial loss. Sometimes an overcompensation is 
offered. In these cases, victims receive a compensation that is greater than the 
damage they suffered, which results in a more favorable outcome for the victim than 
the perpetrator, and thus signals self-sacrifice from this perpetrator (see De Cremer 
& Van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004). Such overcompensation occurs in real-life, for 
example in the context of customer service complaints when companies provide 
additional compensation that goes beyond mere failure restoration (e.g., in the form 
of a refund, a coupon, or a product replacement that is worth more than the damage 
suffered), in order to increase post-complaint satisfaction (Boshoff, 1997; Estelami, 
2000; Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002; Gilly & Hansen, 1985). Or, in case of hotel 
overbooking, when a customer is offered the finest suite of the hotel, a voucher, or a 
cash-based overcompensation (Noone & Lee, 2011). 
Although overcompensation occurs in many real-life situations (as 
illustrated by the above mentioned examples), it is unclear whether 
overcompensation entails higher satisfaction with the arrangement than equal 
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compensation (i.e., compensation that covers the exact damage suffered). Indeed, 
very few empirical studies have investigated whether overcompensation has positive 
consequences beyond equal compensation. Because overcompensation is associated 
with additional costs on top of the expenses of equal compensation, it is costly for 
the perpetrator, but at the same time profitable for the victim. Moreover, since 
people attach high value to fairness and equality (see Camerer, 2003; Messick, 1993) 
− and overcompensation fails to restore equality in outcomes − the critical question 
that arises is whether such costly overcompensation has beneficial effects, and more 
specifically, has effects in addition to the impact of equal compensation? To answer 
this question, we contrast an economic perspective (which focuses on the magnitude 
of the outcomes per se) and a psychological perspective (focusing on fairness and 
equality in outcomes, rather than the outcome itself) on overcompensation. 
An economic perspective on overcompensation 
According to classic economic theory, which is based upon the concept of 
“homo economicus” or “economic man”, individuals are mainly motivated by 
money and by the possibility of making profits (Franz, 2004). Hence, such an 
economic perspective assumes that individuals are self-interested and, above all else, 
want to maximize their own outcomes (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Dawes & Thaler, 
1988). This implies that, in terms of economic outcomes, after a financial harm has 
been inflicted, greater compensation should yield better outcomes for the victim. In 
line with this argument, there is some evidence in consumer behavior that indicates 
that, after a service failure, overcompensation results in more satisfaction than an 
equal compensation (Boshoff, 1997; Gilly & Hansen, 1985).  
Hence, from an economic perspective, when an overcompensation is granted 
the recipient can be expected to show a host of positive reactions. More specifically, 
compared to equal compensation, overcompensation should foster greater 
satisfaction with the agreement, more favorable perceptions of the perpetrator, 
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higher levels of trust in this perpetrator, and a greater willingness to continue the 
relationship with this perpetrator (e.g., see Desmet et al., 2011a; Lewicki, Wiethoff, 
& Tomlinson, 2005; also see De Cremer & Van Kleef, 2009; De Cremer & Van 
Knippenberg, 2002, 2004). 
A psychological perspective on overcompensation 
Psychological models have postulated that behavior in interpersonal settings 
is not only driven by concerns for tangible outcomes, but also by other, non-material 
concerns (see Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). Specifically, rather than the 
magnitude of outcomes per se, it is also important whether these outcomes are fair 
and in proportion to the damages suffered. Indeed, a substantial body of research has 
shown that people are influenced profoundly by such fairness considerations (for 
reviews on this matter, see Bazerman, White, & Loewenstein, 1995; Folger, 1984; 
Törnblom, 1992), and that in many situations people adhere to the fairness norm of 
equality as a decision heuristic (Messick, 1993). The equality norm (Deutsch, 1975) 
assumes that people prefer equal outcomes between all members of some specified 
group (see Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003; 
Lerner, 1975; Pillutla & Murnighan, 2003; Sampson, 1975; Van Dijk, De Cremer, & 
Handgraaf, 2004). Based on this norm different effects of overcompensation, 
relative to equal compensation, might be expected.  
From one point of view, as soon as the financial compensation undoes the 
damage suffered by meeting or exceeding the equality norm, a ceiling effect might 
occur whereby people benefit little from additional financial restitution (see 
Haesevoets et al., 2013). This implies that overcompensation should yield similar 
(no better, nor worse) results as equal compensation. Accordingly, research in the 
area of consumer behavior recently confirmed the idea that overcompensation is of 
little additional value in a meta-analysis of 17 experimental studies (Gelbrich & 
Roschk, 2011) by showing that overcompensation does not significantly enhance 
FINANCIAL OVERCOMPENSATION 
 
19 
post-complaint satisfaction beyond the effect of simple compensation (i.e., when the 
refund given is equivalent to or less than the purchase price). 
 From another point of view, however, equal compensation and 
overcompensation differ in the extent to which the compensation reestablishes 
equality in outcomes between the victim and the perpetrator (Messick, 1993). That 
is, while equal compensation restores equality, overcompensation fails to restore 
equality, as it turns the state of disadvantageous inequality on the part of the victim 
into a state of advantageous inequality. Because of the high value that people attach 
to equality (Deutsch, 1975; Lerner, 1975; Sampson, 1975), equal compensation 
should be considered the best possible outcome for a victim. Research on fairness 
has indeed revealed that people’s appreciation of equal and unequal outcomes may 
not match their objective monetary value (e.g., see Adams & Freedman, 1976). 
More specifically, although people prefer advantageous inequity over 
disadvantageous inequity, most people prefer equal outcomes over both 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequity (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 
1989). In other words, people value equality over other outcome distributions, even 
if those might objectively have greater economic value and thus prove more 
favorable to the self. Following this point of view, overcompensation should even be 
less effective than equal compensation. Moreover, after receiving overcompensation, 
people may feel guilty because they consider the compensation to be exaggerated, or 
be suspicious about the motives of the perpetrator (see Estelami & De Maeyer, 
2002).  
 Taken together, if people’s behavior is not only driven by concerns for the 
outcome in itself, but also by fairness considerations, overcompensation should not 
be more effective (i.e., as effective or even less effective) than equal compensation 
in entailing positive outcomes regarding for example satisfaction, perceptions, trust, 
and cooperation. 
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Previous research 
In spite of its ubiquity in social life and the different theoretical perspectives 
on its potential effectiveness very few studies investigated the effectiveness of 
overcompensation with regard to important variables such as equality, trust betrayal, 
trust repair, and cooperation (for some exceptions, see Bies & Tripp, 2006; 
Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006; 
Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2006). Moreover, the few studies conducted so far 
focused on very small overcompensations and revealed inconsistent results. 
Specifically, relative to equal compensation, some studies reported positive effects 
of slight overcompensation, while other studies reported neutral or even negative 
effects (see Desmet et al., 2010, 2011a; Haesevoets et al., 2013).  
We believe that these inconsistent results are possible due to the fact that 
these studies focused on different aspects of trust, namely affect-based trust (e.g., 
interpersonal trust, see the studies of Desmet et al., 2010, 2011a) versus cognition-
based trust (e.g., relationship preservation, see the studies of Haesevoets et al., 
2013). Affect-based trust, on the one hand, depends on the emotional bonds between 
individuals, which entails caring about others’ needs (Lewis & Wiegert, 1985). 
Here, the main focus is on the relationship itself. Cognition-based trust, on the other 
hand, reflects a strategic choice based on the prospect of making a profit (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996). Here the main focus is not on the relationship itself, but on the 
benefits that the relationship may provide. Thus, based on these different 
foundations that underlie trust, it is possible that overcompensation reveals different 
patterns of results for more affective, relational-based outcomes (such as 
interpersonal trust, cf. affect-based trust) than for more cognitive, calculus-based 
outcomes (such as relationship preservation and further cooperation, cf. cognition-
based trust; see McAllister, 1995; also see Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewicki et al., 
2005; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Williams, 2001). 
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Present studies 
Because we were particularly interested in the conflict between economic 
and psychological motives, in the present research we focus on the effectiveness of a 
large overcompensation between two strangers in a newly formed relationship. In 
such situations there is no interference of past behavior on future trust and 
cooperation. From an economic perspective, large overcompensation results in high 
profit for the victim, but at the same time it constitutes a serious deviation from 
equality according to a psychological perspective. Consequently, in the present 
paper we aim to answer the following research question: After a financial damage 
has been inflicted, is overcompensation more effective, as effective, or even less 
effective than equal compensation to yield positive outcomes (like great satisfaction, 
favorable perceptions, and high levels of trust and cooperation)? To answer this 
question, we conducted a questionnaire study (Study 1), two scenario studies 
(Studies 2 and 3), and a lab experiment (Study 4) in which a financial harm was 
inflicted in the first phase of each study (i.e., a damaged property in Studies 1 
through 3 and an unequal division of resources in Study 4), that the transgressor then 
tried to undo by offering the victim an equal compensation or an overcompensation. 
 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants, design, and procedure 
The aim of this first study was to gain insight in the attributions that people 
ascribe to financial compensation, in order to develop a measurement for our further 
studies. Therefore, as part of a classroom exercise, 44 undergraduate political 
sciences students at Ghent University (26 men, 13 women, and five individuals who 
did not specify their gender, Mage = 21.11, SD = 3.93) participated voluntarily in a 
questionnaire study, in which they were randomly assigned to a two condition 
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(compensation: equal compensation versus overcompensation) between-subjects 
design. A short scenario presented an anonymous person (the perpetrator) who 
caused a purely financial damage of €50 to another anonymous person (the victim). 
In the equal compensation condition, participants were told that the perpetrator 
reimbursed this financial loss by paying the victim €50. In the overcompensation 
condition, the perpetrator paid the victim €500. No further information regarding the 
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim or the nature of the transgression 
was provided. 
Measures 
To get a broad picture of the attributions people believe to underlie financial 
compensation, we asked participants an open question: “Why do you think this 
person paid €50 (if the damage equals €50)?” in the equal compensation condition, 
and “Why do you think this person paid €500 (while the damage equals only €50)?” 
in the overcompensation condition. 
Results 
 Participants’ answers to the open question revealed 30 different attributions. 
Fourteen unique attributions were obtained in the equal compensation condition, ten 
attributions emerged solely in the overcompensation condition, while six attributions 
occurred in both the equal compensation and overcompensation conditions. Out of 
these 30 attributions, 15 attributions were mentioned by at least three participants. 
These 15 attributions (that are given in the first column of Table 1) were used to 
develop a measurement of attributions that people believe to underlie financial 
compensation. This measure was used in our further studies.  
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Study 2 
Method 
Participants, design, and procedure 
As part of a classroom exercise, 90 undergraduate social sciences students at 
Ghent University (22 men, 65 women, and three individuals who did not specify 
their gender, Mage = 19.61, SD = 2.82) participated voluntarily in a scenario study. 
Participants were again randomly assigned to a two condition (compensation: equal 
compensation versus overcompensation) between-subjects design. We used the same 
scenario as in the previous study, in which a person first caused a financial damage 
and then made up for this loss by offering the victim an equal compensation or an 
overcompensation. 
Measures 
Attributions underlying a compensation. First, to measure the extent to 
which participants believed a particular attribution to underlie financial 
compensation, we used the 15 attributions that had been mentioned by at least three 
participants in the previous study. For each of these attributions we asked 
participants: “To what extent do you think this person paid €50 [attribution]?” in the 
equal compensation condition, and “To what extent do you think this person paid 
€500 [attribution]?” in the overcompensation condition (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much).  
Perceptions of person who offers a compensation. Besides these attributions, 
in the present study we also probed participants’ perceptions of the person who 
offered the compensation. Therefore, we employed seven items that are based on the 
benign impressions scale (see Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2004; Van 
Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002). In both conditions, we asked participants, 
“To what extent do you think this person is: honest, just, trustworthy, friendly, 
reliable, insincere, and unlikable (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; negative items 
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reverse-coded). These items were aggregated into a scale measure of perceptions of 
the person who offered the compensation (M = 4.54, SD = 0.96, α = .86). 
Results 
Factor congruence 
Given that the attributions we obtained in Study 1 often pertained to only the 
equal compensation or overcompensation condition, we checked whether the 
underlying structure of these attributions was similar in both conditions. Therefore, 
we first extracted principal components (with eigenvalues > 1) from the correlations 
among the attributions in each condition separately. Next, we calculated the degree 
of congruence between the two sets of component loadings (see Harman, 1976).  
In the equal compensation condition (n = 43), four components were 
extracted with an eigenvalue of 4.99, 2.23, 1.78, and 1.20, respectively. In the 
overcompensation condition (n = 47), we extracted five components with an 
eigenvalue of 4.28, 2.17, 1.55, 1.22, and 1.10, respectively. Following Harman’s 
(1976) empirical rule, we then computed the correlations among the component 
scores that were obtained in both conditions. It was revealed that the four 
components of the equal compensation condition were well represented in the other 
condition, with correlations among components ranging from .75 to .93 (all ps ≤ 
.001). Only the fourth component in the overcompensation condition was not related 
to any of the components in the equal compensation condition. This result thus 
indicates that the four extracted components in the equal compensation condition are 
congruent with the factors found in the overcompensation condition. 
Because we obtained support for the factor congruence across both 
compensation conditions, we extracted four principal components from the scores on 
these 15 attributions, using the total sample (N = 90). These components had an 
eigenvalue of 4.46, 2.54, 1.65, and 1.20, respectively. Table 1 shows the factor 
loadings of these four component scores after OBLIMIN rotation. As can be inferred 
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from these loadings, the attributions ‘enlighten one’s conscience’, ‘guilt’, ‘feeling 
better about oneself’, and ‘financial capability’ (attributions 1 through 4) loaded on 
the first component, which we labeled proself orientation (α = .80). The attributions 
‘righteousness’, ‘logical’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘moral obligation’, and ‘taught in education’ 
(attributions 5 through 9) constituted the second component, which we labeled moral 
orientation (α = .86). The attributions ‘surprised’, ‘compensate for additional costs’, 
‘no accurate estimation of the damage’, and ‘fear’ (attributions 10 through 13) 
loaded on the third component, which we labeled uncertainty reduction orientation 
(α = .67). Finally, the attributions ‘quickly get out of the situation’ and ‘silence the 
victim’ (attributions 14 and 15) constituted the fourth component, which we labeled 
exit orientation (α = .52). The correlations among these four components were rather 
modest (all rs < .31). 
Attributions underlying a compensation 
 We conducted four independent t-tests to compare the scores on these four 
components between conditions. Therefore, we used the four component scores that 
were extracted by the principal component analysis (using the total sample). There 
was only a significant difference between equal compensation (M = -0.65, SD = 
0.90) and overcompensation (M = 0.59, SD = 0.67) for moral orientation, t(86) = -
7.39, p < 001. No significant differences between equal compensation and 
overcompensation were obtained for proself orientation, uncertainty reduction 
orientation, and exit orientation (all ps > .05). These results thus suggest that a 
person who offered an overcompensation is considered to be less morally oriented 
than a person who offered an equal compensation. 
Perceptions of person who offers a compensation 
We also obtained a significant difference in perceptions of the person 
offering the compensation, t(87) = 2.50, p < .05. A person who offered an equal 
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compensation (M = 4.80, SD = 0.86) is perceived more favorably than a person who 
offered an overcompensation (M = 4.31, SD = 1.00). 
 
Table 1. Principal component analysis (pattern matrix) of the 15 attributions for Study 2. 
  Attribution Factor loading 
  To what extent do you think this person paid €50 / €500: PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
  1) To enlighten his or her consciences .92 .02 -.16 .01 
  2) Out of guilt .88 .08 .07 -.13 
  3) To feel better about him- or herself .86 -.11 -.01 .01 
  4) Because he or she is financially capable to do so .53 -.15 .16 .11 
  5) Because this is righteous -.02 -.90 -.13 .11 
  6) Because this is the most logical response -.09 -.89 -.04 .08 
  7) Because he or she embraces the principle of reciprocity .01 -.71 .29 -.18 
  8) Out of moral obligation .13 -.69 .12 -.21 
  9) Because this is what people are taught to do .20 -.66 -.11 .27 
  10) Because he or she is affected or surprised -.09 -.20 .72 .02 
  11) To compensate for possible additional costs .13 .11 .71 -.23 
  12) Because he or she cannot accurately estimate the damage .01 .12 .70 .12 
  13) Out of fear .00 -.22 .55 .20 
  14) To quickly get out of the situation -.08 -.07 .03 .89 
  15) To silence the victim .30 .20 .42 .52 
Note. Bold factor loading reflects loading on the relevant component. 
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Discussion 
 This study provides initial evidence that when a financial harm has been 
inflicted, and the perpetrator subsequently offered an overcompensation, this person 
is perceived less favorably and the attributions underlying his or her behavior are 
considered to be due to a lower level of moral orientation than when this person 
offered an equal compensation. This result was obtained with a major 
overcompensation (i.e., compensation that covered ten times the damage suffered), 
which from an economic perspective represents the best situation for a victim 
because of the high profits, while from a psychological perspective it constitutes a 
serious deviation from equality. In these situations, in which the conflict between 
self-interest and concerns for equality is at a high level, people seem most concerned 
about fairness as they prefer a perpetrator who provides an equal compensation 
compared to a perpetrator who offers an overcompensation.  
 
Study 3 
In the previous study we focused on attributions underlying the 
compensation and perceptions of the perpetrator. Because trust has been reported to 
be an important outcome variable in previous research on the effectiveness of 
financial compensation (i.e., trust restoration, see Lewicki et al., 2005; Ren & Gray, 
2009; also see Desmet et al., 2010, 2011a), in the present study we also examined 
the effectiveness of equal compensation and overcompensation on trusting 
intentions. 
Moreover, in the present study we focused on a situation in which the 
participant was the victim of the financial harm and the recipient of the 
compensation. The previous two studies focused on a situation in which participants 
evaluated a financial compensation between a dyad (i.e., a victim and a perpetrator) 
as an observer. By making participants themselves the victim of the transgression, 
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this study will enable us to examine whether participants’ judgments of 
overcompensation also extend to situations where they themselves are the recipient 
of this compensation (e.g., see Risen & Gilovich, 2007).  
Method 
Participants, design, and procedure 
As part of a classroom exercise, 55 undergraduate social sciences students at 
Ghent University (12 men, 38 women, and five individuals who did not specify their 
gender, Mage = 19.17, SD = 1.51) participated voluntarily in a scenario study. They 
were randomly assigned to a two condition (compensation: equal compensation 
versus overcompensation) between-subjects design. A short scenario was presented 
in which a classmate (unknown to the participant) damaged the participant’s newly 
purchased textbook during a lecture (by spilling a can of Coke on it). It was 
explained that his book had a monetary value of €10 (and no emotional or practical 
value). In the equal compensation condition, the perpetrator reimbursed the 
participant’s financial loss by repaying the exact value of the textbook (i.e., €10). In 
the overcompensation condition, the perpetrator paid the participant €100. 
Measures 
Attributions of moral orientation. We measured the five attributions that 
constituted the moral orientation component in Study 2. Specifically, we asked 
participants, “I think that this person paid me €10 (equal compensation condition) / 
€100 (overcompensation condition): because this is righteous, because this is the 
most logical response, because he or she embraces the principle of reciprocity, out of 
moral obligation, and because this is what people are taught to do” (binary choice: 0 
= no, 1 = yes).  
Trusting intentions. Participants’ trusting intentions towards the perpetrator 
were measured using six trust items (based on Desmet et al., 2011b): “I trust this 
person”, “I have no trust in this person”, “I think this person would deceive me if he 
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or she would benefit from it”, “I think this person can be trusted”, “I think this 
person would lie to me if he or she would gain from it”, and “I think this person 
means well for me” (1 = certainly not agree, 7 = certainly agree; negative items 
reverse-coded). Scores were combined into a general measure of trust towards the 
perpetrator (M = 4.60, SD = 1.23, α = .90). 
Manipulation check. Finally, to examine whether the compensation 
manipulation was successful, we asked participants: “To what extent has this person 
paid you more than the exact damage?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; M = 4.27, SD 
= 2.76). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
 An independent t-test revealed that participants in the overcompensation 
condition (M = 6.70, SD = 1.20) were more likely to indicate that the perpetrator 
paid them more than the exact damage, compared to participants in the equal 
compensation condition (M = 1.93, SD = 1.49), t(53) = -13.05, p < .001. 
Attributions of moral orientation 
The five attributions were examined separately using chi-square tests. 
Significantly more participants in the equal compensation condition than in the 
overcompensation condition believed these attributions to underlie the financial 
compensation (all ps < .01; see Table 2). 
Trusting intentions 
A significant difference in trusting intentions after equal compensation 
compared to overcompensation emerged, t(53) = 3.23, p < .01. Specifically, after 
equal compensation (M = 5.08, SD = 1.00) participants trusting intentions were 
higher than after overcompensation (M = 4.10, SD = 1.25).  
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Table 2. Results of the chi-square tests for attributions of moral orientation for Study 3. 
Attribution Equal compensation (n = 28) Overcompensation (n = 27) 2χ  
I think that this person paid me €10 / €100: No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%)  
Because this is righteous 4 (14.3) 24 (85.7) 25 (92.6) 2 (7.4) 33.82*** 
Because this is the most logical response 6 (21.4) 22 (78.6) 26 (96.3) 1 (3.7) 31.67*** 
Because he or she embraces the principle of reciprocity 14 (50.0) 14 (50.0) 24 (88.9) 3 (11.1) 9.73** 
Out of moral obligation 3 (10.7) 25 (89.3) 18 (66.7) 9 (33.3) 18.23*** 
Because this is what people are taught to do 6 (21.4) 22 (78.6) 20 (74.1) 7 (25.9) 15.28*** 
Note. df = 1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
 
Discussion 
This scenario study provides further evidence that a person who offered an 
overcompensation is considered to be less morally oriented than a person who 
offered an equal compensation. Moreover, this study also suggests that, compared to 
equal compensation, overcompensation results in lower intentions to trust the 
perpetrator. 
 
Study 4 
The results of the studies described so far were all obtained on the basis of 
participants’ self-reports and scenario studies. In the present study we used a lab 
experiment to test whether these results also occur when the transgression and the 
compensation have real monetary consequences for the participants. Additionally, 
this study differs from the previous studies in two other important ways.  
First, in the previous three studies we only investigated major 
overcompensation (i.e., compensation that covered ten times the amount of the 
damage); while in this study we investigated whether these negative effects of 
overcompensation also occur when the compensation is smaller. Therefore, two 
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moderate forms of overcompensation (i.e., small overcompensation, which covered 
approximately two times the amount of the damage, and large overcompensation, 
which covered approximately six times the amount of the damage) as well as a 
control condition (i.e., no compensation) were included in this study.  
Secondly, in literature a central distinction is made between affect- and 
cognition-based trust (see McAllister, 1995). Affect-based trust (which is also 
referred to as trust “form the heart”, see Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008, p. 437) 
mainly focuses on the intrinsic virtue of the relationship itself (Rempel, Holmes, & 
Zanna, 1985); while cognition-based trust (which is also referred to as trust “from 
the head”, see Chua et al., 2008, p. 437) reflects a strategic choice that focusses on 
the benefits that the relationship may yield (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). We assume 
that the effectiveness of an overcompensation may vary depending on which aspects 
of trust it targets. Therefore, in the present study we included more calculus-based 
outcomes that tap into the cognitive aspect of trust (such as cooperation and 
relationship continuation); in addition to more relational-based outcomes which 
reflect affective trust (like perceptions and trusting intentions; see Lewis & Wiegert, 
1985; McAllister, 1995). 
Method 
Participants and design 
 A total of 68 undergraduate students of different faculties at Ghent 
University (nine men, 54 women, and five individuals who did not specify their 
gender, Mage = 21.70, SD = 2.47) participated in the study in exchange for payment. 
Unlike the previous studies, this study was a lab experiment in which we employed a 
4-level (compensation: no compensation vs. equal compensation vs. small 
overcompensation vs. large overcompensation) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
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 Upon arrival in the laboratory, each participant was placed in front of a 
computer. First, participants were told that, in order to perform a decision task, they 
would receive a starting budget of €20. Further, it was highlighted that at end of the 
experiment participants would be paid in accordance to their earnings during this 
task (whereby each euro represents 10 eurocents). The decision task was explained 
next. This task was a standard dictator game in which two players would decide over 
the division of a certain amount of money (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). To 
induce ownership over the money that was going to be divided during this task, both 
players had to cede €5 of their starting budget. During the task, the first player (the 
allocator) would then unilaterally divide this €10, while the second player (the 
recipient) could not influence this division, and thus had to accept the money offered 
by the allocator. All participants played the role of the recipient; the allocator was 
simulated. Before the start of the task, participants completed three comprehension 
checks (i.e., “Who will divide the money?”, “To what extent is the recipient able to 
influence the allocator’s decision?”, and “How much is the money in the game 
actually worth?”). All participants answered at least two checks correctly. 
Subsequently, all participants proceeded to the task in which the allocator was 
preprogrammed to allocate €2 to participant and to keep the remaining €8 for him- 
or herself. Taking into account that before the start of the task both players still had 
€15 left of their starting budget, the allocator’s decision yielded a €17 versus €23 
distribution in favor of the allocator. 
 Next, to examine whether participants perceived this division as a 
transgression, we asked participants to indicate their satisfaction with the 
distribution by selecting one of two messages to send to the allocator (i.e., “I am 
satisfied with how you divided the €10” or “I am NOT satisfied with how you 
divided the €10”). Five participants (7.4%) indicated that they were satisfied with 
the initial division, and thus did not experience it as a transgression. For these 
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participants the experiment ended at this point, whereas the remaining 63 
participants (92.6%) proceeded to the compensation manipulation. 
 Participants in the no compensation condition received no additional money 
(“I give you no extra money”), which resulted in the recipient still ending up with €2 
(or overall €17) and the allocator still ending up with €8 (or overall €23). In the 
equal compensation condition, participants received a compensation that precisely 
restored equality (“I give you €3 extra”). Thus, in this case both the allocator and 
the recipient eventually received €5 within the task itself and €20 in total. In the 
small overcompensation condition, participants received a compensation that 
resulted in the recipient ending up with a higher outcome than the allocator (“I give 
you €7 extra”). This additional compensation yielded a €9 versus €1 (or overall a 
€24 versus €16) distribution in favor of the participant. Finally, in the large 
overcompensation condition, participants received a compensation that resulted in 
the recipient ending up with a much higher outcome than the allocator (“I give you 
€17 extra”). Here, the allocator offered the €8 that he or she kept during the task as 
well as an additional €9 from his or her remaining starting budget, which eventually 
resulted in a €34 versus €6 distribution in favor of the participant.  
Next, participants completed the different measures. Thereafter, the 
experiment was stopped, and the participants were paid. All participants received 
€10 for their participation, plus the money that they earned during the decision task 
(multiplied by 0.10). This amount depended on the specific condition they were in: 
In total, in the no compensation condition, participants received €11.7 (i.e., €10 + 
[€17 × 0.10]), in the equal compensation condition €12 (i.e., €10 + [€20 × 0.10]), in 
the small overcompensation condition €12.4 (€10 + [€24 × 0.10]), and in the large 
overcompensation condition €13.4 (i.e., €10 + [€34 × 0.10]).  
Finally, the participants were debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
Measures 
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 Satisfaction with the division. To probe participants’ satisfaction with the 
final division, we used two items: “To what extent are you satisfied with the final 
division?” and “To what extent are you happy with the final division?” (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much; M = 4.74, SD = 2.02, α = .97). 
 Fairness of the division. To assess whether participants perceived the final 
division as fair, we also used two items: “To what extent do you think the final 
division is fair?” and “To what extent do you think the final division is just?” (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much; M = 3.67, SD = 2.03, α = .96). 
 Attributions of moral orientation. We used the same five attributions as in 
Study 3 (i.e., “To what extent do you think the allocator offered you an additional €0 
/ €3 / €7 / €17: because this is righteous, because this is the most logical response, 
because he or she embraces the principle of reciprocity, out of moral obligation, and 
because this is what people are taught to do”). Here, these attributions were 
measured using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; M = 3.75, 
SD = 1.48, α = .86) instead of a binary choice. 
 Perceptions of the allocator. As an indicator of participants’ perceptions of 
the allocator, we used the same seven impressions (i.e., honest, just, trustworthy, 
friendly, reliable, insincere, and unlikable) and response scales (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much) as in Study 2 (M = 4.09, SD = 1.31, α = .95). 
 Trusting intentions. In order to grasp participants’ trusting intentions 
towards the allocator in a broader form, we used ten trust items. Here, we used the 
same six trust items as in Study 3, plus an additional four trust items (which are 
based on the trust subscale of Mayer and Davis, 1999). These four additional items 
were: “If I had my way, I wouldn’t let the allocator have any influence over issues 
that are important to me”, “I am willing to let the allocator have complete power 
over my outcomes in the next round of the task”, “I wish I had a good way to keep 
an eye on the allocator”, and “I would be comfortable giving the allocator a task or 
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problem which is critical for me, even if I could not monitor his or her actions” (1 = 
certainly not agree, 7 = certainly agree; negative items reverse-coded). The ten trust 
items were aggregated into a scale measure of participants’ trusting intentions (M = 
3.44, SD = 1.09, α = .89). 
 Relationship preservation. To assess participants’ intentions to preserve the 
relationship with the allocator we used the six-item scale developed by Haesevoets 
et al. (2013). A sample item is: “I am inclined to give the allocator a second chance” 
(1 = certainly not agree, 7 = certainly agree; negative items reverse-coded; M = 
4.39, SD = 1.25, α = .91). 
 Cooperative intentions. To probe participants’ intentions to cooperate with 
the allocator again in the future we used six items (Van Hiel, De Cremer, & Stouten, 
2008). A sample item is: “I would like to cooperate with the allocator on a future 
task” (1 = certainly not agree, 7 = certainly agree; negative items reverse-coded; M 
= 4.30, SD = 1.50, α = .91). 
 Cooperative behavior. Next, before the second round of the task would start, 
participants were asked: “Do you want to change your current opponent for another 
participant?” (binary choice: 0 = yes, 1 = no; M = 0.59, SD = 0.50). After answering 
this question, participants were informed that the time available for the experiment 
was expired. 
 Manipulation check. Finally, to examine whether the compensation 
manipulation was successful, we used two items: “To what extent has the allocator 
offered you a lot of extra money” and “To what extent has the allocator offered you 
little extra money” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; second item reverse-coded; M = 
4.56, SD = 2.16, α = .94). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
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An analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of 
compensation on the manipulation check, F(3, 59) = 113.64, p < .001, η²p = .85 (see 
Table 3 for the means and standard deviations for each compensation condition).  
We explored this main effect further using five planned contrasts (see Table 
4). These contrasts revealed significant differences in the expected direction in the 
no compensation condition compared to the different compensation conditions 
(contrast 1), in the equal compensation condition compared to the two 
overcompensation conditions (contrast 2), in the equal compensation condition 
compared to the small overcompensation condition (contrast 3), and in the equal 
compensation condition compared to the large overcompensation condition (contrast 
4). However, the difference between the small overcompensation and the large 
overcompensation condition was non-significant (contrast 5). 
Effectiveness of financial compensation 
Eight one-way ANOVA’s showed significant main effects of compensation 
on satisfaction with the division, F(3, 59) = 31.19, p < .001, η²p = .61, fairness of the 
division, F(3, 59) = 127.91, p < .001, η²p = .87, attributions of moral orientation, 
F(3, 59) = 27.17, p < .001, η²p = .58, perceptions of the allocator, F(3, 59) = 16.54, p 
< .001, η²p = .46, trusting intentions, F(3, 59) = 11.79, p < .001, η²p = .38, 
relationship preservation, F(3, 59) = 9.85, p < .001, η²p = .33, cooperative intentions, 
F(3, 59) = 10.56, p < .001, η²p = .35, and cooperative behavior, F(3, 59) = 3.28, p < 
.05, η²p = .14 (see Table 3 for the means and standard deviations for each 
compensation condition). 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations for each compensation condition for Study 4.  
 
Measure Condition 
 No compensation Equal 
compensation 
Small over 
compensation 
Large over 
compensation 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Manipulation check 1.31 0.77 4.76 1.02 6.06 0.93 6.29 0.58 
Satisfaction with division 2.25 1.08 6.47 0.80 5.00 1.29 5.18 1.85 
Fairness of division 1.97 0.87 6.68 0.43 3.16 0.85 2.57 0.83 
Moral orientation 2.45 0.96 5.38 0.59 3.93 0.92 3.06 1.39 
Perceptions of allocator 2.70 1.04 5.05 0.98 4.46 0.82 4.11 1.12 
Trusting intentions 2.41 0.82 4.22 0.82 3.60 0.63 3.49 1.21 
Relationship preservation 3.17 1.40 4.89 1.10 4.80 0.68 4.71 0.84 
Cooperative intentions 2.84 1.55 5.16 1.33 4.56 0.95 4.63 1.00 
Cooperative behavior 0.31 0.48 0.82 0.39 0.62 0.50 0.57 0.51 
 
 
Again, we explored these main effects further using five planned contrasts 
for each of these measures (see Table 4). The first contrast revealed that in the no 
compensation condition participants were less satisfied with the division, perceived 
it as less fair, attributed (the absence of) the compensation to occur as a result of a 
lower level of moral orientation on the part of the allocator, perceived him or her as 
less favorable, trusted him or her less, were less inclined to preserve the relationship 
with him or her and to cooperate with him or her in the future, and displayed less 
cooperative behavior than in the other compensation conditions. Regarding the 
second contrast, in the equal compensation condition participants were more 
satisfied with the division and perceived it as fairer, attributed the compensation to 
occur as a consequence of a higher level of moral orientation on the part of the 
allocator, perceived him or her as more favorable, and trusted him or her more than 
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in the small and large overcompensation condition; whereas no such difference 
occurred for relationship preservation, cooperative intentions, and cooperative 
behavior. More specifically, the third contrast revealed that the difference between 
equal compensation and small overcompensation was significant for satisfaction, 
fairness, attributions of moral orientation, and trust; however, the difference between 
these two conditions was only marginally significant for perceptions of the allocator, 
and non-significant for relationship preservation and cooperation. Furthermore, the 
results of the fourth contrast showed that the difference between equal compensation 
and large overcompensation was significant for satisfaction, fairness, attributions of 
moral orientation, perceptions of the allocator, and trust; and non-significant for 
relationship preservation and cooperation. Finally, the last contrast showed that 
small overcompensation is perceived fairer and attributed to occur due to a higher 
level of moral orientation on the part of the allocator than large overcompensation, 
whereas no such differences between these two overcompensation conditions were 
found for the remaining measures.  
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Table 4. Contrasts tested for Study 4. 
Measure Contrast 
 Contrast 1 Contrast 2 Contrast 3 Contrast 4 Contrast 5 
 CE SE CE SE CE SE CE SE CE SE 
Manipulation check -4.39*** 0.25 -1.41*** 0.26 -1.30*** 0.30 -1.52*** 0.31 -0.22 0.31 
Satisfaction with division -3.30*** 0.37 1.38** 0.39 1.47** 0.45 1.29** 0.46 -0.18 0.47 
Fairness of division -2.17*** 0.22 3.81*** 0.23 3.52*** 0.26 4.11*** 0.27 0.59* 0.28 
Moral orientation -1.67*** 0.29 1.89*** 0.30 1.45*** 0.34 2.32*** 0.36 0.87* 0.36 
Perceptions of allocator -1.84*** 0.29 0.77* 0.30 0.60┼ 0.35 0.94* 0.36 0.34 0.36 
Trusting intentions -1.36*** 0.26 0.68* 0.27 0.62* 0.31 0.73* 0.32 0.11 0.32 
Relationship preservation -1.63*** 0.30 0.13 0.32 0.09 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.09 0.38 
Cooperative intentions -1.94*** 0.36 0.56 0.38 0.59 0.43 0.53 0.45 -0.07 0.45 
Cooperative behavior -0.36* 0.14 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.05 0.17 
Note. 
┼
 p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; CE = Contrast Estimate; SE = Standard Error; Contrast 1 = no compensation 
vs. equal compensation + small overcompensation + large overcompensation; Contrast 2 = equal compensation vs. small 
overcompensation + large overcompensation; Contrast 3 = equal compensation vs. small overcompensation; Contrast 4 = equal 
compensation vs. large overcompensation; Contrast 5 = small overcompensation vs. large overcompensation. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study provides further evidence that not only major, but also moderate 
overcompensation provokes negative outcomes (compared to equal compensation). 
That is, overcompensation is attributed to occur because of a lower level of moral 
orientation on the part of the perpetrator. Further, it results in less favorable 
perceptions of the perpetrator and lower levels of trust in the perpetrator. However, 
in addition to these results, overcompensation is just as effective as equal 
compensation to encourage relationship preservation and further cooperation.  
Taken together, our results suggest that the effectiveness of 
overcompensation may depend on the aspect of trust on which it is focused. That is, 
overcompensation seems less effective than equal compensation when we focus on 
more relational-based outcomes (like trust and perceptions); whereas 
Chapter 2 
 
 
40 
overcompensation appears to be just as effective − and thus not more effective, 
although the perpetrator makes great costs − as equal compensation for more 
calculus-based outcomes (such as cooperation and relationship preservation; see 
Lewis & Wiegert, 1985; also see McAllister, 1995). 
 
General discussion 
The occurrence of a financial damage (e.g., a damaged property or an 
unequal division of resources) violates victims’ outcome-related concerns (Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), which can lead to a host of negative 
reactions (like distrust and non-cooperation, see Bottom et al., 2002; Desmet et al., 
2011a). Prior research has demonstrated that in such an economic context, 
perpetrators can satisfy victims’ outcome-related concerns by providing a financial 
compensation (Lewicki et al., 2005; Ren & Gray, 2009). However, despite the fact 
that overcompensation occurs in many real-life situations, it has hardly been studied 
in relation to important variables like trust (restoration) and cooperation. 
Because overcompensation is associated with considerable costs for the 
perpetrator (i.e., it constitutes a financial self-sacrifice), the critical question that we 
tried to answer in this research is whether such costly compensation has beneficial 
effects in addition to the impact of equal compensation. To explore this question, we 
conducted a questionnaire study, two scenario studies, and a lab experiment in which 
the perpetrator inflicted financial harm upon the victim in the first phase of each 
study, that he or she then tried to undo by offering the victim an equal compensation 
or an overcompensation. 
Main conclusions 
The results of our studies revealed that overcompensation does not provide 
any surplus value in addition to the impact of equal compensation regarding 
relationship preservation and cooperation, and that it even provokes negative 
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outcomes in terms of perceptions and trust. This implies that trust and cooperation 
are not simply determined by the financial value of the compensation. Contrary to 
the popular belief in classic economic theory, immaterial aspects such as fairness 
and equality considerations also seem to contribute to the actual value that victims 
attach to the compensation. Hence, our findings support the notion held by many 
scholars that insights from psychology are useful, and even necessary, to understand 
people’s behavior and decisions in economic contexts (for an overview, see Leiser & 
Azar, 2008). 
In the remainder of the discussion, we further elaborate on three issues. 
First, we focus in more detail on the economic and psychological perspectives as 
point of views from which the effectiveness of overcompensation can be explained. 
Next, we pay attention to the different effects of overcompensation on trust and 
cooperation. Finally, we describe in depth some strengths and limitations of the 
present studies, and formulate some recommendations for further research. 
Economic and psychological perspectives 
The results of our studies demonstrate that overcompensation is not more 
effective than equal compensation. This result does not corroborate an economic 
perspective, which states that in monetary terms overcompensation results in the best 
possible outcome for the victim, and thus should result in the most favorable 
situation. Our findings are more in favor of a psychological perspective, which 
postulates that behavior in interpersonal relationships is not only driven by concerns 
for the magnitude of the outcome per se, but also by the degree in which the 
compensation restores equality in outcomes.  
From a first point of view, we argued that once a financial compensation is 
able to undo the victim’s financial loss, a ceiling effect might occur, which implies 
that compensation beyond the level of equal compensation should have no additional 
(positive or negative) effect. In line with this idea, the results of Study 4 revealed 
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that overcompensation is just as effective as equal compensation to promote the 
preservation of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, to increase 
victims’ intentions to cooperate with the perpetrator again in the future, and to entail 
actual cooperative behavior on the part of the victim. These results also corroborate 
the findings of a recently conducted meta-analysis in the field of consumer behavior, 
which demonstrated that overcompensation has no additional effect on post-
complaint satisfaction, beyond the impact of simple compensation (Gelbrich & 
Roschk, 2011). 
However, from a second point of view, we argued that if compensation is 
appreciated for the extent to which it redresses inequality, overcompensation should 
even be less effective than equal compensation, exactly because overcompensation 
fails to restore equality in outcomes. As a result of this inequality in favor of the 
victim, he or she may feel guilty or be suspicious about the motives of this 
perpetrator (see Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002). Indeed, our results indicate that 
overcompensation results in less satisfaction with the outcome and is perceived less 
fair than equal compensation (Study 4). Moreover, after a financial damage was 
inflicted and the perpetrator subsequently offered the victim an overcompensation, 
his or her behavior was attributed to a lower level of moral orientation than when 
this person offered an equal compensation (Studies 2 through 4). Further, 
overcompensation also leads to less favorable perceptions of the perpetrator (Studies 
2 and 4) as well as lower levels of trust in this perpetrator (Studies 3 and 4). 
However, here it is important to note that although overcompensation is not more 
effective than equal compensation, overcompensation is still more effective than no 
compensation. Thus, to enhance positive outcomes, it is still better that the 
perpetrator offers a compensation (equal or over) than no compensation at all. These 
results are consistent with the fairness literature which revealed that people prefer 
equity above both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity (i.e., inequality 
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aversion, see Engelmann & Strobel, 2004; also see Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999), and although both types of inequity results in negative emotions 
(see Walster, Walster, & Traupmann, 1978; Schafer & Keith, 1980; Rook, 1987) 
advantageous inequity is typically preferred to disadvantageous inequity 
(Loewenstein et al., 1989). Moreover, the present findings also corroborate previous 
research in the domain of service marketing that showed that overgenerosity (i.e., 
outperforming consumers’ expectations through too generous actions) may under 
certain conditions have negative effects on customers’ evaluations (Estelami & De 
Maeyer, 2002). 
To conclude, our results revealed that although overcompensation is 
associated with additional costs, it has no positive effects beyond equal 
compensation. However, an important question that arises from the current findings 
is the differential effects of overcompensation regarding relationship preservation 
and cooperation, on the one hand, and trust and perceptions, on the other hand. 
Different effects of overcompensation on trust and cooperation 
We argue that these inconsistent results regarding the effectiveness of 
overcompensation are due to the fact that we focused on different aspects of trust 
(i.e., affect- versus cognition-based trust, McAllister, 1995).  
More specifically, we reason that perceptions and trusting intentions (which 
reflect affective, relational-based outcomes informed by emotional responses to 
another person; Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006) are rooted in affect-based trust. Affect-
based trust (also referred to as trust “from the heart”, see Chua et al., 2008) is 
informed by emotional responses to the other party and thus reflects an implicit 
appraisal based on a gut feeling of another person’s “dependable goodwill” (see 
Blois, 1999, p. 200). Here, the main focus is on the relationship itself. Conversely, 
we argue that relationship preservation and cooperation (which reflect cognitive, 
calculus-based outcomes informed by careful evaluations of potential costs and 
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benefits; Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006) are grounded in cognition-based trust. 
Cognition-based trust (also referred to as “trust from the head”, see Chua et al., 
2008) is informed by the kind of careful evaluation of the trustworthiness of another 
person, and thus reflects a strategic choice based on the prospect of making a profit 
(see Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Lewis & Wiegert, 1985). Here, the main focus is not 
on the relationship itself, but on the benefits that the relationship may yield. Thus, 
when the victim has low confidence in the goodwill of the perpetrator (cf. low 
affective-based trust), the victim’s perceptions of the perpetrator will be unfavorable 
and his or her trust in the perpetrator will be low. On the contrary, even when there 
is a certain level of suspicion on the part of the victim, cooperation will be high and 
the relationship will be preserved if the possible benefits of continuing the 
relationship outweigh the costs. However, while cooperation is possible in such 
situations, this cannot be considered as “true trust” because, according to Dietz and 
Den Hartog (2006, p. 563) “a deep a priori suspicion of the other remains”. 
Despite the fact that trust and cooperation entail different effects with regard 
to overcompensation, up till now the precise relationship between trust and 
cooperation − i.e., whether trust leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust − 
remains elusive, leading theorists to disagree on the causal direction (for an 
overview, see Hardin, 2002; Macy, 2002; also see Yamagishi, Kanazawa, Mashima, 
& Terai, 2005). Moreover, although numerous scholars have argued that trust is a 
necessary ingredient for cooperation (e.g., Cook, 2001; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005), 
some authors have demonstrated that trust is not a required condition for cooperation 
to occur (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). More 
specifically, cooperation can result for a variety of reasons unrelated to trust, such as 
coercion (e.g., a court-ordered compliance) or out of financial considerations (e.g., 
the possibility of making a profit; see Mayer et al., 1995). In line with this idea, our 
results seem to suggest that cooperation can also occur even without “true 
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interpersonal trust” (i.e., a deeper form of trust which results from a process of 
mutual risk-taking over time; see Cook, Yamagishi, Cheshire, Cooper, Matsuda, & 
Mashima, 2005; also see Dietz & Den Hartog, 2006). This implies that, after 
receiving overcompensation, victims may still distrust the perpetrator but in first 
instance they are willing to continue their relationship with the perpetrator and to 
cooperate with the perpetrator again. The reason for this cooperation may, however, 
be due to self-interest and the prospect of receiving specific benefits from this 
relationship. Nonetheless, the main message behind these results is that, while 
overcompensation may rebuild cooperation (albeit not more effectively than equal 
compensation) it does so not only at monetary, but also at relational costs that limit 
its effectiveness as a tool to promote true interpersonal trust. 
Limitations and strengths 
Before closing, some limitations, strengths, and recommendations for further 
research must be discussed. First, we only used undergraduate students from a 
Belgian university as participants in our studies (although we recruited students from 
different majors). This implies that our sample is not representative of the general 
population. Consequently, when in a specific situation financial needs are high (e.g., 
when a person is bankrupt) or in other cultures (e.g., the legal claim culture in the 
United States) potentially different effects of overcompensation can be expected. 
More specifically, in such situations and cultures where there is a larger focus on 
economic considerations, overcompensation may have better effects than presently 
obtained. In accordance with this idea, research on trust in the domain of inter-
organizational relationships found that automobile dealers in Dutch firms respond 
negatively to both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, whereas in the 
United States they only respond negatively to disadvantageous inequity (Scheer, 
Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003). Further research should compare the effectiveness of 
overcompensation across different cultures. 
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Secondly, an important strength of our research is that we started with an 
open mindset (i.e., in Study 1 participants were completely free to give their own 
interpretation of the situation, and in Studies 2 through 4 we built further upon these 
attributions), used different approaches of data collection (i.e., Study 1 was a 
questionnaire study, Studies 2 and 3 were scenario studies, and Study 4 was a lab 
experiment), different transgression types (i.e., a damaged property in Studies 1 
through 3, and an unequal division of resources in Study 4), and included different 
measures (i.e., attributions in Studies 1 through 4, perceptions in Studies 2 and 4, 
trust in Studies 3 and 4, and satisfaction, fairness, relationship preservation, and 
cooperation in Study 4). This divergence in the methods used enlarges our 
confidence in the robustness of our findings. 
Finally, in our first three studies we employed a major overcompensation. 
Here, our main aim was to use a stringent test of the economic versus psychological 
perspective. However, our results indicate that even in such an extremely beneficial 
situation in economic terms, people’s perception of the perpetrator were less 
favorable and their trust in the perpetrator was lower compared to a situation in 
which the perpetrator provided an equal compensation. Nonetheless, a vital strength 
of our research is that we were able to replicate these negative effects of 
overcompensation using two moderate forms of overcompensation; and this in a lab 
experiment in which the transgression and the subsequent compensation had real 
monetary consequences for the participants.  
Conclusion 
The present studies investigated the effectiveness of overcompensation, 
relative to equal compensation. Our results revealed that despite the considerable 
costs of overcompensation, it even has negative effects on affective, relational-based 
outcomes, like perceptions and trust. Furthermore, although overcompensation does 
not have these negative effects on cognitive, calculus-based outcomes, such as 
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relationship preservation and cooperation, it does not yield better outcomes than 
equal compensation. In conclusion, if a perpetrator has inflicted a financial damage 
to a person, overcompensation is not a cost-effective means to redress the damage. 
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Chapter 3 
 
More Money, More Trust? Target and Observer 
Differences in the Effectiveness of Financial 
Overcompensation to Restore Trust 
 
Abstract 
Recent research revealed that despite its financial costs, overcompensation is not 
more effective to restore trust in the perpetrator than equal compensation. In a lab 
experiment (N = 115), we compared the effects of these compensation sizes for both 
targets of the compensation and non-involved observers. It was revealed that 
overcompensation did not yield superior outcomes than equal compensation. 
Specifically, for targets overcompensation resulted in lower levels of trust than equal 
compensation, while for observers equal compensation and overcompensation 
resulted in similar levels of trust. This finding suggests that overcompensation is not 
a cost-effective trust repair strategy, neither for the targets nor for third party 
observers. Other implications are discussed as well. 
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., Reinders Folmer, C., & Van Hiel, A. (2014). More 
money, more trust? Target and observer differences in the effectiveness of financial 
overcompensation to restore trust. Psychologica Belgica, 54, 389-394. 
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Introduction 
Trust plays a pivotal role in many aspects of our lives, as it represents a 
necessary ingredient to coordinate and smooth social relationships (Cook, 2001). 
However, people’s actions and decisions in everyday life offer numerous 
opportunities for violating trust (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006), and ample 
research has shown that such trust breaches may lead to pervasive and persistent 
negative consequences (e.g., see Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008). In 
many situations, perpetrators try to restore broken trust by the offer of a monetary 
reimbursement to the victim. Previous research regarding the effectiveness of 
financial compensation mainly explored compensation that is smaller than or 
approximately equivalent to the damage suffered. On the basis of these studies (e.g., 
see Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002; also see Desmet, De Cremer, & 
van Dijk, 2011a), it was concluded that financial compensation is an effective tool in 
restoring a victim’s trust. Some scholars have, however, argued that restoring broken 
trust may ask more from a perpetrator than just exactly restoring the damage (e.g., 
Kim et al., 2006). When the compensation offered by the perpetrator is of greater 
value than the financial loss suffered by the victim, we speak of overcompensation.  
Because overcompensation implies additional costs on top of the expenses 
of compensation that exactly covers the loss suffered (i.e., equal compensation), it is 
costly for the perpetrator, but at the same time profitable for the victim. From such 
an economic perspective it is surprising that recent research has shown that 
overcompensation does not provide any surplus value beyond the level of equal 
compensation, and that it may even provoke adverse effects. Specifically, 
overcompensation results in lower levels of trust repair and less favorable 
perceptions of the perpetrator than equal compensation (Haesevoets, Van Hiel, 
Reinders Folmer, & De Cremer, 2014). These results are consistent with fairness 
literature (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), which has shown that people prefer equal 
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outcomes (cf. equal compensation) above unequal outcomes (cf. the advantageous 
inequality that results from overcompensation; see Loewenstein, Thompson, & 
Bazerman, 1989).  
Importantly, all previous studies regarding the effectiveness of financial 
overcompensation merely focused on the target of the compensation, thereby 
overlooking the potential positive influences that overcompensation may have on 
non-involved observing parties. Indeed, perpetrators often offer victims an 
overcompensation, not only to repair their relationship with the victim, but also to 
avoid reputational damage and to positively influence the ‘general public’, like for 
instance when a company offers a dissatisfied customer a refund, a coupon, or a 
product replacement that is worth more than the original purchase price (for a meta-
analysis on this matter, see Gelbrich & Roschk, 2011). 
 In the present research, we investigated whether target-observer differences 
exist in the effectiveness of financial (over)compensation as a trust repair strategy. 
Specifically, in line with the results of Haesevoets et al. (2014) we hypothesized that 
for targets, overcompensation is less effective to repair trust than equal 
compensation (Hypothesis 1). With regard to observers, we formulated two 
competing hypotheses. According to fairness literature, people evaluate and react not 
only to the unfairness that they personally experience, but also to the fairness 
experienced by others (cf. O’Reilly & Aquino, 2011; Zhu, Martens, & Aquino, 
2012). Hence, since overcompensation fails to restore equality in outcomes, a first 
possibility is that – similar to targets − overcompensation is also less effective than 
equal compensation to repair observers’ trust (Hypothesis 2a). However, based on 
the affective forecasting literature (for an overview, see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), it 
can be expected that observers are unable to adequately forecast their reactions to 
overcompensation as they lack direct involvement, and therefore experience it 
differently than targets. More precisely, it can be argued that people have to 
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experience the advantageous inequality that overcompensation entails themselves for 
overcompensation to result in lower levels of trust. Following this reasoning, it can 
be expected that for observers overcompensation has no positive nor negative effects 
and thus results in similar levels of trust as equal compensation (Hypothesis 2b).  
 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred fifteen undergraduate students at Ghent University (75% 
female, Mage = 19.05, SD = 1.74) participated in an experiment for course credits. 
We employed a 2 (perspective: target versus observer) × 3 (compensation size: no 
compensation versus equal compensation versus overcompensation) between-
subjects design.  
Procedure 
 Participants were invited in groups of 12 persons. Upon arrival in the 
laboratory, participants were informed they would participate in a decision task. It 
was explained that in this task an allocator and a recipient must decide over the 
division of a certain amount of money. In the target conditions, participants were 
told that they would play this task in the role of recipient with another player present 
in the lab who would be assigned to the role of allocator. In the observer conditions, 
participants learnt that they would observe a task that takes place between two other 
players (i.e., an allocator and a recipient) who were present in the lab.  
 Before the start of the task, all participants received a budget of €20. To 
induce a sense of ownership over the money that was going to be divided during the 
task, both the allocator and the recipient (but not the observer) had to cede €5 of 
their budget. The allocator would then unilaterally divide this €10. The recipient 
could not influence this division, and thus had to accept the money offered by the 
allocator. The trust violation was operationalized by means of an unfair allocation of 
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the resources. That is, the allocator was preprogrammed to allocate €1 to recipient 
and to keep the remaining €9 for him- or herself.  
To examine whether this division is perceived as a transgression by the 
recipient, we asked participants in the target conditions to indicate their satisfaction 
with the distribution by selecting one of two messages to send to the allocator (i.e., 
“I am satisfied with how you divided the money” or “I am not satisfied with how 
you divided the money”). In the observer conditions, participants observed the 
recipient sending the message that he or she was not satisfied with the division. In 
the target conditions, four participants (3.5%) indicated that they were satisfied with 
the division, and thus did not experience it as a transgression. For these participants 
the experiment ended at this point. The remaining 111 participants (96.5%) 
proceeded to the compensation size manipulation. 
 In the target conditions, the participants themselves received or did not 
receive compensation from the allocator, while in the observer conditions the 
participants observed another person (i.e., the recipient) receiving compensation (or 
not). In the no compensation conditions, the allocator did not give additional money 
to the recipient. In the equal compensation conditions, the allocator gave the 
recipient €4 extra. Finally, in the overcompensation conditions, the allocator offered 
the recipient an additional €14 (for a more detailed description of this procedure, see 
Haesevoets et al., 2014).  
Measures 
Trust 
Participants’ trust in the allocator was measured using the six item trust scale 
of Desmet et al. (2011b). A sample item is: “I trust the allocator” (1 = totally 
disagree, 7 = totally agree; α = .87).  
Manipulation checks 
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To examine whether the perspective manipulation was successful, we used 
two items: “To what extent were you the recipient of the compensation?” and “To 
what extent was another person than you the recipient of the compensation?”. 
Moreover, to investigate the effectiveness of the compensation size manipulation, 
participants were asked: “To what extent was the compensation greater than the 
damage caused by the unequal division of the allocator?”. These three manipulation 
checks were all measured on a scale form 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
First, we tested the effectiveness of the perspective manipulation using two 
one-sample t tests. The results for the first manipulation check revealed that for the 
target conditions the sample mean of 4.80 (SD = 1.62) significantly deviates from 
the scale’s theoretical midpoint, t(55) = 3.71, p < .001. Similarly, for the second 
manipulation check the analysis revealed that for the observer conditions the sample 
mean of 4.58 (SD = 1.61) also significantly differs from the value of 4, t(54) = 2.69, 
p = .01. The effectiveness of the compensation size manipulation was subsequently 
tested using a 2 (perspective) × 3 (compensation size) ANOVA. As expected, 
participants indicated more often that the compensation was greater than the damage 
caused by the unequal division in the overcompensation conditions (M = 6.34, SD = 
0.97) than in the equal compensation conditions (M = 2.26, SD = 1.41) and the no 
compensation conditions (M = 1.44, SD = 0.89), F(2, 105) = 180.14, p < .001, η²p = 
.77. A post hoc test (LSD) showed that the mean scores of the three compensation 
sizes significantly differ from each other (all ps < .005). The main effect of 
perspective and the interaction effect of perspective × compensation size were non-
significant, F(1, 105) = 0.40, p = .531, η²p = .00 and F(2, 105) = 0.22, p = .806, η²p 
= .00, respectively. 
TARGET - OBSERVER DIFFERENCES IN OVERCOMPENSATION 
 
63 
Trust 
A 2 (perspective) × 3 (compensation size) ANOVA on the trust scale 
showed a non-significant main effect of perspective, F(1, 105) = 0.01, p = .94, η²p = 
.00, a significant main effects of compensation size, F(2, 105) = 30.69, p < .001, η²p 
= .37, and a significant interaction effect of perspective × compensation size, F(2, 
105) = 4.76, p = .011, η²p = .08. This interaction effect was further explored using 
planned comparisons. Within both the target and the observer conditions, a 
significant effect of compensation size emerged, F(2, 105) = 27.19, p < .001, η²p = 
.34 and F(2, 105) = 8.39, p < .001, η²p = .14, respectively. Specifically, for both 
targets and observers, equal compensation (M = 4.51, SD = 0.79 and M = 3.80, SD = 
0.96, respectively) and overcompensation (M = 3.51, SD = 0.97 and M = 3.80, SD = 
0.79, respectively) resulted in higher levels of trust (both ps < .001) compared to no 
compensation (M = 2.31, SD = 1.02 and M = 2.69, SD = 0.69, respectively). Further, 
in line with Hypothesis 1, overcompensation is less effective to repair trust (p < 
.001) than equal compensation for targets. Moreover, as predicted by Hypothesis 2b 
(and opposite to the predictions made in the competing Hypotheses 2a), for 
observers no significant difference (p = .986) between equal and overcompensation 
occurred. Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations for each condition.  
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for each condition (N = 111). 
Compensation size Perspective 
 Target Observer Total 
 M SD M SD M SD 
No compensation 2.31 1.02 2.69 0.69 2.51 0.87 
Equal compensation 4.51 0.79 3.80 0.96 4.17 0.94 
Overcompensation 3.51 0.97 3.80 0.79 3.65 0.88 
Total 3.66 1.24 3.51 0.96 3.59 1.11 
 
 
Discussion 
We replicated the finding of Haesevoets et al. (2014) that despite its 
considerable costs for the perpetrator and its profitability for the victim, 
overcompensation has negative effects on the target’s trust in the perpetrator 
(Hypothesis 1). Moreover, we also supplement the current literature by showing that 
for non-involved observing parties, overcompensation is neither more (nor less) 
effective than equal compensation to re-establish broken trust (Hypothesis 2b). The 
latter result can possibly be ascribed to the inability of observers to accurately 
predict their reaction towards overcompensation (see the affective forecasting 
literature; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), which seems to align with the idea that people 
must experience the inequality that results from overcompensation themselves for it 
to result in a decrease of trust. However, although overcompensation does not entail 
adverse effects, it also has no additional effect on top of equal compensation in 
terms of perceived trustworthiness among observing parties. Our results therefore 
show that overcompensation is not a cost-effective tool to repair broken trust, 
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certainly not for the target of overcompensation, but neither for members of the 
public.  
 An important recommendation for further research is to investigate whether 
these findings also emerge in the context of customer services, as financial 
compensation is one of the most widely used strategies in service and product 
recovery (Davidow, 2003). Previous research in this domain has shown that after a 
product failure, overcompensation has few, if any, positive effects on the target of 
the compensation (i.e., the dissatisfied customer; see the meta-analysis of Gelbrich 
& Roschk, 2011). However, despite the absence of positive effects of 
overcompensation on targets, companies may generously reimburse dissatisfied 
customers by providing overcompensation in order to positively influence the 
general public’s image of the company, like through the creation of positive word-
of-mouth which can in turn attract new customers. In this vein, it is surprisingly that, 
at least to our knowledge, no previous research in the domain of customer services 
investigated whether overcompensation has indeed positive effects on observing 
third parties. However, if our finding that overcompensation as a means to resolve a 
transgression at the interpersonal level entails no positive consequences − not for 
targets nor for observers − would also apply to consumer settings, companies should 
critically assess the use of financial overcompensation as a restoration strategy for a 
product or service failure. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of 
Financial Compensation for Repairing 
Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust 
Violations 
 
Abstract 
Despite the popularity of financial compensation as a means for addressing trust 
violations, the question whether (more) money can indeed buy trust back remains 
largely unexplored. In the present research, we focus on the role of violation type 
and compensation size. The results of a scenario study and a lab experiment show 
that financial compensation can effectively promote the restoration of trust for 
transgressions that indicate a lack of competence. Conversely, for transgressions 
which signal a lack of integrity, financial compensation is not an effective tool to 
repair trust. Moreover, our findings indicate that for both violation types, 
overcompensation has no positive effects on top of the impact of equal 
compensation. These findings therefore show that when it comes to trust, money 
cannot buy everything.  
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., Reinders Folmer, C., & Van Hiel, A. (2015). Is trust for 
sale? The effectiveness of financial compensation for repairing competence- versus integrity-
based trust violations. PLoS ONE, 10(12), e0145952. 
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Introduction 
The issue of trust has been on the forefront of research agendas across a 
variety of disciplines in social sciences including psychology, management, 
organizational behavior, economics, and law (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; 
Kramer & Lewicki, 2010; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). This 
multidisciplinary approach highlights the pivotal role that trust plays in many 
aspects of our lives, as it is part of a social glue which is essential for making us the 
social animal that we are (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). In fact, almost any social 
decision or exchange that we engage in includes some sort of trust evaluation, either 
towards a person, an organization, or even society as a whole. Trust thus represents a 
necessary ingredient to coordinate and smoothen various types of social 
relationships (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 2007).  
Given the pervasiveness of trust in our daily lives, surprisingly few studies 
have focused on how trust can be violated and subsequently be repaired. In many 
situations that involve material harm, a common restorative approach for 
perpetrators is to offer victims a monetary compensation (see Desmet, De Cremer, & 
Van Dijk, 2011a; also see Davidow, 2003; Worsfold, Worsfold, & Bradley, 2007). 
In the present contribution, we examine if trust violations that reflect a lack of 
competence or a lack of integrity can be repaired by means of a financial 
compensation. In addition, we investigate whether these two violation types require 
different levels of compensation (i.e., equal compensation or overcompensation) to 
effectively repair trust. 
Why trust matters 
A common understanding has grown that “trust is a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of 
the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395). The presence 
of trust has been shown to offer numerous benefits (for a meta-analytic review, see 
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Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). For example, trust has been linked to love and happiness in 
close relationships (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Moreover, it also establishes 
effective work relationships, promotes organizational commitment and performance, 
positively influences cooperation, and leads to lower turnover intentions (Costigan, 
Insinga, Berman, Kranas,
 
& Kureshov, 2012; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Dirks & 
Ferrin, 2001; Lee, Stajkovic, & Cho, 2011; Sousa-Lima, Michel, & Caetano, 2013).  
Although numerous researchers have focused on the positive consequences 
that emerge if trust is present, hardly any attention has been devoted to the 
psychology of moving from a state of distrust to a state of regained trust (i.e., trust 
restoration; De Cremer & Desmet, 2012). This gap in the literature is regretful, 
particularly because people’s actions and decisions in everyday life offer numerous 
opportunities for violating trust (e.g., romantic betrayal or a friend who does not 
repay a loan; see Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002; Kim, Dirks, 
Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, 
& Bradlow, 2006). Acknowledging the fact that such violations lead to a host of 
negative outcomes regarding emotions (such as anger, sadness, and wounded pride; 
see Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2013; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) and behavior 
(like revenge-seeking behavior, verbal aggression, and decreased cooperation; see 
Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bottom et al., 2002; Haden & Hojjat, 2006), it seems crucial to 
develop a better understanding of how trust can be violated and if and how violated 
trust can be successfully repaired. 
The violation of trust 
  Prior research has demonstrated that when trust gets violated, people are 
motivated to seek explanations for this violation (Blount, 1995; Stouten, De Cremer, 
& Van Dijk, 2006). In this regard, scholars have made an important distinction 
between two explanations that can underlie the same trust violation. More 
specifically, a particular trust violation can often be ascribed to either a lack of 
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competence or a lack of integrity (see Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Kim et 
al., 2004, 2006; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; also see Janowicz-Panjaitan & 
Krishnan, 2009; Xie & Peng, 2009). Competence-related trust violations occur when 
a perpetrator violates the positive expectations that another person or group has 
about the perpetrator’s technical and interpersonal skills required to perform a 
certain task (see Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Integrity-related 
trust violations, on the contrary, arise when a perpetrator adheres to a set of moral 
principles that are considered as unacceptable by another person or group, such as 
lying and cheating (Kim et al., 2004, 2006; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 2007). 
Research has revealed that competence and integrity violations are distinct 
bases for determining trustworthiness (Barber, 1983; Butler & Cantrell, 1984), 
which reflect differently on the perpetrator. Specifically, although a single 
competence violation may have unpleasant consequences, it is generally not 
perceived as a reliable signal of a lack of competence, let alone a lack of overall 
reliability. Conversely, a single lapse of integrity signals the absence of general 
integrity, and thus automatically reflects badly on the perpetrator (see Kim et al., 
2004, 2006). An explanation for these observations has been offered by the model of 
dispositional attribution of Reeder and Brewer (1979). According to this model, a 
single poor performance does not necessarily signal incompetence given that both 
competent and incompetent people can behave poorly in certain situations, while a 
single dishonest behavior is considered a reliable signal of the absence of integrity, 
given the belief that only people of low integrity will behave in dishonest ways. 
Following this reasoning, the violation type (i.e., competence versus integrity) 
influences the victim’s perception of the perpetrator’s trustworthiness, and is thus 
likely to play a key role in determining if and how broken trust can effectively be 
repaired. 
The repair of trust 
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Previous research of perpetrators’ attempts to restore broken trust (for an 
overview, see Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009) largely focused on verbal accounts such 
as apologies, promises, excuses, and denials (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004, 
2006; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004; Schweitzer at al., 2006). In this regard, 
the studies of Ferrin et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2004, 2006) revealed that the 
violation type indeed plays a crucial role in determining whether these strategies are 
effective to repair broken trust. Specifically, apologies are most effective after a 
competence-based trust violation. When the transgression reflects a lack of integrity, 
attributing blame to external factors by offering an excuse or a denial generates the 
best outcomes. However, the latter strategies pose great risks if the perpetrator’s 
culpability is subsequently revealed.  
Given that there is nothing tangible to lend credibility to such verbal 
response strategies, scholars have argued that they may be discounted by victims as 
“cheap talk” (Bottom et al., 2002), and this should especially be the case when the 
trust violation results in monetary loss for the victim, which verbal responses do not 
redress. In such situations, actions may speak louder than words. Accordingly, a 
non-verbal response, such as the offer of a financial compensation, may be necessary 
to validate and strengthen the claim that the perpetrator will behave trustworthy in 
the future (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011). Compensations are frequently 
employed in a wide range of interpersonal and social relationships; for example, 
when we repay a colleague for a borrowed book that we lost or when a company 
reimburses a customer for a dissatisfactory product. 
Previous research has indicated that financial compensation can be an 
effective tool for restoring a victim’s trust (e.g., see Bottom et al., 2002; Desmet, De 
Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, & Van 
Hiel, 2014; Haesevoets, Van Hiel, Reinders Folmer, & De Cremer, 2014; also see 
DeCarufel, 1981; Worsfold et al., 2007). But, does the effectiveness of financial 
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compensation depend on the type of violation? And how much should we 
compensate to repair trust after such violations? Concerning this latter question, a 
calculative view on trust assumes that larger compensation should foster more trust 
(Lewicki, Wiethoff, & Tomlinson, 2005); but some recent studies revealed that this 
is not always the case. More specifically, relative to equal compensation (i.e., 
compensation that exactly covers the loss suffered by a victim), some studies 
reported positive effects of overcompensation (i.e., compensation that is greater than 
the loss suffered by a victim), while other studies reported neutral or even negative 
effects (see Desmet et al., 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, De 
Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013; Haesevoets, Van Hiel, et al., 2014). In the present 
contribution, we test the effectiveness of monetary compensation as a means to 
repair trust in the aftermath of a financial harm by taking into account both the 
violation type (competence versus integrity) and the compensation size (equal 
compensation versus overcompensation). 
Hypotheses 
In the present studies, participants were presented a financial situation in 
which a monetary loss had been suffered. We hypothesized that the positive impact 
of financial compensation will be a function of a combination of whether this loss 
can be attributed to the perpetrator’s competence or integrity and the size of the 
compensation. 
More specifically, when the violation can be ascribed to a lack of 
competence, the wrongdoing is not indicative that the perpetrator is a bad person, 
because anyone can display such a low performance level under certain 
circumstances (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Therefore, undoing the 
monetary loss should be sufficient to restore trust, and little benefit would arise from 
additional financial restitution. Hence, we hypothesized that after a competence 
violation, both equal compensation and overcompensation are more effective to 
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repair trust than no compensation (Hypothesis 1a). In addition, we predicted that 
overcompensation has no supplementary value beyond the level of equal 
compensation (Hypothesis 1b).  
On the contrary, when the violation can be attributed to a lack of integrity, 
the wrongdoing signals that the perpetrator is a bad person, because only people who 
fall short on certain moral values will display such dishonest behavior (Ferrin et al., 
2007; Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Therefore, we expected that only undoing the 
financial damage is not sufficient to restore trust. We thus hypothesized that after an 
integrity fault, equal compensation is not more effective than no compensation 
(Hypothesis 2a). With regard to the effectiveness of overcompensation, we 
formulate two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, after an integrity violation, 
the perpetrator may show his or her goodwill by going the extra mile and showing 
self-sacrifice by offering the victim compensation beyond the level of equal 
compensation. Following this rationale, overcompensation should be more effective 
than both no compensation and equal compensation (Hypothesis 2b). On the other 
hand, an integrity violation might reflect so badly on the perpetrator that even 
overcompensation will not be effective to repair trust. Following this perspective, 
overcompensation can be expected to be as ineffective as no compensation and equal 
compensation (Hypothesis 2c). 
Present studies 
We tested our hypotheses in two studies. In both studies, we employed a 
financial context in which participants observed a perpetrator who inflicted a 
monetary loss to a victim by either a lack of competence or a lack of integrity, which 
he or she subsequently tried to undo by financially compensating the victim. Trust 
was operationalized in terms of intentions and behavior. The first study was a 
scenario study in which participants imagined how they would react to a perpetrator 
who offered no compensation, equal compensation, or overcompensation to his or 
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her victim. In Study 2, we conducted a lab experiment to test whether our results 
could be cross-validated by actual trusting behavior. The perpetrator was presented 
as unknown to the participant in the scenario study, whereas in the lab experiment 
this person was framed as a classmate. 
 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 141 US citizens (90 men and 51 women; Mage = 35.43, SD = 
10.81), recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed a scenario study in 
exchange for $0.5. Fourteen participants (9.9%) failed on our check questions and 
were thus excluded from further analyses. We employed a 2 (violation type: 
competence versus integrity) × 3 (compensation size: no compensation versus equal 
compensation versus overcompensation) between-subjects design. 
Procedure 
Participants read a short scenario which presented them with two persons: 
Person A and Person B. In both violation type conditions, participants were told that 
Person A inflicted Person B a monetary loss of $100. In the competence condition, 
this loss was attributed to insufficient skills on part of Person A; while in the 
integrity condition, the loss was ascribed to insincere behavior on part of Person A. 
Subsequently, in the no compensation condition, Person A did not financially 
compensate Person B for the inflicted loss; in the equal compensation condition, 
Person A offered Person B a financial compensation of $100; and in the 
overcompensation condition, the compensation amounted $150. 
Measures 
Participants’ trusting intentions towards Person A were measured using the 
six item trust scale developed by Desmet and colleagues (2011b). Particularly, we 
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asked participants: “I trust Person A”, “I think Person A can be trusted”, “I think 
Person A means well for others”, “I have no trust in Person A”, “I think Person A 
would deceive others if he or she would benefit from it”, and “I think Person A 
would lie to others if he or she would gain from it” (last three items reverse-coded; 1 
= certainly not agree, 7 = certainly agree). The scores on these six items were 
combined into a general measure of trust towards Person A (M = 3.05, SD = 1.90, α 
= .96). 
To examine whether the violation type manipulation was successful, we 
asked participants: “To what extent could the financial loss be attributed to a lack of 
competence? (competence manipulation check)” and “To what extent could the 
financial loss be attributed to a lack of integrity? (integrity manipulation check)” (1 
= not at all, 7 = very much). To investigate whether the compensation size 
manipulation was successful, we asked participants: “Did Person A offer Person B a 
financial compensation?” (no / yes) and “If yes, how does this compensation relate 
to the inflicted loss?” (1 = compensation equals the loss, 7 = compensation is larger 
than the loss). 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
We tested the effectiveness of the violation type manipulation using a 2 
(violation type) × 3 (compensation size) ANOVA for both violation type 
manipulation checks. The results showed that participants in the competence 
condition attributed the violation more to a lack of competence (M = 6.35, SD = 
0.85) than participants in the integrity condition (M = 2.41, SD = 1.86), F(1, 121) = 
236.51, p < .001, η²p = .66. Similarly, participants in the integrity condition 
attributed the violation more to be a lack of integrity (M = 6.58, SD = 1.04) than 
participants in the competence condition (M = 2.35, SD = 1.48), F(1, 121) = 351.81, 
p < .001, η²p = .74. Moreover, a 2 (violation type) × 2 (compensation size) ANOVA 
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on the compensation size manipulation check showed that participants in the 
overcompensation condition rated the compensation as larger (M = 6.69, SD = 0.68) 
than participants in the equal compensation condition (M = 1.50, SD = 1.52), F(1, 
76) = 394.93, p < .001, η²p = .84. For both the violation type manipulation checks 
and the compensation size manipulation check, the other main and interaction effects 
were non-significant (all Fs < 2.24).  
Trusting intentions 
A 2 (violation type) × 3 (compensation size) ANOVA on the trust scale 
showed significant main effects of violation type, F(1, 121) = 216.53, p < .001, η²p = 
.64, and compensation size, F(2, 121) = 26.47, p < .001, η²p = .30. These main 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction between violation type and 
compensation size, F(2, 121) = 11.10, p < .001 , η²p = .16. To test our hypotheses, 
this significant interaction effect was further explored using simple effects tests 
(with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons). Figure 1 visually displays 
this interaction term.  
Within the competence condition, there was a significant effect of 
compensation size, F(2, 121) = 34.89, p < .001, η²p = .37. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 1a, after a competence violation, equal compensation (M = 5.03, SD = 
1.28) and overcompensation (M = 5.42, SD = 1.08) were both more effective for 
repairing trust than no compensation (M = 2.95, SD = 1.30; both ps < .001). Further, 
in agreement with Hypothesis 1b, the difference between overcompensation and 
equal compensation was non-significant after a competence violation (p = .709). 
Within the integrity condition, there is no significant effect of compensation size, 
F(2, 121) = 1.85, p = .162, η²p = .03. In agreement with Hypothesis 2a, after an 
integrity violation, equal compensation (M = 1.93, SD = 0.93) was not more 
effective than no compensation (M = 1.37, SD = 0.62) to repair trust (p = .25). 
Moreover, as predicted by Hypothesis 2c (and opposite to the predictions made in 
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the competing Hypothesis 2b), overcompensation (M = 1.84, SD = 0.98) was not 
more effective than no compensation (p = .416) and equal compensation (p > .999) 
to repair trust after an integrity violation. 
 
Figure 1. Trusting intentions as a function of violation type and compensation size in Study 1. 
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Discussion 
This study provides initial evidence that when trust gets violated by a 
competence-related violation, it can effectively be repaired by financial 
compensation, and that the size of the compensation (i.e., equal compensation or 
overcompensation) does not affect the degree of trust repair. On the other hand, after 
an integrity-related violation, financial compensation is not an effective tool to repair 
trust. In the next study, we use a lab experiment to test whether these results also 
occur when we focus on trusting behavior instead of trusting intentions. 
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Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 137 undergraduate psychology students at Ghent University, 
Belgium (35 men, 102 women; Mage = 18.73, SD = 2.72), participated in a lab 
experiment in exchange for course credits. Again, a 2 (violation type: competence 
versus integrity) × 3 (compensation size: no compensation versus equal 
compensation versus overcompensation) between-subjects design was employed. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was placed in front of a 
computer. Participants learned that they were connected to another classmate present 
in the lab, this person was referred to as Player A. Participants observed Player A 
during his or her interaction with another classmate, who was referred to as Player 
B. During this interaction, Player A violated Player B’s trust through either a 
competence or an integrity fault, and consequently offered this player no 
compensation, equal compensation, or overcompensation. To be able to manipulate 
these concepts, both players were preprogrammed, unbeknownst to participants. 
Specifically, during the experiment participants observed Player A as he or 
she completed two stages of an experimental task. This task was a puzzle task in 
which Player A could earn money by solving mathematical puzzles (cf. Mazar, 
Amir, & Ariely, 2008). During the first stage of the task, Players A and B would 
perform the puzzle task individually, thereby earning money for themselves. In the 
second stage, Players A and B would perform the puzzle task for each other, earning 
money for their counterpart. Participants observed Player A during both stages, thus 
observing his or her performance for him- or herself (in stage 1) and his or her 
performance for Player B (in stage 2). In this context, the violation type was 
manipulated, as was the level of compensation.  
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Player A’s level of performance during both stages constituted our 
manipulation of violation type. In the competence condition, participants observed 
Player A solving only a few puzzles in both stages (i.e., poor performance both 
when benefiting oneself in stage 1 and when benefiting Player B in stage 2). In the 
integrity condition, participants observed Player A solving all puzzles during the 
first stage, but only a few in the second stage (i.e., excellent performance for oneself 
in stage 1, poor performance for Player B in stage 2). In either case, this poor 
performance of Player A in the second stage meant that when the outcomes of the 
task were unveiled after the completion of both stages, Player A had solved less 
puzzles for Player B than vice versa. As a result of this poor performance, Player A 
had inflicted a monetary loss on Player B, as Player B received €3 less than he or she 
had earned for Player A.  
In response to this outcome, participants observed electronic communication 
between the two players, in which Player A blamed the poor outcomes that he or she 
attained for Player B to “poor skill at this type of task”. In light of Player A’s 
performance for him- or herself during stage 1 (allegedly unknown to Player B, but 
observed by the participant), this claim was truthful in the competence condition 
(where Player A attained poor outcomes in both stages), making it a competence 
violation; but false in the integrity condition (where Player A did attain good 
outcomes for oneself, but not for Player B), making it an integrity violation. Note 
that the puzzles were equally difficult in both stages. Although making a lesser effort 
for someone other than oneself can be justified, lying about this makes it a clear 
integrity violation. 
Upon completion of the task, the outcomes of both stages were unveiled, 
exposing Player A’s actual performance level, and the veracity of his or her claim. In 
response, the manipulation of compensation size was implemented, with Player A 
providing Player B no compensation (in the no compensation condition), a 
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compensation of €3 (in the equal compensation condition), or a compensation of €9 
(in the overcompensation condition). 
Measures 
We employed a behavioral measure of participants’ trust in Player A. 
Participants learned that after completion of the task, they had to take part in a 
second study, in which they would perform an (unrelated) dyadic task. It was 
explicitly stated that this additional task did not require mathematical skills. For this 
unrelated task, they were offered the choice between two possible interaction 
partners: Player A, whom they had just observed (choice which reflects trust in 
Person A) or Player B, the other player who was victimized and subsequently 
compensated by Player A (choice which reflects no trust in Person A). Specifically, 
we asked participants: “Which player would you prefer to complete the second study 
with?” (Player A / Player B). 
To examine whether the violation type manipulation was successful, we 
asked participants: “To what extent shows Player A’s behavior competence? 
(competence manipulation check)” and “To what extent shows Player A’s behavior 
integrity? (integrity manipulation check)”(1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Next, to 
investigate whether the compensation size manipulation was successful, we asked 
participants: “To what extent did Player A offer Player B a lot of extra money?” (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much). 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
We tested the effectiveness of our manipulations using a 2 (violation type) × 
3 (compensation size) ANOVA for each manipulation check. The analysis on the 
competence manipulation check showed that participants in the competence 
condition indicated less that Player A’s behavior demonstrates competence (M = 
3.26, SD = 1.39) than participants in the integrity condition (M = 4.72, SD = 1.78), 
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F(1, 131) = 29.77, p < .001, η²p = .19. Similarly, the analysis on the integrity 
manipulation check revealed that participants in the integrity condition indicated less 
that Player A’s behavior demonstrates integrity (M = 3.33, SD = 1.41) compared to 
participants in the competence condition (M = 4.14, SD = 0.82), F(1, 131) = 16.75, p 
< .001, η²p = .11. Finally, the analysis on the compensation size manipulation check 
showed a significant main effect of compensation size, F(2, 131) = 27.74, p < .001, 
η²p = .30. A post hoc test (Bonferroni) showed that participants indicated more often 
that Player A offered Player B a lot of extra money in the overcompensation 
condition (M = 6.04, SD = 0.87) than in the equal compensation condition (M = 
4.76, SD = 1.25), as well as in the equal compensation condition compared to the no 
compensation condition (M = 3.22, SD = 2.76; all ps < .003). For all three 
manipulation checks, the other main and interaction effects were non-significant (all 
Fs < 2.76).  
Trusting behavior 
A logistic regression analysis with violation type, compensation size, and the 
interaction of violation type × compensation size as predictor variables and trusting 
behavior as dependent variable yielded a significant overall interaction effect (Wald 
= 6.24, p = .044). The percentages of participants who chose to complete the next 
task with Player A (choice which reflects trust) per condition are displayed in Figure 
2. Our hypotheses predicted a specific pattern in the effectiveness of compensation 
size on the willingness to trust the perpetrator. In order to test these patterns we 
employed dummy coded variables for our compensation size variable as this is a 
three-level nominal variable. 
Logistic regression analyses using these dummy coded variables yielded an 
almost significant interaction effect between violation type and the dummy that 
contrasted equal compensation with no compensation (Wald = 3.01, p = .083), a 
significant interaction effect between violation type and the dummy contrasting 
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overcompensation to no compensation (Wald = 5.46, p = .019), and a non-
significant interaction effect between violation type and the dummy that contrasted 
overcompensation with equal compensation (Wald = 0.65, p = .421). To further 
explore these interaction effects, we relied on simple slope analyses.  
In line with Hypothesis 1a, participants in the competence condition were 
more inclined to trust Player A when he or she provided Player B an equal 
compensation compared to no compensation (B = 1.60, SE = 0.66, Wald = 5.94, p = 
.015), or an overcompensation compared to no compensation (B = 2.61, SE = 0.85, 
Wald = 9.43, p = .002). As predicted by Hypothesis 1b, the difference between equal 
compensation and overcompensation was non-significant after a competence 
violation (B = 1.02, SE = .90, Wald = 1.29, p = .256). Moreover, in agreement with 
Hypothesis 2a, participants in the integrity condition were not more inclined to trust 
Player A when he or she provided Player B an equal compensation compared to no 
compensation (B < 0.001, SE = 0.65, Wald = 0.00, p > .999). Finally, in accordance 
with Hypothesis 2c (and contrary to the predictions made in the competing 
Hypothesis 2b), after an integrity violation, participants were not more inclined to 
trust Player A when he or she provided Player B an overcompensation compared to 
no compensation (B = 0.13, SE = 0.63, Wald = 0.04, p = .833), or an 
overcompensation compared to an equal compensation (B = 0.13, SE = 0.63, Wald = 
0.04, p = .833). 
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Figure 2. Percentage of participants who chose to complete the next task with Player A 
(choice that reflects trust) as a function of violation type and compensation size in Study 2. 
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Discussion 
This study extends Study 1 by indicating that our findings replicate in actual 
trusting behavior. In particular, financial compensation is an effective tool to repair 
trust after a competence-based trust violation, but not after an integrity-based trust 
violation. Furthermore, the results show that after both violation types, providing 
compensation beyond the level of equal compensation is not cost-effective.  
 
General discussion 
Although trust is a vital ingredient of social relationships, it is not 
uncommon that people violate trust, and subsequently try to restore it (Kim et al., 
2004, 2006). In case of harm that can be quantified financially, perpetrators can try 
repair broken trust by offering a monetary compensation to the victim. The 
contribution of the present studies is twofold. First, we tested whether the 
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effectiveness of financial compensation as a means to repair trust is dependent on 
the violation type. Secondly, for both competence and integrity violations, we 
examined whether larger compensation entails higher levels of restored trust. 
Main conclusions 
Both of our studies showed that after a competence-based trust violation, 
equal compensation and overcompensation are more effective to repair trust 
compared to no compensation (Hypothesis 1a). This result is congruent with 
traditional justice models which suggest that when the harm is unintended − which is 
often the case with competence violations − monetary compensation “evens the 
score” and is thus viewed as an appropriate way to redress the inflicted harm 
(Austin, Walster, & Utne, 1976; Brickman, 1977). Moreover, as predicted by 
Hypothesis 1b, overcompensation was not more effective than equal compensation 
to restore trust in the aftermath of a competence violation. This finding corroborates 
previous research that found that once the financial harm is undone, people benefit 
little from additional financial restitutions (Haesevoets et al., 2013; Haesevoets, Van 
Hiel, et al., 2014). Thus, our studies showed that after a competence-based trust 
violation which resulted in a financially re-compensable harm, trust can effectively 
be repaired by financial compensation and the degree of trust repair is not affected 
by the size of the compensation. 
 With regard to integrity violations, however, equal compensation is not 
more effective than no compensation (Hypothesis 2a). These results corroborate 
studies in restorative justice research which revealed that people do not consider the 
provision of a compensation as satisfactory when the harm is inflicted intentionally 
(Darley & Pittman, 2003; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997), which is mostly 
the case with integrity violations. With regard to the effectiveness of 
overcompensation, we formulated two competing hypotheses. As predicted by 
Hypothesis 2c (and contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis 2b) our results revealed 
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that overcompensation is not more effective than no compensation and equal 
compensation. Our results thus extend restorative justice research by showing that in 
response to an integrity-based trust violation, overcompensation is also not effective 
in repairing trust. 
In the remainder of the discussion, we further elaborate on four issues. First, 
we pay attention to the economic and psychological perspectives on trust repair. 
Secondly, we clarify why financial compensation is effective after a competence-
based trust violation, but ineffective after an integrity-based trust violation. Next, we 
address the question if trust can at all be repaired after an integrity fault. Finally, we 
describe some strengths, limitations, and recommendations for future research. 
Economic versus psychological perspectives on trust repair 
Our findings contrast sharply with the calculative view on trust, which 
assumes that when a trust violation results in a monetary loss, trust repair will 
mainly be driven by the outcome that the financial compensation entails (Lewicki et 
al., 2005). Following such an economic perspective, overcompensation results in the 
best possible outcome for the victim, and should thus cause the highest levels of 
trust (cf. Desmet et al., 2011a). However, psychological models have postulated that 
even in financial situations, trust is not only driven by concerns for tangible 
outcomes, but also by non-material concerns (such as justice and fairness 
considerations; see Haesevoets, Van Hiel, et al., 2014; Okimoto & Tyler, 2007). 
Our results confirmed the psychological perspective that, even in a purely 
financial context, “not only money matter”. First, the provision of a financial 
compensation did not always facilitate trust repair. More specifically, its impact was 
non-significant in situations where the violation was due to a lack of integrity. 
Secondly, the present findings highlight that compensating victims beyond the actual 
financial harm has no additional value for re-establishing trust after both competence 
and integrity violations. Hence, our reasoning that in response to an integrity 
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violation additional effort on part of the perpetrator would elicit greater trust 
(Hypothesis 2b) has not been substantiated. 
Trust repair after competence and integrity violations 
The finding that financial compensation is an effective trust restoration 
strategy after a lapse of competence, but not after a lapse of integrity, can be 
explained by expectancies about the cause (i.e., internal versus external) and the 
stability (i.e., stable versus unstable) of the perpetrator’s behavior. The model of 
dispositional attribution of Reeder and Brewer (1979) holds that positive information 
about competence is weighted more heavily than negative information; while 
negative information about integrity is weighted more heavily than positive 
information (see Kim, Diekmann, & Tenbrunsel, 2003; Reeder, Hesson-McInnis, 
Krohse, & Scialabba, 2001; for a review, see Snyder & Stukas, 1999).  
More precisely, with regard to competence violations, the model of Reeder 
and Brewer (1979) indicates that a single event showing a lack of competence is not 
necessarily internalized to the perpetrator, because anyone could commit a 
competence-based trust violation under unfavorable conditions (Kim et al., 2004, 
2006). Thus, although a single competence failure can be attributed both internally 
and externally, people may be willing to believe that the violation was an anomaly 
which will not repeat itself in the future (Ferrin et al., 2007). Consequently, the 
violation of the perpetrator is believed to be unstable, which explains why a mere 
compensation of the inflicted harm is perceived as satisfactory. It is important to 
note, however, that these predictions primarily concern isolated transgressions, like 
those in the present study. In the case that a perpetrator commits a series of 
competence faults in an ongoing relationship, it is likely that this will be regarded as 
a stable sign of incompetence, and will be attributed internally to the perpetrator. 
Moreover, sufficient incompetence can also become an integrity issue. Consider for 
example the case where a person indicates during a job interview that he or she is 
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capable of performing a certain task. The person is hired and later it turns out that he 
or she lacks the necessary abilities to complete the task that he or she claimed to be 
good at during the job interview. Here, the incompetence in itself can also become 
an integrity issue as it may convey the impression that the job applicant lied about 
his or her abilities. In such cases, financial compensation is likely to lose its 
effectiveness as a trust repair strategy. 
Regarding integrity violations, the dispositional attribution model contends 
that people intuitively believe that people with high integrity would always abstain 
from dishonest behavior, regardless of the situation. A single dishonest act is thus 
generally considered to offer a reliable signal of the person’s absence of integrity 
(Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Consequently, a single integrity violation reflects badly on 
the perpetrator by indicating that he or she is a bad or immoral person. This also 
implies that even in the context of ongoing relationships, it can be expected that one 
isolated lapse of integrity will lead to the conclusion that the perpetrator should not 
be trusted. Once established, this belief is very difficult to disconfirm (Ferrin et al., 
2007). In sum, people attribute a single dishonest act internally and ascribe high 
stability to this behavior. Accordingly, a lack of integrity is seen as unchangeable, 
which explains why the offer of a financial compensation is unsatisfactory, as it does 
not prevent one to show the same erroneous behaviors in the future.  
Another explanation for the present findings reside in the implicit message 
conveyed by competence and integrity violations in terms of the importance the 
perpetrator ascribes to the relationship with the victim. When a monetary loss is 
inflicted by a competence fault, the only harm is financial (Desmet et al., 2011a), 
while the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim is not violated. This 
might also explain why, after a competence fault, undoing the financial damage by 
providing equal compensation suffices to restore trust. However, an integrity 
violation conveys the implicit message that the relationship is not valued by the 
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perpetrator (Tyler et al., 1997). Consequently, when a monetary loss can be 
attributed to a lack of integrity, the harm done is not only financial but also 
relational, which implies that not only material, but also relational concerns need to 
be addressed in order to restore trust (see Darley & Pittman, 2003; also see Tyler & 
Blader, 2003). Hence, in case of an integrity violation “trust is not for sale”, as it 
cannot be regained by solely a financial compensation. This implies that there is a 
mismatch between the purely instrumental benefits that the compensation entails and 
the harmed relational needs of the victim. Taken together, these findings should 
caution people from expecting that in the current “age of money” (Weatherford, 
1998, p. 268), compensation would provide a universal solution to undo financial 
harm. Having said this, some studies (Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004, 2006) 
have shown that apologies alone are also not effective after an integrity violation, 
while such a strategy particularly appeals to relational concerns (Lazare, 2004). It is 
thus still unclear which strategies might help after an integrity violation. 
Can trust be repaired after an integrity violation? 
The question that arises here is if and how trust can be repaired when the 
violation concerns a matter of integrity. Kim et al. (2004, 2006) reported that 
attributing blame to external factors by offering an excuse or a denial is the most 
effective strategy to regain trust after integrity-based violations. However, as noted 
by these researchers, such strategies are not only unethical but also strategically 
risky because evidence about the perpetrator’s involvement may subsequently be 
revealed to the victim or already be known by the victim. 
 Hitherto, there is no evidence in the literature suggesting that trust can 
successfully be repaired after an integrity violation. We suggest that it is important 
to consider the fact that trust repair strategies have only been studied in isolation as 
previous studies focused on the effectiveness of one single repair strategy. However, 
because both instrumental and relational concerns are violated after an integrity 
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violation (see Darley & Pittman, 2003; Tyler et al., 1997), perhaps different 
strategies should be offered simultaneously so that the “cheap talk” of an apology 
can be substantiated with the tangibility of a compensation (see Haesevoets et al., 
2013). Future research should thus investigate whether such a combination of 
different strategies can be an effective method to repair trust after an integrity 
violation.  
Moreover, the time frame of the restoration process may also play a vital 
role. In this vein, it is important to study trust repair processes during a longer time 
frame, as most social relationships develop over a period of multiple interactions. 
Based on the forgiveness literature (e.g., McCullough & Witvliet, 2002), we assume 
that the process of trust repair in response to an integrity violation will be a process 
of long duration, in which trust can be rebuilt gradually over time. Hence, in order to 
successfully restore trust, the perpetrator must prove to the victim that the lapse of 
integrity was an anomaly by repeatedly demonstrating that he or she possesses 
integrity and can thus be trusted. The investigation of time frame is an important 
topic for future research.  
Strengths, limitations, and recommendations for further research 
An important strength of the present research is that it provides an 
experimental method by means of which competence and integrity violations can 
experimentally be induced in a lab context. Thereby, it provides an important 
contribution to the trust literature, which until now has solely relied on scenarios to 
understand the impact of violation type on the restoration of trust (see Ferrin et al., 
2007; Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Our research thus provides a much needed and easy 
applicable paradigm that can actually manipulate violation type experimentally.  
Moreover, this method can also be employed to study how victims, rather 
than observers, may respond to trust repair stratgies after competence and integrity 
violations. While this perspective has been overlooked in extant research on such 
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violations (see Ferrin et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2004, 2006), it can provide crucial 
insight into how such reparations may affect the relationship between victim and 
offender, rather than the community at large (see Risen & Gilovich, 2007; also see 
Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, & Van Hiel, 2014). The present research provides a 
crucial tool to study this question, and we regard this as a highly valuable avenue for 
future research.  
A first limitation of the present research, however, is that we only focused 
on situations in which the harm was financially compensable. It could be expected 
that in other contexts − in which the loss is framed in non-financial terms such as in 
the studies of Ferrin et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2004, 2006) – financial 
compensation will even be less effective to promote trust repair. Future research 
should thus consider the context in which trust is impaired. In this regard, it would 
be interesting for follow-up research to investigate whether competence- or 
integrity-attributable harm in, for example, a slander case leads to the same results as 
the ones obtained in the present study. However, it is important to note that despite 
the compensation friendly context in our studies, compensation size effects (of equal 
compensation versus overcompensation) failed to occur.  
Finally, in the present studies we solely focused on the role of violation type 
in isolated transgressions. It is important to note that there are many other variables 
that could have an influence on the trust repair process. For instance, the 
effectiveness of financial compensation as a means to repair broken trust may also 
depend on the strength and the duration of the prior relationship between the 
perpetrator and the victim. Further, whether the violation reflects an isolated 
transgression or a frequently reoccurring transgression may also play an important 
role in the trust repair process. How these processes may impact the effectiveness of 
financial compensations is as of yet not well understood. For this reason, we 
encourage future research to take these variables into account. 
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Chapter 5 
 
How Much Compensation is Too Much? An 
Investigation of the Effectiveness of Financial 
Overcompensation as a Means to Enhance 
Customer Loyalty 
 
Abstract 
The present chapter examines the effectiveness of financial overcompensation as a 
means to enhance customer loyalty. Overcompensation implies that customers are 
entitled to a refund that is larger than the purchase price. It is, however, still unclear 
whether large overcompensations entail saturation effects, or alternatively, result in 
an actual drop in customer loyalty. We predicted that the overcompensation–loyalty 
relationship is generally characterized by an inverted U-shaped function. In line with 
this prediction, the results of four studies showed that mild overcompensations had 
an additional positive effect on customer loyalty beyond equal compensation, but 
only up to compensation levels of approximately 150% of the purchase price of 
faulty products, after which the effectiveness of overcompensation clearly 
diminished. Despite this overall pattern, two studies revealed robust individual 
differences in how customers react to increasing overcompensation. A majority of 
customers increased their loyalty when the overcompensation enlarged, but the 
curve flattened out in the high range. However, there was also a smaller portion of 
customers who reacted negatively to every form of overcompensation.  
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., Van Hiel, A., Pandelaere, M., Bostyn, D., & De Cremer, 
D. (in press). How much compensation is too much? An investigation of the effectiveness of 
financial overcompensation as a means to enhance customer loyalty. Judgment and Decision 
Making.  
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Introduction 
Suppose that you bought a new vacuum cleaner at a nearby store. The 
vacuum cleaner turned out to be malfunctioning and you decided to go straight back 
to the store to complain about this. One way to settle this product failure is through a 
monetary reimbursement by the store. Customers often receive compensation that 
exceeds the damage suffered, which is generally referred to as overcompensation 
(Gelbrich & Roschk, 2011). In the example of a malfunctioning vacuum cleaner, the 
store can, for instance, offer you a reimbursement that is worth more than the 
original purchase price. Similarly, in case of hotel overbooking, customers can be 
offered the finest suite of the hotel or, if no other room is available, a voucher- or 
cash-based compensation that is worth more than the original room price (Noone & 
Lee, 2011). Or, when a restaurant serves the wrong dish, it can replace the dish and 
additionally offer the customer the meal for free (Hocutt, Bowers, & Donavan, 
2006). Other examples of overcompensation can be found in the context of 
insurance companies that sometimes overpay material losses (Tullberg, 2006).  
 Despite its pervasive use and its additional financial cost to companies, it is 
surprising to see that it is still unclear how overcompensation affects customers’ 
responses beyond compensation that covers the damage exactly (i.e., equal 
compensation). This is particularly the case in light of maintaining or even 
enhancing customer loyalty. From an economic perspective, individuals are 
primarily concerned with maximizing their own outcomes (cf. Camerer & Thaler, 
1995; Dawes & Thaler, 1988). As a result, the greater the level of compensation the 
higher the level of recovery should be. Following this “more is better” assumption, 
overcompensation should be a more effective recovery remedy than equal 
compensation; and, even more importantly, greater levels of overcompensation 
should result in higher loyalty levels than smaller ones. In the present study we 
investigated whether this is indeed the case.  
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Effectiveness of financial overcompensation  
 For most companies occasional lapses in product (or service) quality are 
nearly inevitable, making attempts to restore such failures highly relevant. Because 
the primary reason for a complaint is often a monetary loss by the customer, 
reimbursing this tangible damage is seen as vital for the recovery process. Ample 
studies have indicated that compensation is indeed the key driver of satisfaction and 
repurchase intention after failures (for overviews, see Davidow, 2003; Gelbrich & 
Roschk, 2011). Consequently, companies might opt to provide customers as much 
compensation as possible, and – as illustrated by the above mentioned examples – 
compensations that surpass the mere damage are frequently employed by companies. 
A critical question that arises is whether such costly overcompensations have 
beneficial effects on the recovery process beyond less costly equal compensation. 
 Although overcompensation is an open-ended interval with no natural upper 
boundary, most prior compensation studies included a maximum of two or three 
overcompensation levels (e.g., Boshoff, 1997; Garrett, 1999; Gilly & Hansen, 1985; 
Hocutt et al., 2006; Noone & Lee, 2011), which is insufficient to cover the broad 
overcompensation range. Fortunately, there is a recent study by Gelbrich, Gäthke, 
and Grégoire (2015) in which the effectiveness of 11 compensation levels (ranging 
from 0% to 200% of the loss, in steps of 20%) were compared. Importantly, 
although Gelbrich and colleagues included a total of 11 compensation levels, only 
five of these were larger than the loss and can hence be categorized as 
overcompensations (i.e., 120%, 140%, 160%, 180%, and 200%). In this 
overcompensation range, the compensation–satisfaction relationship was represented 
by a concave curve. Small amounts of overcompensation were more effective than 
equal compensation. However, there was some level of discrepancy between the 
estimated curve and the actual observations in the higher range of 
overcompensations. Specifically, for larger overcompensations the estimated curve 
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showed a downward slope when customers rejected a flawed service, but a further 
examination of the observed mean values indicates a saturation effect instead of a 
negative return. Consequently, Gelbrich et al. noted the following: “As the observed 
means seem to indicate saturation, we suggest collecting additional data for extreme 
values to better understand this pattern (…). Such research could confirm a 
saturation effect or may find a true negative effect” (p. 119). 
 In reaction to this observation, an important aim of the present research was 
to investigate the curve progression between overcompensation and recovery in 
greater detail, in order to unravel whether high amounts of overcompensation lead to 
a saturation effect (resulting in a flattening curve) or a true negative effect (leading 
to a downstream curve). In both cases, the overcompensation becomes cost-
ineffective at a certain point, but a downstream curve would even indicate that costly 
overcompensation may in fact harm the interests of companies. In this vein, we also 
aimed to identify the optimal overcompensation level that results in the highest 
degree of recovery. Further, we also explored if there are individual differences in 
how customers respond to different levels of overcompensation. 
Curve progression 
In the present study customer loyalty – a multiple dimensional construct that 
includes, besides repurchase intention, the willingness to recommend a company to 
others and to return to a company in the future (see Lam, Shankar, Erramilli, & 
Murthy, 2004; Webster & Sundaram, 1998) – was investigated as the main outcome 
variable. We started from the basic assumption that the degree of customer loyalty 
may depend on the overcompensation size (cf. Gelbrich et al., 2015). That is, the 
impact of an overcompensation is expected to differ in specific zones along the 
overcompensation continuum. But how does the magnitude of an overcompensation 
influence its effectiveness? 
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It is important to realize that in case of a product failure the customer has to 
establish that the product is actually defective, physically return the faulty product, 
and persuade the company to replace or reimburse the item. Returning a 
dissatisfactory product thus elicits additional costs for the customer in terms of time 
and money, and because it is unpleasant to return a product and expressing 
complaints, it can also lead to psychological costs. In order to establish a failure free 
situation, the provided reimbursement should thus be larger than the product price of 
the dissatisfactory product in order to take the inconveniences of returning a faulty 
product into consideration. It can therefore be expected that in the aftermath of a 
product failure customers feel that they are entitled to receive more than just damage 
restoration. As such, small overcompensation is expected to enhance customer 
loyalty beyond the level that is already reached by equal compensation. Although a 
general positive effect can be expected from small overcompensation, prior research 
indicates that especially large amounts of cash-based overcompensation are not well 
received by customers (see Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002; also see Garrett, 1999; 
Noone & Lee, 2011, for some examples). In this light, it can be expected that, from a 
particular level onwards, the overcompensation will be perceived as too much, and 
as such could result in a decay in customer loyalty.  
Taken together, we hypothesize that the effect of overcompensation on 
customer loyalty will be characterized by an inverted U-shaped function: As the 
level of overcompensation increases, customer loyalty also improves, but only to a 
certain point beyond which an increase in overcompensation generates a drop in 
customer loyalty. In the present contribution we aimed to identify the optimal 
overcompensation level that produces the highest level of customer loyalty. 
Individual differences  
 Prior studies investigating overcompensation effects all employed between-
subject designs in which participants were confronted with only one single 
Chapter 5 
 
106 
compensation level (see Boshoff, 1997; Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002; Gelbrich et 
al., 2015; Garrett, 1999; Hocutt et al., 2006; Noone & Lee, 2011). As a result, these 
studies did not incorporate analyses of how people react to different 
overcompensation sizes, and as such these studies were not suited to thoroughly 
investigate the role of individual differences. Although we expect that the curve 
between overcompensation and customer loyalty is inverted U-shaped, it is possible 
that there are individual differences in how customers respond to various 
overcompensation levels. Indeed, the presence of a general trend does not preclude 
the possibility of different classes of individuals, all reacting differently to increasing 
levels of overcompensation. 
In this regard, it can be expected that there are customers for whom loyalty 
increases with extra overcompensation and customers for whom loyalty decreases 
with extra overcompensation. A salient group, at least in theoretical terms, might be 
labelled as “homo economicus” (or economic man). This concept portrays humans 
as consistently rational and narrowly self-interested agents who usually pursue to 
maximize utility as a consumer (see Rittenberg & Tregarthen, 2012; also see 
Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Dawes & Thaler, 1988). Because in economic terms larger 
compensations result in better outcomes for the customer, for these people it can be 
expected that the greater the level of compensation, the higher the level of recovery 
will be. As such, for this subset of customers it is expected that overcompensation 
results in higher loyalty ratings than equal compensation (cf. Boshoff, 1997; Gilly & 
Hansen, 1985, Hocutt et al., 2006), and, even more importantly, that greater levels of 
overcompensation result in higher loyalty ratings than smaller ones (cf. Gelbrich et 
al., 2015). 
However, this particular group should be accompanied by other groups of 
customers given the evidence that rather high overcompensation results in similar or 
even lower levels of customer loyalty than equal compensation (see Garrett, 1999; 
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Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002; Noone & Lee, 2011; also see Haesevoets, Reinders 
Folmer, De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013; Haesevoets, Van Hiel, Reinders Folmer, & 
De Cremer, 2014). A possible other group of costumers might be those who react 
negatively to every form of overcompensation, resulting in an immediate decline in 
customer loyalty once the compensation transcends the point of equality. Indeed, 
many people prefer equal outcomes over unequal outcomes (Loewenstein, 
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Moreover, inequality is not only considered to be 
unwanted when one receives less than another party, but receiving more than others 
is generally considered to be undesirable too (see Blount, 1995; Dana, Cain, & 
Dawes, 2006). Given that overcompensation is a form of advantageous inequality, 
customers may feel guilty and indebted to the provider of the compensation as they 
believe that they are getting much more than they deserve (Garrett, 1999; 
McCollough, Berry, & Yadav, 2000). Their might thus also be a subset of customers 
for whom greater levels of overcompensation result in lower levels of customer 
loyalty than smaller ones.  
However, as we are unaware of any study of individual differences in the 
context of overcompensation, the present exploration may yield other classes of 
individuals showing distinct reactions across the range of overcompensations. 
Moreover, rising and falling curves are not necessarily linear but might instead be 
quadratic. In the present research we employed within-subject design studies in 
which each participant had to rate multiple overcompensation levels in order to 
examine the existence of these individual difference patterns. 
The present studies 
The goals of the present study were twofold. First, we aimed to determine 
the exact nature of the relationship between the level of overcompensation and the 
degree of customer loyalty, because especially in the high overcompensation range it 
is still unclear whether in general terms the compensation–loyalty curve flattens or 
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actually declines. If too much compensation is offered to customers, companies are 
unnecessarily wasting money, even at the risk of adverse effects on customer 
loyalty. In this venture, the present research meets the call of ample scholars (e.g., 
Davidow, 2003; Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002; Gelbrich et al., 2015; Gelbrich & 
Roschk, 2011) who have argued that it is vital for companies to identify the point 
from which more compensation becomes too much. In this light, we also aimed to 
identify the optimal level of overcompensation that generates the highest degree of 
customer loyalty. Moreover, although the relationship between overcompensation 
and customer loyalty is generally expected to be characterized by an inverted U-
curve, customers might react differently to various overcompensations. The second 
aim of our research was therefore to investigate if there are robust individual 
differences in how customers react to increasing levels of overcompensation. No 
prior studies, at least to our knowledge, have investigated such individual 
differences. 
In order to achieve these two goals, we conducted four studies in which we 
systematically studied the overcompensation continuum by including a wide range 
of different overcompensation levels and by using different study methods. More 
precisely, in the first study participants were asked to evaluate one single 
compensation level, whereas in the latter three studies participants had to rate 
multiple compensation levels (both separately and in pairs). 
 
Study 1 
Similarly to the research of Gelbrich and colleagues (2015), we investigated 
the overcompensation continuum using a design in which the different compensation 
levels were manipulated between-subjects. In order to better understand the slope of 
the compensation–loyalty curve in the high overcompensation range (flat or 
declining), we followed these authors’ suggestion to include more extreme 
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overcompensation values. In this light, in addition to a 100% and 150% 
compensation level, we included two more extreme overcompensation amounts 
which covered 300% and 500% of the product price of a dissatisfactory product. 
Method 
Participants and design  
A sample of 192 US citizens (92 men, 100 women, Mage = 34.22, SD = 
12.13) was recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, which has been 
demonstrated to be an appropriate method of recruiting participants (Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). 
Participants completed a scenario study in exchange for payment. To safeguard data 
quality, we implemented multiple attention checks spread throughout the study. One 
participant (0.5%) was excluded from further analyses because he failed on these 
check questions; three additional participants (1.6%) were excluded because they 
were unable to answer our manipulation check regarding the received compensation 
level correctly. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 4-level 
(compensation level: 100%, 150%, 300%, and 500% of the purchase price) between-
subjects design. 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with a written scenario in which they were asked 
to imagine that their vacuum cleaner broke down and that they paid $100 for a new 
one at a nearby store. When participants returned home, their new vacuum cleaner 
turned out to be malfunctioning. Participants were then asked to imagine that they 
returned to the store to complain about this product failure. Subsequently, 
participants were informed that the store reacted to this failure by offering them a 
compensation that exactly covered the purchase price (i.e., $100) in the equal 
compensation condition, or a compensation that was larger than the purchase price 
in the three overcompensation conditions (i.e., $150, $300, or $500). 
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Measures 
Following Gelbrich et al. (2015), we first checked the effectiveness of the 
compensation manipulation using an open-ended question about the perceived 
monetary value of the remuneration. More specifically, we asked participants: “How 
much money did you receive from the store as compensation for your broken 
vacuum cleaner?” Next, customer loyalty was measured with a four item scale. 
These items are based on former scales that probed different indicators of customer 
loyalty (see Butcher, Sparks, & O’Callaghan, 2002; Grewal, Roggeveen, & Tsiros, 
2008; Lam et al., 2004). More precisely, we asked participants to rate the following 
items, after receiving this compensation: “I am planning to purchase products at this 
store in the future” (repurchase), “I look forward to return to this store again” 
(return), “I will recommend this store to a friend who seeks my advice” 
(recommend), and “I will buy more products in this store again in the future” 
(patronage) (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; M = 5.14, SD = 1.64, Cronbach alpha = 
.97).  
Results 
Figure 1 visualizes the relationship between the level of compensation and 
the degree of customer loyalty. This figure shows that the curve first goes up, 
followed by a downwards trend in the high overcompensation range, which suggests 
an inverted U-relationship between compensation level and customer loyalty. In 
order to test statistically whether the overcompensation–loyalty curve is quadratic in 
nature, we conducted a regression analysis, using SPSS software, in which we 
included both the linear (Model 1) and the quadratic term (Model 2) for the effect of 
compensation level. The results of this analysis revealed that in the first model the 
linear term explained 2.0% of the variance in customer loyalty (b = 0.14, F(1, 186) = 
3.85, p = .05). In the second model, the addition of the quadratic term explained an 
additional 5.5% of the variance in customer loyalty (F(1, 185) = 11.05, p = .001). 
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Here, the beta-values of the linear (b = 1.51, p < .001) and the quadratic term (b = -
1.39, p = .001) were both significant.  
In addition, we also conducted a post-hoc test to examine whether there 
were significant differences among the four compensation levels. This test revealed 
that the equal compensation condition (100%) resulted in significant lower customer 
loyalty ratings (all ps < .05) than the three overcompensation conditions (150%, 
300%, and 500%). Although Figure 1 suggests a small decay in customer loyalty for 
the highest overcompensation level, no significant differences in customer loyalty 
were found among the three overcompensation levels (all ps > .46). As such, we 
were not able to substantiate the presence of an inverted U-curve. 
Figure 1. Relationship between compensation level and customer loyalty in Study 1.  
Note. The graph is based on the observed means: M100% = 4.38, SD = 1.84; M150% = 5.30, 
SD = 1.56; M300% = 5.70, SD = 1.07; M500% = 5.22, SD = 1.72. 
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Discussion 
Following the example of Gelbrich et al. (2015), we investigated the 
effectiveness of different overcompensation sizes with a between-subjects design. 
There was no actual decline in the high overcompensation range, as our results 
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revealed no significant differences among the three included overcompensation 
conditions. Similar to Gelbrich and colleagues our findings thus seem to indicate 
that when customers reject a dissatisfactory product there is no additional positive 
recovery effect once the overcompensation crosses a certain point, but based on the 
current results it is not possible to draw a firm conclusion regarding the location of 
this particular point, and the effectiveness of overcompensation after this point (flat 
or declining). 
Importantly, the use of between-subjects designs to investigate preferences 
for different compensation levels is associated with some disadvantages. An 
important limitation of manipulating compensation levels between-subjects is that 
participants only have to judge one single compensation level. By using a within-
subjects design in which the same participants have to judge multiple compensation 
levels, more fine-grained analyses can be conducted. Based on the evaluability 
framework, customers are expected to be more sensitive to differences in 
overcompensation sizes when they evaluate multiple compensation levels than when 
they are confronted with only one compensation level (see Hsee, 1996; Hsee, 
Loewenstein, White, & Bazerman, 1999; Hsee & Zhang, 2010). 
In this regard, Bazerman, Loewenstein, and White (1992) have made an 
important distinction between two methods that can be used to evaluate multiple 
alternatives, that is, participants can be forced to choose one preferred option among 
two or more alternatives, or be asked to judge multiple alternatives separately. In the 
next study, we used the first method in which participants had to judge different 
compensation levels in pairs, and indicate which of the two levels they preferred. 
Such a method of paired comparisons allows an explicit comparison of many 
different compensation levels as well as the estimation of a curve that visually 
displays the nature of the relationship between the level of overcompensation and 
the degree of customer loyalty. Moreover, this method also provides a useful way to 
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determine the optimal level of overcompensation that results in the highest degree of 
customer loyalty.  
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 19 undergraduate university students (3 men, 16 women, Mage = 
22.89, SD = 3.81) of different faculties (i.e., psychology and educational sciences, 
political and social sciences, arts and philosophy, medicine and health sciences, and 
law) participated in this study in exchange for payment. In the current study, the 
compensation levels ranged from 100% up till 200% of the purchase price of a 
dissatisfactory product, in small steps of 5%. This implies that in total 21 
compensation levels were included. 
Procedure 
Students were invited in groups of four persons. Upon arrival to the 
laboratory, participants were presented with a written scenario in which they were 
asked to imagine that they had bought a new digital photo camera at a nearby store 
for €100 (worth $106 at the time that the study was conducted). Participants were 
then informed that when they came home the camera turned out to be broken. The 
store decided to financially compensate for this malfunctioning. Next, participants 
were asked to evaluate different compensations which the store could use to respond 
to this product failure.  
The method of paired comparisons is a well-established technique for 
measuring relative preferences assigned to certain objects of any kind. Generally 
spoken, the aim of this method is to establish an ordering of the objects on a 
preference scale according to specific attributes. Therefore, the paired comparison 
method splits the ordering process into a series of evaluations carried out on two 
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objects at a time. For each of these pairs, a decision is made which of the two objects 
is preferred (for more detailed information on this method, see Hatzinger & Dittrich, 
2012; see also David, 1963; Thurstone; 1927). In the context of the present study, 
the objects were embodied by the 21 included compensation levels, which resulted 
in a total of 210 pairwise comparisons for each participant to complete. These pairs 
were presented to participants in a random order.  
Measures 
For each of the 210 comparisons, participants were asked to answer the 
following question: “After which of the following two compensations are you the 
most willing to buy products at this store again?” (item based on the repeat purchase 
intention item of Garrett, 1999). Because repurchase intention can be seen as a 
central dimension of customer loyalty (see Lam et al., 2004; Webster & Sundaram, 
1998), we used this specific item as an index for the customer loyalty construct.  
Results 
A simple preference scale was constructed to numerically describe perceived 
preference for each compensation level using R software. This scale was estimated 
through a Bradley-Terry model using the R package Prefmod (Hatzinger & Dittrich, 
2012). Bradley-Terry models are a variant of loglinear models (Dittrich, Hatzinger, 
& Katzenbeisser 1998; Sinclair, 1982) which assume that, given J objects, the 
observed number of times in which object j was preferred over object k follows a 
Poisson distribution. The location of each object on the preference scale is estimated 
in a worth parameter πj that can be estimated through the function: 
p(j > k | πj, πk) = πj / (πj + πk) 
Although these models allow us to test whether the preference for each 
compensation level differs from the preference for another compensation level, they 
assume that the objects being compared are categorical in nature and hence do not 
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allow us to test directly for a linear or non-linear effect of compensation level on 
preference. However, as depicted in Figure 2, the estimated worth values of each 
compensation level clearly suggest an inverted U-relation. That is, customer loyalty 
increased up to a compensation level of 140%. After this optimal level, customer 
loyalty clearly declined.  
Figure 2. Relationship between compensation level and customer loyalty in Study 2.  
Note. Worth parameter: Given two compensation levels j and k, the probability that compensation level j 
is preferred over compensation level k is given by the worth of j divided by the sum of the worth of j and 
the worth of k. The line represents a loess-curve fitted to the predicted worth values for visualization 
purposes. 
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Discussion  
The present study provides some initial evidence for the predicted inverted 
U-curve between level of overcompensation and degree of customer loyalty. 
Especially, in the present study the ideal overcompensation level emerged at 140% 
of the purchase price of the dissatisfactory product. After overcompensation 
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exceeded this threshold, its effectiveness as a means to enhance customer loyalty 
seems to deteriorate. Hence, the present study’s findings suggest that too much 
compensation can indeed affect customer loyalty negatively.  
The next study was designed with the aim to replicate the present findings 
using a different study method, in which participants had to rate each compensation 
level separately instead of in pairs (i.e., a standard within-subjects design), that 
allows us to statistically test the linear and quadratic components of the 
compensation–loyalty relationship. Moreover, scholars have argued that when the 
magnitude of the failure in financial terms is high, customers might react differently 
to the compensation than when the magnitude is low (see Garrett, 1999; Smith, 
Bolton, & Wagner, 1999). Therefore, in the next study we also included several 
products – ranging in purchase price from $5 to $500 – in order to test whether we 
could replicate the inverted U-relationship between overcompensation and customer 
loyalty for different failure magnitudes.  
Importantly, an inverted U-relation may point toward the existence of two 
opposing mechanisms that jointly operate (Coombs & Avrunin, 1977). For instance, 
in the context of social groups, it has been argued that people prefer membership of 
moderately sized minorities rather than either small minorities or large majorities, 
because it balances the need for belonging – which implies a positive relation 
between group size and preference – and the need for distinctiveness – which 
implies a negative relation between group size and preference (Leonardelli, Pickett, 
& Brewer, 2010). Alternatively, an inverted U-curve may arise when a sample 
consists of subsamples with different relations, and the resulting general trend may 
just be the mere mean tendency of distinctive patterns. Therefore, in the next study 
we also explored if there are individual differences in customers’ reactions to 
growing levels of overcompensation. 
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Study 3 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 251 US citizens (138 men, 113 women, Mage = 33.95, SD = 10.46), 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed this study in exchange for 
payment. Eighteen participants (7.2%) were excluded from further analyses because 
they failed on our check questions. We employed a mixed-factorial design in which 
we included seven different compensation amounts as the within-factor 
(compensation level: 100%, 125%, 150%, 175%, 200%, 225%, and 250% of the 
purchase price) and 12 different products that were nested within four different price 
classes as the between-factor (product price and product type: $5: kilo tomatoes, 
book, pair of socks; $50: blender, sweatshirt, bottle of wine; $100: pair of shoes, 
espresso machine, coffee table; and $500: television, watch, dining table). 
Procedure 
To administer our manipulations, participants were presented with a written 
scenario in which they were asked to imagine that they had bought one of these 12 
different products at a nearby store, and that it turned out that their purchase was 
damaged or malfunctioning. Participants were then asked to imagine that they 
returned to the store to complain about this product failure. Subsequently, 
participants evaluated seven responses by which the store could react to this failure. 
Each of these reactions presented a specific compensation level. In the present study, 
the different compensation levels were offered in ascending order. Customer loyalty 
was measured with the same four items as in Study 1.  
Results 
Curve progression 
We analyzed the effect of compensation level on customer loyalty – an 
index created by aggregating the return, repurchase, recommend, and patronage 
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items. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on customer loyalty showed that the 
compensation levels of 100%, 225%, and 250% all lead to lower customer loyalty 
than the compensation levels of 125% to 200% (all ps < .001), which supports the 
notion that loyalty increases with higher compensation up to a certain point, after 
which it decreases again. In fact, loyalty for the compensation levels of 100%, 225% 
and 250% did not significantly differ from each other (all ps > .18). Figure 3 
visualizes the relationship between the level of compensation and the degree of 
customer loyalty. 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between compensation level and customer loyalty in Study 3.  
Note. The graph is based on the observed means (collapsed across product prices): M100% = 
5.05, SD = 1.60; M125% = 5.66, SD = 1.39; M150% = 5.67, SD = 1.54; M175% = 5.54, SD = 
1.68; M200% = 5.43, SD = 1.85; M225% = 5.23, SD = 2.02; M250% = 5.12, SD = 2.12.  
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To examine the inverted U-relation in greater depth, we analyzed the data 
through multilevel regression in Mplus, with observations (level 1) nested in 
participants (level 2). We treated the independent variable, level of compensation, as 
a quantitative variable in our analyses and we estimated the functional form of its 
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effect by considering both a linear and a quadratic trend. To eliminate problems 
associated with small parameter estimates, we rescaled the compensation levels 
(100% to 250%, in steps of 25%) to an index variable (1 to 7). This linear 
transformation did not affect any substantial result or statistical test. Finally, we 
included the effect of product price ($5, $50, $100, and $500) using three dummy 
variables with the highest price being the reference category.  
Because the data are multilevel, the Cronbach alpha of customer loyalty can 
be estimated at the between and the within levels. The analyses revealed that both 
are very high (α = .99 and α = .96, for respectively the between and the within level). 
In our first model, we tested whether the relation between level of compensation and 
customer loyalty is moderated by product price by including interactions between 
the three dummy variables and both the linear and quadratic trend for level of 
compensation. We found that none of the product price dummies interacted with the 
linear (all ps > .35) or the quadratic trend (all ps > .33). In addition, none of the three 
dummy variables themselves had a significant effect (all ps > .78). We therefore 
collapsed our data across price levels. The subsequent analysis revealed a significant 
linear (t(1396) = 5.49, p < .001) and quadratic trend (t(1396) = 7.44, p < .001). This 
analysis further indicates that as the compensation level increased to about 168%, 
customer loyalty became more favorable, but it started to become less favorable 
after the 168% compensation level.  
Finally, to formally test the existence of an inverted U-relation, we estimated 
in one overall analysis a model that approximates the quadratic relation with two 
linear relations (Simonsohn, 2016). Specifically, we estimated one linear relation on 
the basis of the data for the first three compensation levels and a second linear 
relation was estimated on the remaining four levels, by introducing a breakpoint that 
allowed for a different intercept and slope for the two regression lines. We selected 
this breakpoint because our previous analysis indicated that the 168% compensation 
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is the point with the highest customer loyalty – this optimal point lies between the 
third and fourth compensation level. An inverted U-relation is formally present if the 
slope of the first regression line is significantly positive and the slope of the second 
regression line is significantly negative (and significantly different from the slope of 
the first regression line; Simonsohn, 2016). Our results clearly support the existence 
of an inverted U: The slope of the regression covering compensation levels from 
100% to 150% was significantly positive (b = .31, t(1396) = 5.48, p < .001), the 
slope of the regression covering compensation levels from 175% to 250% was 
significantly negative (b = -.14, t(1396) = 5.46, p < .001), and both slopes differed 
significantly (t(1396) = 7.88, p < .001).  
Individual differences 
To examine whether there are indeed individual differences in how 
customers react to increasing levels of overcompensation, we ran several additional 
multilevel models. First, we extended the random-intercept model (Model 1) 
described above to a random-slopes model (Model 2). This model allows the 
parameter for both the linear and the quadratic component of the relation between 
compensation and loyalty to vary across participants, but the individual parameters 
are assumed to be drawn from an overall normal distribution of parameters. In other 
words, even though there may be some variation across participants, the random-
slopes model assumes that the participants represent a fairly homogeneous group. 
We therefore also estimated multilevel mixture models that assume that the 
participants are drawn from two (Model 3), three (Model 4), four (Model 5), or five 
(Model 6) latent classes. Table 1 gives the BIC values for the different models 
(lower values are better), as well as the test for the improvement in fit resulting from 
adding latent classes and, for models with more than one latent class, the entropy 
measure (which is a 0 to 1 measure that indicates the ease of classifying participants 
in the different classes with higher numbers representing better solutions). 
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Table 1. Estimated multilevel mixture models in Study 3. 
Model # Description BIC  
 
Lo-Mendell-Rubin 
Adjusted LRT Test 
Entropy 
1 Random intercept 5526.41 -     - 
2  Random slope: 1 class 4400.42 -     - 
3  Random slope: 2 classes 4341.29 85.82, p < .001 .870 
4  Random slope: 3 classes 4280.80 79.29, p = .028 .938 
5  Random slope: 4 classes 4259.19 49.60, p = .028 .936 
6 Random slope: 5 classes 4269.93 60.32, p = .10 .938 
 
 
The best-fitting model was a model with four latent classes: It had the lowest 
BIC and showed similar levels of entropy as the models with three and five latent 
classes. Moreover, the Lo-Mendell-Rubin test indicated that a model with four latent 
classes represented a significant improvement over a model with three classes, while 
a model with five classes was not significantly different from a model with four 
classes. Table 2 gives the parameter estimates for the four classes; Figure 4 shows 
the corresponding regression curves for each class.  
Table 2. Parameter estimates (βs) for the four classes of individual differences in Study 3. 
Latent class # % of sample Intercept Compensation Compensation
2
 
1 25.3 4.431 0.435 -0.070 
2 57.1 4.652 0.760 -0.069 
3 11.2 5.844 -0.053 -0.089 
4 6.4 6.567 -1.944 0.172 
 
 
There is little indication of an inverted U-function in any separate latent 
class (see Figure 4). Classes 3 and 4 showed a negative reaction to 
overcompensation, and differed only in how fast reactions became negative with 
increasing overcompensation. Consumers in Class 1 initially did not respond 
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strongly to overcompensation, but their reactions became more negative when the 
overcompensation was enlarged. Finally, the largest class (Class 2) consisted of 
consumers who responded positively to overcompensation, but their positive 
reactions leveled out (i.e., reached an asymptote) for very high levels of 
overcompensation. It is not clear, however, whether this leveling off was legitimate 
or rather due to a ceiling effect. Note that in none of the four classes there was a 
positive effect of extra compensation for the highest overcompensation levels.  
Figure 4. Four different customer reactions to overcompensation in Study 3.  
Note. The graph is based on the estimated means. 
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Discussion 
The present study provides strong evidence for the general inverted U-
shaped relationship between the level of overcompensation and the degree of 
customer loyalty, and this relationship holds for high and low failure magnitudes. 
More precisely, over the different product prices the optimal level of 
overcompensation was constantly situated around a compensation level that is equal 
to approximately 168% of the purchase price. Note that this threshold is somewhat 
higher than in the previous study, in which the ideal compensation level was already 
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reached at the level of 140%. After this threshold the curve decreased and the largest 
overcompensation levels (i.e., beyond 200%) even negatively affected customer 
loyalty. Moreover, our individual difference analysis revealed that four classes of 
customer reactions to increasing overcompensation could be identified, and in none 
of these classes this general pattern was observed. This result implies that the 
general inverted U-shape represents merely an average tendency across groups 
instead of a “real” psychological reaction that is shared by all consumers. In other 
words, customers do not react universally to different levels of overcompensation, as 
some react positive and others negative. However, and most importantly, all groups 
showed stagnation or a decline in loyalty at the higher ends of the range of 
overcompensations. The differences between classes are thus especially pronounced 
at the lower end of the overcompensation continuum, with some classes showing 
increased loyalty at this point, and others decreased loyalty. 
Two limitations of the present study should be acknowledged. First, in the 
current study the overcompensation range (in steps of 25%) was rather large, and 
thus not very sensitive to unravel the optimal level of overcompensation. To 
overcome this limitation, in the next study we investigated the continuum using a 
much finer range, in small steps of only 10%. These more fine grained steps might 
shed a different light on the operation of individual differences in the context of mild 
overcompensations, which shows the greatest variability. Secondly, in the present 
study the compensation levels were presented to participants in a fixed order. In 
order to avoid potential sequential effects, the compensation levels were randomized 
in the next study. 
 
Study 4 
Method 
Participants and design 
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The sample consisted of 128 US citizens (62 men, 66 women, Mage = 36.46, 
SD = 12.32), who were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and participated 
in this scenario study in exchange for payment. Fourteen participants (10.9%) were 
excluded from further analyses because they failed on our check questions. To 
administer our compensation manipulation we employed a within-subjects design in 
which we included eight compensation levels (i.e., 100%, 110%, 120%, 130%, 
140%, 150%, 160%, and 170% of the purchase price). Because the prior study 
showed there was no further increase in customer loyalty for overcompensations 
beyond the level of 168% (which was identified as the optimum), we did not include 
compensation sizes beyond this particular level in the present study. 
Procedure 
Participants read a scenario in which they imagined that they had bought a 
new espresso machine at a nearby store for the price of $100. In the present study we 
only included one product price, because in the previous study the compensation–
loyalty relationship was not affected by the magnitude of the product failure. 
Participants imagined themselves that they came home and then realized that their 
espresso machine did not function properly. They thus decided to go back to the 
store to complain about this malfunctioning. Participants were asked to evaluate 
eight responses by which the store could react to this situation; each of these 
reactions presented a specific compensation level. Importantly, the different 
compensation levels were presented in a random order. 
Measures 
We used the same four items as in Study 1 to measure customer loyalty. In 
addition, to measure whether the compensation level manipulation was successful, 
we also probed participants’ perception of the magnitude of the compensation. 
Therefore, we asked participants for each of the compensation levels: “To what 
extent do you find this compensation large?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
OVERCOMPENSATION AND CUSTOMER LOYALTY 
 
125 
Results 
Similar to Study 3, most analyses were conducted using Mplus software. We 
again treated the independent variable, level of compensation, as a quantitative 
variable and we estimated the functional form of its effect by considering both a 
linear and a quadratic trend, using a regression approach. Because every participant 
responded to eight different compensation levels, we used a multilevel regression 
model with observations (level 1) nested in participants (level 2). To eliminate 
problems associated with small parameter estimates, we rescaled the compensation 
levels (100% to 170%) to an index variable (1 to 8). As in the previous study, this 
linear transformation did not affect any substantial result or statistical test. 
Perception of compensation size 
As a manipulation check, we first tested the effect of compensation level on 
perception of compensation size. The analysis revealed both a significant linear 
(t(796) = 8.95, p < .001) and quadratic trend (t(796) = 4.74, p < .001) for the relation 
between compensation level and size perception. Figure 5 reveals that individuals 
tend to view less difference between adjacent compensation levels as the 
compensation size becomes larger. This finding is in line with a host of research on 
the mental number line, showing a logarithmic relation between numbers and their 
mental representation (e.g., Dehaene, 1992; Nieder & Miller, 2003). 
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Figure 5. Relationship between compensation level and size perception in Study 4.  
Note. The graph is based on the observed means: M100% = 2.02, SD = 1.76; M110% = 3.18, SD 
= 2.14; M120% = 3.96, SD = 1.97; M130% = 4.58, SD = 2.04; M140% = 5.08, SD = 1.79; M150% 
= 5.55, SD = 1.68; M160% = 5.86, SD = 1.66; M170% = 6.21, SD = 1.42. 
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We subsequently analyzed the effect of compensation level on customer 
loyalty, which was again created on the basis of the repurchase, return, recommend, 
and patronage items (α = .99 and α = .97, for respectively the between and the within 
level). A one-way repeated measures ANOVA showed a significantly lower loyalty 
level for the compensation of 100% than for the other compensation levels (all ps < 
.001). Loyalty for the compensation level of 110% was significantly lower than for 
all the levels up to 160% (all ps < .05), and marginally different from the 
compensation level of 170%. Loyalty for the compensation level of 120% was 
significantly lower than for all the levels up to 150% (all ps < .05), but not different 
from the compensation levels of 160% and 170% (all ps > .26). Loyalty for the 
compensation levels from 130% to 170% did not significantly differ among each 
other (all ps > .10). This analysis thus reveals evidence for an increasing positive 
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reaction to overcompensation, which leveled off around compensation levels of 
130%. As could be expected, the small range of overcompensations precluded us to 
substantiate the presence of an overall inverted U-reaction (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between compensation level and customer loyalty in Study 4.  
Note. The graph is based on the observed means: M100% = 4.85, SD = 1.84; M110% = 5.23, SD 
= 1.70; M120% = 5.47, SD = 1.65; M130% = 5.68, SD = 1.59; M140% = 5.71, SD = 1.56; M150% 
= 5.73, SD = 1.56; M160% = 5.61, SD = 1.73; M170% = 5.56, SD = 1.81. 
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We conducted a subsequent multilevel regression in Mplus to identify the 
optimal overcompensation level. This analysis revealed both a significant linear 
(t(796) = 5.05, p < .001) and quadratic trend (t(796) = 4.93, p < .001). Here, the 
optimal compensation level that resulted in the highest loyalty rating was identified 
at a compensation level of 146%.  
Individual differences 
To examine the presence of meaningful individual differences in the 
reactions to the various overcompensation levels, we ran several multilevel models. 
As in the prior study we first ran a random-intercept model (Model 1) and a random-
slopes model (Model 2). Again, we also estimated multilevel mixture models that 
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assume that the participants are drawn from two (Model 3), three (Model 4), or four 
(Model 5) latent classes. Table 3 gives the BIC values for the different models, the 
test for the improvement in fit resulting from adding latent classes, and the entropy 
measure. 
Table 3. Estimated multilevel mixture models in Study 4. 
Model # Description BIC  
 
Lo-Mendell-Rubin 
Adjusted LRT Test 
Entropy 
1 Random intercept 3002.02  -     - 
2  Random slope: 1 class 2602.83 -     - 
3  Random slope: 2 classes 2582.92 45.51, p = .034 .908 
4  Random slope: 3 classes 2576.60 32.39, p = .58 .937 
5  Random slope: 4 classes 2584.92 18.60, p = .79 .885 
 
 
The model with two latent classes was selected as the best-fitting model. It 
had the second lowest BIC and almost the same entropy as the model with three 
latent classes. Moreover, the Lo-Mendell-Rubin test indicated that a model with two 
classes represented a significant improvement over a model with only one class, but 
the model with three classes was not better compared to the model with two classes. 
Moreover, the results of the three latent classes model revealed that the additional 
class consisted of only 2.6% of the participants, and that the other classes were 
basically similar as those from the two-cluster solution. Table 4 gives the parameter 
estimates for the two classes; Figure 7 shows the corresponding regression curves 
for each class.  
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Table 4. Parameter estimates (βs) for the two classes of individual differences in Study 4. 
Latent class # % of sample Intercept Compensation Compensation
2
 
1 84.2 4.796 0.440 -0.034 
2 15.8 4.364 0.055 -0.039 
 
 
As in Study 3, the largest class (Class 1) consisted of consumers who 
responded positively to overcompensation, but again their positive reactions leveled 
out (i.e., reached an asymptote) for higher levels of overcompensation. In this case, 
this leveling off does not seem to signal a ceiling effect, as there was still some room 
for more positive evaluations. Class 2 showed a negative reaction to 
overcompensation, which became even more negative with increasing levels of 
overcompensation.  
Figure 7. Two different customer reactions to overcompensation in Study 4.  
Note. The graph is based on the estimated means. 
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Discussion 
In the current study we investigated the overcompensation continuum with 
smaller steps of 10%. Here, the optimum overcompensation level was reached at a 
compensation level that is equivalent to about 146% of the purchase price. Beyond 
this point customer loyalty again flattened. The use of moderate overcompensation 
levels precluded the presence of a downstream curve. Again, our findings revealed 
that there are individual differences in how people evaluate different compensation 
levels. As in the prior study, most consumers reacted positively to increasing 
overcompensation, at least to a certain level. In the present study not less than 84.2% 
of the customers showed this pattern, which is consistent with Study 3. Indeed, in 
Study 3 Classes 1 and 2, which included 82.4% of the participants, also showed 
higher loyalty levels in the low range of overcompensations. In the present study a 
smaller proportion of customers (15.8%) responded negatively to all forms of 
overcompensation, which mirrors the behavior of customers included in Classes 3 
and 4 of Study 3 (17.6%), who showed a similar pattern. 
 
General discussion 
When products fail to live up to customers’ expectations, companies can 
financially compensate these customers for their loss. Companies often choose to 
provide dissatisfied customers more compensation than required to undo the failure 
with the aim to further increase their loyalty. The aim of the present paper was to 
investigate in detail the effectiveness of monetary overcompensation as a means to 
enhance customer loyalty. Based on the current literature, it is still unclear whether 
in the high overcompensation range a saturation effect (leading to a flattening curve) 
or a true negative effect (resulting in a downstream curve) occurs. As such, our 
research responds to the request that additional research is needed to determine how 
much compensation is perceived as too much (see Davidow, 2003; Estelami & De 
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Maeyer, 2002; Gelbrich et al., 2015). Moreover, because it can be expected that 
customers do not react universally to increasing amounts of overcompensation, we 
also included a thorough analyses of individual differences.  
Main conclusions 
 Across three studies the optimal level of overcompensation was always 
located around a compensation level that is equivalent to an average of about 150% 
of the purchase price of the faulty product (i.e., 140% in Study 2, 168% in Study 3, 
and 146% in Study 4). Note that in Study 1, which asked participants to provide 
ratings for only one compensation level, this optimum seems to be located further 
along the continuum. Taken into account that overcompensation is characterized by 
an open-ended interval which has no natural upper boundary, it can be concluded 
that the optimum level is situated at the rather low end of the continuum. 
Importantly, after this ideal point had been reached, the effect of overcompensation 
on customer loyalty was limited – and for more extreme overcompensation levels 
there was even an actual decrease in customer loyalty, which sharply contrasts with 
the standard economic notion that increasing levels of compensation would continue 
to produce higher levels of customer loyalty. As such, the present research has 
established the existence of an overall inverted U-relation between the amount of 
overcompensation and the degree of customer loyalty. These results corroborate 
ample previous compensation research that failed to report favorable effects of large 
overcompensation relative to equal compensation (e.g., see Estelami & De Maeyer, 
2002; Garrett, 1999; Haesevoets et al., 2013, 2014; Noone & Lee, 2011). 
We hypothesized that an inverted U-curve may arise because there are 
subsamples of customers that react differently to increasing levels of 
overcompensation. The present paper is the first, at least to our knowledge, to 
investigate individual differences in overcompensation effectiveness. We found 
similar patterns of rising and dropping curves in Studies 3 and 4. More specifically, 
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in line with the idea that humans are economic men, in both studies about 80% of 
the customers reacted positively to overcompensation by increasing their loyalty 
when the provided overcompensation enlarged, but this was only up to a certain 
point after which the curve flattened. Hence, even for customers who reacted 
positively to increasing overcompensation this effect was bounded. Or, stated 
otherwise, while it is true that the majority of people react as homo economicus, they 
do so only to a certain point, after which they seem fulfilled. 
The overall decline in the high overcompensation range seems to be due to 
the fact that there was also a smaller group of customers (which included 
approximately 20% of all customers) that reacted negatively to every form of 
overcompensation, and, importantly, most of these customers’ reactions became 
even more negative with increasing overcompensation. Our individual difference 
analyses thus entail that customers do not react universally to various 
overcompensations, but instead there is a large subgroup of customers that react 
positively and a smaller segment of customers that react negatively to increasing 
levels of overcompensation. Importantly, however, what seems to be universal is 
that all customer groups show stagnation or a decline in loyalty at the higher ends of 
the range of overcompensations, which further substantiates the central finding that 
high overcompensations do not yield any beneficial effect on loyalty. 
Because in both studies there was no indication of an inverted U-function for 
the separate classes, the general curve represents an average tendency rather than a 
genuine psychological reaction, which has theoretical implications. For instance, we 
reasoned that returning a faulty product is associated with additional costs for the 
customer in terms of lost time and experienced inconveniences. Because of these 
additional costs, we argued that overcompensation should transcend the mere 
product price of a dissatisfactory product in order to further elicit loyalty. But after 
this level of overcompensation is reached, loyalty levels should drop. Whereas this 
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reasoning seems valid on the basis of the general curve across groups, close 
inspection of the specific curves in each of the four classes identified in Study 3 and 
the two classes in Study 4 revealed no such pattern. The absence of this curve in 
specific groups suggests that customers do not think in terms of such additional 
costs, or at least that such costs are not explicitly taken into account when making 
loyalty judgments. 
Practical implications of the present research 
It is important to realize that despite these robust individual differences in 
customers’ reactions to various overcompensation levels, the general data pattern 
which consists of an inverted U still holds some important practical implications for 
companies, who often have no information regarding how an individual customer 
will react to a certain compensation level, and as such have to rely on general trends 
in customers’ reactions. 
Overcompensating dissatisfied customers entails high costs for companies 
because it is associated with incremental expenses. As our findings revealed that, in 
general, overcompensation only has beneficial effects on customer loyalty at the 
rather low end of the overcompensation continuum, the present research cautions 
companies that attempt to differentiate themselves by overcompensating customers 
for product failures. Companies should be aware that when the overcompensation 
exceeds the original purchase price with more than 50%, they are generally wasting 
money which does not further enhance loyalty for the largest group of customers, 
but instead even results in a decline for about one fifth of their customers. As such, 
more extreme overcompensations are not only not cost-effective but actually even 
cost-ineffective for companies. Knowledge of this upper threshold after which more 
compensation becomes too much is of vital importance as it will enable companies 
and marketers to realize an optimal allocation of their marketing budget and avoid 
inefficient spending on too large overcompensation. 
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Companies may be concerned about the costs and returns of 
overcompensation strategies. In this regard, it must be noted that although mild 
overcompensation generally has a significant positive influence on customer loyalty, 
the additional benefit on top of equal compensation is rather small. Indeed, 
corroborating previous compensation research (see Davidow, 2003; Gelbrich & 
Roschk, 2011, for overviews), our results revealed that for most customers equal 
compensation already resulted in a rather favorable situation in term of loyalty. A 
relevant question, therefore, is whether this rather small increase in customer loyalty 
is worth the extra cost that overcompensation entails. An overcompensation of 
150%, for example, holds that, in addition to the reimbursement of the expenses, the 
company offers the customer an extra amount that is half as large as the damage 
suffered. This might not be a problem for companies when the magnitude of the 
failure is low, but when the monetary value of a dissatisfactory product is high, like 
in the automobile sector, the costs of overcompensation in absolute terms rapidly 
increase. The question whether overcompensation is a cost-effective repair strategy 
is one that each company should answer for itself; and the answer to this question 
might depend on other factors such as the competitiveness of the market and the 
status of the client (regular versus occasional customer).  
Strengths, limitations, and recommendations  
First of all, an important strength of the present research is that we used 
different methods of data collection as well as different study samples. That is, in 
Study 1 we used a between-subjects design to deliver the different compensation 
levels. In contrast, in Study 2 we employed the method of paired comparisons, 
whereas in Studies 3 and 4 participants rated each presented compensation level 
separately. In Studies 1, 3, and 4 the sample consisted of consumers that were 
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which have been shown to be able to 
provide reliable and high-quality data (see Buhrmester et al., 2011; Hauser & 
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Schwarz, 2016). Study 2 was conducted among undergraduate university students. 
The fact that we could replicate the diminished effectiveness of large 
overcompensation using this divergence in methods, designs, and samples enlarges 
our confidence in the robustness of the reported findings. 
A second strength of the present research is that we focused on customer 
loyalty as the outcome variable. Many previous compensation studies mainly 
focused on post-complaint satisfaction, a construct that has been defined very 
differently across different studies (Olsen & Johnson, 2003). Although we 
acknowledge that satisfaction is an important aspect of the recovery process, we 
believe that it is at least equally important to companies that customers are willing to 
recommend the company to others and to purchase products again – two critical 
elements of customer loyalty (see Lam et al., 2004; Webster & Sundaram, 1998). 
A limitation of our research is that we relied on scenario-based experiments 
in which participants had to imagine receiving different amounts of compensation 
from a company. As with all research methodologies, scenarios yield advantages and 
disadvantages (see Carlsmith, Ellsworth, & Aronson, 1976). An important advantage 
of this method is that it enhances internal and statistical conclusion validity by 
controlling manipulated variables and by reducing random noise in the outcome 
measure (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Churchill, 1995). Yet, imagining receiving 
compensation might differ from actually receiving compensation. Future research 
should thus investigate whether the present results also apply when customers 
actually receive different levels of overcompensation in a field setting (cf. Garrett, 
1999). 
 As a closing remark, we would like to mention that an important factor that 
may influence customers’ reactions towards overcompensation is whether a 
company recalls a defective product or whether the customer him- or herself has to 
detect that a product is defective. In this light, it can be expected that the costs for 
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the customer may be lower when the company recalls a product, because under such 
circumstances a part of the fault-finding expenses and inconveniences have already 
been carried out by the company. As such, the optimal compensation level might 
also be smaller when companies themselves recall faulty products, and therefore be 
located earlier on the overcompensation continuum. We believe that the 
investigation of overcompensation effects under such conditions provides an 
interesting avenue for future compensation research. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Low-Price Guarantees as Advertisement Strategy 
and Compensation Policy: The More, the Better? 
 
Abstract 
Companies sometimes employ a “lowest price or more than the difference back” 
policy (i.e., a price-beating guarantee). We investigated whether such a policy is 
more effective to attract and retain customers than when the exact price difference is 
promised (i.e., a price-matching guarantee). The first study revealed that about 60% 
of the marketers and shop owners in our sample thought that beating price 
differences is a more effective strategy than matching price differences. However, 
the four subsequent studies challenged this assumption. Specifically, the 
advertisement as well as the provision of price-beating refunds did not have an 
incremental positive effect on customers’ general attitudes in terms of trust, brand 
perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions beyond the level that was already 
reached by price-matching refunds. Moreover, our mediation analyses revealed that 
the null effect of price-matching versus price-beating was mediated by fairness 
perceptions. From a theoretical perspective, these results are in line with a fairness 
account which holds that people do not only evaluate the economic value of an 
outcome, but also take equality considerations into account. Because price-beating is 
literally more expensive than price-matching, from a practical point of view, 
companies should be informed that the employment of a price-beating guarantee is a 
cost-ineffective advertisement strategy and compensation policy. 
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., Van Hiel, A., Onraet, E., Joosten, A., & De Cremer, D. 
(in press). Low-price guarantees as advertisement strategy and compensation policy: The more, 
the better. Journal of Consumer Behaviour. 
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Introduction 
Imagine that you can buy a new refrigerator in two stores in your 
neighborhood. The first store advertises that when you find the same fridge for a 
lower price in any other store, you will get paid back the exact amount of the price 
difference. The second store, however, advertises that in case of a price difference, 
you will be compensated twice the price difference. Which of these two stores would 
you prefer? Now imagine that there is a third store that advertises to triple or even 
tenfold the price difference. Would you be more inclined to go to this third store? 
From the viewpoint of a “homo economicus” the latter store should be preferred 
because it offers the highest refund and thus also the highest monetary profit. 
The strategy to promise customers to pay more than the difference when 
another store sells the exact same item for a lower price has been employed by many 
companies for a long time. For example, the baby products retailer Babies“R”Us has 
published an advertisement on its website which stated the following: “Spot a lower 
price for baby gear? We will beat it by 10%.” The Good Guys, a chain of consumer 
electronics retail stores in Australia, currently employs a similar low-price 
guarantee, beating price differences by 20%. Yet, there are also companies that 
employ larger low-price guarantees. For instance, the car repair shop Tires Plus 
employs a double-the-difference-insurance policy. That is, this company advertises 
that: “If you find a better price within 30 days of purchase, we’ll give you twice the 
amount of the difference back.” Furthermore, in reaction to the price war among 
supermarkets in 2011, Tesco promised to reimburse shoppers twice the difference 
for products found cheaper at Wal-Mart owned Asda. Some companies promise 
customers to triple price differences. The Walking Company, for example, 
advertises: “If you purchase shoes from us at regular price and see them advertised 
for less, we’ll give you triple the difference in store credit.” Similar strategies have 
been employed in the past. On January 13, 1982, in an advertisement published in 
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the newspaper The Palm Beach Post from West Palm Beach, the American drug 
store SupeRx announced to triple the price difference in cash when customers found 
a product cheaper in any other store in town by advertising: “Lowest overall prices 
guaranteed every day or you get triple-the-difference in cash!” Some companies 
even go a step further. At the end of 2014, in two of its Belgian stores, the French 
grocery giant Carrefour advertised to pay shoppers five times the difference if beaten 
on price by the Dutch supermarket chain Albert Heijn. Similarly, during the summer 
of 2016 Carrefour promised customers to pay them back five times the price 
difference on school material. Earlier, Carrefour even offered customers up to ten 
times the price difference for toys bought during the Christmas season. 
 A low-price guarantee can be defined as a policy in which a company 
announces to offer the lowest possible price for certain products and promises to 
match or beat competitors’ lower prices for these products (see Biswas, Pullig, 
Yagci, & Dean, 2002; Sivakumar & Weigand, 1996). Two types of low-price 
guarantees can thus be identified: (1) The price-matching guarantee, where the 
customer is refunded the exact price difference, and (2) the price-beating guarantee, 
where the customer is refunded more than the price difference. The examples 
mentioned above illustrate that in the last few decades companies worldwide have 
employed “lowest price or more than the difference back” advertisement strategies 
in the battle to attract new and maintain existing customers. In spite of the 
widespread use of such price-beating refunds, empirical work on this topic is rather 
scarce (see Kukar-Kinney, 2006; Kukar-Kinney & Walters, 2003; Kukar-Kinney, 
Walters, & MacKenzie, 2007; Kukar-Kinney, Xia, & Monroe, 2007; for some 
notable exceptions). The aim of the present research was to gain a deeper 
understanding of the (cost) effectiveness of price-matching and price-beating 
guarantees. 
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We first examined the thoughts of marketers and shop owners on this matter. 
Do they believe that beating price differences is an effective strategy to attract and 
retain customers? Next, we investigated whether the announcement of a price-
beating refund is indeed an effective strategy to attract customers. Specifically, we 
compared matching refund and beating refund conditions with respect to customers’ 
trust, brand perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions. Importantly, companies do 
not only promise different refunds, but also provide such refunds to their customers 
when price differences actually occur. Therefore, we also examined whether the 
provision of a price-beating refund in reaction to a price difference is more effective 
than the offer of a price-matching refund.  
Price-beating refunds from the perspective of the customer and the company 
From the perspective of the (potential) customer a low-price guarantee that 
promises to beat instead of match price differences is better, because in case of an 
actual price difference the price-beating guarantee leads to a higher outcome for the 
customer. This reasoning is in line with the classic economic theory, which assumes 
that individuals are primarily motivated by earning money and by the possibility of 
making profits. Following such a calculative perspective, there should thus be a 
positive relationship between the depth of a refund and customers’ favorable 
reactions towards the store. Based on this “more is better” assumption, it can hence 
be expected that customers will have a higher intention to purchase products at a 
company when it advertises to beat a price difference compared to when a matching 
refund is promised.  
Yet, it is important to highlight that for companies price-beating strategies 
are less attractive because they are more expensive. That is, a price-beating 
guarantee entails additional costs on top of the costs of a price-matching guarantee 
when price differences actually occur. Indeed, in case of an actual price difference, 
providing a price-beating refund is literally more expensive for a company than 
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providing a refund that matches the difference. In this regard it is thus important to 
investigate whether such costly price-beating guarantees are actually a more 
effective strategy to attract and retain customers than less costly price-matching 
guarantees. Two important functions of low-price guarantees can be distinguished. 
First, a company can advertise the employment of a price-matching or a price-
beating guarantee with the aim to attract customers to its business. Secondly, a 
company can provide customers who actually bought a product and then found it 
cheaper elsewhere a price-matching or a price-beating refund in order to retain this 
customer. In what follows, we will give an overview of previous research on the 
effectiveness of price-beating refunds as a means to attract and retain customers. 
Are price-beating refunds effective to attract customers? 
The vast majority of the previous research on low-price guarantees has 
investigated how the presence versus absence of a price-matching guarantee impacts 
upon customers’ reactions (e.g., Biswas et al., 2002; Jain & Srivastava, 2000; Lurie 
& Srivastava, 2005; Srivastava & Lurie, 2001, 2004). These prior studies have, for 
example, shown that consumers interpret the presence of a price-matching policy as 
a signal of low store prices (Jain & Srivastava, 2000). In addition, the presence of 
such a policy also increases the likelihood that customers will discontinue searching 
for lower prices (Srivastava & Lurie, 2001). 
With the exception of the research conducted by Kukar-Kinney and 
colleagues, it should be noted that not many studies have delved into how refund 
depth – in terms of matching versus beating price differences – influences 
customers’ responses. Kukar-Kinney and Walters (2003) reported that a price-
beating guarantee increased consumers’ perceptions of the value of this guarantee as 
compared to matching price differences, but at the same time reduced its 
believability. Moreover, Kukar-Kinney (2006) found that customer loyalty was not 
enhanced in the price-beating relative to the price-matching guarantee condition. 
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Research by Kukar-Kinney, Walters, and MacKenzie (2007) further revealed that 
individual differences in customers’ price consciousness interacted with refund 
depth. Specifically, only customers with high levels of price consciousness 
expressed a substantial greater likelihood of buying at a store that promised a price-
beating refund than at a store that promised a price-matching refund.  
It is important to note that prior empirical studies all included a rather small 
price-beating refund level that typically transcended the lower price by at most 20%. 
However, as illustrated by the above mentioned examples, in real-life settings 
refunds that are two, five, or even ten times as large as the price difference have 
been prevalently applied by companies like Tesco and Carrefour. It is, however, still 
unclear how the promise of such large price-beating refunds is evaluated by 
customers. This is important to investigate because pronounced price-beating 
refunds might entail high costs for companies when actual price differences occur. 
Consequently, if customers’ purchase intention is not positively affected by it, then 
companies would have no incentive to employ such large price-beating guarantees. 
Instead, it would even be more cost-effective for a company to simply match a price 
difference than to beat it. 
Are price-beating refunds effective to retain customers?  
Low-price guarantees are not only used by companies to attract new 
customers, but also as a compensation policy for existing clients. To the best of our 
knowledge, no prior studies investigated the effect of actually receiving a price-
beating refund on customers. Is a customer more inclined to revisit a store after 
receiving a price-beating instead of a price-matching refund? A line of inquiry that 
may inform us about the effectiveness of receiving price-beating refunds involves 
research in the domain of overcompensating dissatisfied customers. 
Overcompensation occurs when a company offers a customer a refund that is larger 
than the purchase price of a failed product or service. This is conceptually related to 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRICE-BEATING GUARANTEES 
 
149 
price-beating refunds in the sense that both concepts include the provision of a 
refund that exceeds a certain threshold, that is, the original purchase price in case of 
an overcompensation and the price difference in case of a price-beating refund.  
The results of prior overcompensation studies, however, are not very 
consistent. Some studies revealed positive effects of receiving overcompensation. 
For instance, Boshoff (1999) found in the context of an airline company that a 
refund of expenses plus an additional free airline ticket enhanced customers’ 
satisfaction more than when merely the expenses were reimbursed. A similar 
positive effect of receiving overcompensation was obtained in the context of a hotel 
(Gilly & Hansen, 1985) and a restaurant (Hocutt, Bowers, & Donavan 2006). Yet, 
there is also some evidence that overcompensation can be ineffective, and 
sometimes even counterproductive. Garrett (1999), for example, found that 
overcompensating customers for a product that did not perform as expected had no 
significant positive effect relative to exact compensation in terms of enhanced 
satisfaction and repurchase intention. Likewise, Noone and Lee (2011) reported that 
overcompensation did not positively enhance customers’ return intention beyond 
exact compensation in the aftermath of a hotel overbooking. Moreover, Estelami and 
De Maeyer (2002) reported that although low and moderate levels of 
overcompensation were acceptable to most customers, high levels resulted in a drop 
of customer satisfaction.  
Recently, scholars have tried to resolve these mixed results by 
systematically studying the overcompensation range by examining the influence of 
multiple refund depth levels. Gelbrich, Gäthke, and Grégoire (2015), for instance, 
compared five overcompensation levels (i.e., a compensation that covered 120%, 
140%, 160%, 180% and 200% of the loss) that a company could offer for a flawed 
service. Their results revealed a non-linear effect of overcompensation on customer 
satisfaction in the form of a concave curve: Small amounts of overcompensation 
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were more effective than an exact compensation, but after a certain point the curve 
seemed to flatten. Similar findings were obtained in a series of studies by 
Haesevoets, Van Hiel, Pandelaere, Bostyn, and De Cremer (in press). These authors 
reported that in the aftermath of a product failure the overcompensation–loyalty 
curve first goes upwards, but only up to a compensation level that is equivalent to 
approximately 150% of the purchase price of a dissatisfactory product. After this 
threshold had been reached, the effectiveness of overcompensation declined as 
further overcompensation started to negatively affect customer loyalty, resulting in 
an actual downstream curve.  
A possible explanation for the lack of positive results obtained with 
substantial overcompensations in prior research (see Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002; 
Garrett, 1999; Haesevoets et al., in press; Noone & Lee, 2001) might be that in these 
studies the refunds were provided unexpectedly. Such an unexpected large 
reimbursement may trigger cognitive processes that question the nature of and 
motivation behind the refund. There is some preliminary evidence which suggests 
that customers indeed perceive an unexpected large refund to be suspicious, leading 
to negative evaluations of the provider of this refund (Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002). 
Similarly, scholars have argued that customer judgments regarding the ethical 
standards of a company may be negatively affected by the experience of an unusual 
event − such as unexpectedly receiving a large refund − which may in turn 
compromise customers’ trust in and loyalty towards the company (see Bigley & 
Pearce, 1998; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Garbarino & Johnson, 1999). 
Importantly, when the provision of a substantial compensation under the 
form of a price-beating refund is announced through an advertisement strategy, it 
will not be experienced as unusual, and therefore may lead to more favorable 
customer reactions. Yet, no prior studies explicitly focused on the effects of 
receiving a refund that largely beats a price difference. Given the prevalent use of 
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such refunds, and the fact that they can be costly for companies, it is of vital 
importance to unravel how different refund levels influence consumers’ impressions 
of and responses to companies. 
The present studies 
The effectiveness of low-price guarantees was investigated in five empirical 
studies. In Study 1 we investigated a sample of marketers and shop owners to study 
their beliefs about the announcement of a price-beating refund, and whether they 
thought that this is a more effective strategy to attract and maintain customers than 
the announcement of a price-matching refund. In the four subsequent studies we 
investigated the effectiveness of both refunds types by using scenario-based 
experiments in samples of consumers. More specifically, we examined if customers’ 
trust in the company, brand perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions were 
enhanced more when a company announced to beat a price difference rather than to 
match it (Studies 2a and 3a). Moreover, we also explored if in case of a price 
difference the provision of an announced price-beating refund improved these 
outcome measures beyond the level that was reached by a price-matching refund 
(Studies 2b and 3b). The present studies extend previous research on low-price 
guarantees in at least four important ways. 
First, and most importantly, it can be expected that companies employ a 
price-beating guarantee because they believe that this is an especially effective 
strategy to attract customers to their business. However, it is at least equally 
important to evaluate the effectiveness of price-beating policies in stimulating the 
retention of existing customers. In this regard, an important feature of our research is 
that we investigated the effectiveness of price-beating and price-matching 
guarantees as an advertisement tool to attract customers as well as a compensation 
policy to maintain customers. To our knowledge, this latter component has not yet 
been studied in the context of low-price guarantees.  
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Secondly, the few studies that reported on effects of beating price 
differences only included one level of refund depth besides the matching condition 
that served as a baseline (see Kukar-Kinney, 2006; Kukar-Kinney & Walters, 2003; 
Kukar-Kinney, Walters, & MacKenzie, 2007; Kukar-Kinney, Xia, & Monroe, 2007). 
Our study took multiple refund levels into account. As mentioned above, most of 
this prior research included price-beating refunds that are much smaller than the 
ones that companies often provide. An unique feature of the present study, therefore, 
is the inclusion of three price-beating refund levels that cover the price difference 
one and a half times, two times, and five times (i.e., a refund that is equivalent to 
150%, 200%, and 500% of the price difference, respectively). We included the 
refund level of 150% because this level was identified as optimum in the studies of 
Haesevoets et al. (in press) on overcompensation. The two larger refund levels, that 
is, 200% and 500%, reflect the magnitude of the price-beating guarantees often 
employed by companies, such as Tesco and Carrefour. 
While prior studies offer valuable insights into how customers respond to 
price-matching versus price-beating guarantees, customers’ perceived fairness of 
different low-price guarantees has not yet been investigated (see Kukar-Kinney, Xia, 
& Monroe, 2007, for a notable exception). This is regretful because the perceived 
fairness of a low-price guarantee might have an influence on customers’ repurchase 
intentions. In this light, recent overcompensation studies have found that fairness 
perceptions mediate the relationship between overcompensation and customer 
satisfaction (see Gelbrich et al., 2015). Therefore, in the present research we also 
investigated if and how fairness perceptions influence the effectiveness of different 
low-price guarantees. 
Finally, although a first reason to introduce low-price guarantees might be to 
convince consumers that the store offers the lowest price (see Jain & Srivastava, 
2000), it can be argued that other (more distal) customers’ impressions and reactions 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRICE-BEATING GUARANTEES 
 
153 
are important as well. To tap into these reactions, we included trust, brand 
perception, customer loyalty, and shopping intentions as outcome measures in our 
studies. Importantly, these concepts can all be seen as critical factors that influence 
customers’ choice for a particular store (for more information on the inter-
relationship between these concepts, see Martenson, 2007; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, & 
Sabol, 2002). 
 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 16 marketers and 27 shop owners (N = 43; 65.1% men; Mage = 
35.60, SD = 9.98) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk). This 
platform has been demonstrated to be an appropriate method of recruiting subjects 
(see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling 2011; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). Participants 
participated in an online survey study in exchange for payment ($0.50). All 
participants were US citizens who worked at least one year as a marketer or a shop 
owner; during the survey multiple questions were asked to verify that this was 
indeed the case. Participants worked an average of 6.72 years (SD = 6.72) as 
marketer or shop owner and an average of 5.44 years (SD = 5.78) in their current 
function. On average, participants worked 43.70 hours (SD = 19.18) per week. With 
regard to educational level, 2.3% of the participants had no degree, 39.5% a high 
school degree, 53.5% a Bachelor’s degree, and 4.7% a Master’s degree. 
Procedure 
 Participants read a text which presented two related situations in which it 
was stated that customers who purchase a product often compare prices among 
different stores. A store can promote its business by announcing a reimbursement 
when a customer finds another store that offers cheaper prices. We first asked 
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participants to indicate what they thought would be the best advertisement strategy 
to attract new customers to their business. Next, we asked participants to indicate 
what they thought the best strategy would be to retain a customer who actually 
bought a product and then found it cheaper elsewhere. In both situations, participants 
had to choose one the following response options which reflect four different refund 
depths. The first option was a reimbursement that is equal to the price difference 
between the two stores (i.e., 100% of the price difference, which reflects a price-
matching guarantee), whereas the latter three options all embodied reimbursements 
that are larger than the price difference (i.e., > 100% of the price difference, which 
reflect price-beating guarantees). More specifically, the three price-beating refund 
options covered the price difference one and a half times, two times, and five times 
(i.e., 150%, 200%, and 500% of the price difference, respectively). After participants 
had indicated their preference, for each situation they were asked (through an open 
question) why they thought that the chosen strategy is most effective to attract and 
retain customers. 
Results 
Preference for price-matching or price-beating 
Figure 1 shows the results for the use of price-matching and price-beating 
guarantees as an advertisement strategy to attract new customers (Panel A) and as a 
compensation policy to retain existing customers (Panel B). No less than 60.5% of 
the marketers and shop owners judged one of the price-beating options as the most 
effective advertisement strategy to attract customers, while the remaining 39.5% of 
them preferred the price-matching option. Moreover, among the price-beating 
options, most participants preferred a refund that covered the price difference one 
and a half times (32.6%), followed by the option that reflected a refund that covered 
the price difference two times (25.6%) and five times (2.3%). On the question which 
refund would be the most effective policy to retain customers, 41.9% of the 
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marketers and shop owners chose the price-matching option and 58.1% one of the 
price-beating options. Here too, with regard to the different price-beating options, 
most participants preferred a refund that covered the price difference one and a half 
times (30.2%), followed by a refund that covered the price difference two times 
(20.9%) and five times (7.0%). Preferences for refund levels to attract and retain 
customers correlated strongly (r = .82, p < .001). When looking at the data for 
marketers and shop owners separately, similar data patterns were obtained.  
Reasons behind the preference for price-matching or price-beating 
Marketers and shop owners’ answers to the open question regarding the 
most effective strategy to attract new customers revealed nine reasons (only the 
reasons that were mentioned by at least two participants are reported). The following 
five reasons were identified for the 17 participants who selected price-matching as 
the most effective strategy to attract new customers: Matching price differences is 
sufficient (n = 4), the customer can be confident that he or she gets a good deal (n = 
4), giving more is not profitable (n = 3), competition with other stores over prices is 
unwanted (n = 3), and this strategy is most fair (n = 2). For the 26 participants who 
selected one of the price-beating strategies as the most effective strategy to attract 
new customers, the following four reasons were identified: Making the violation 
right requires giving (a little) extra (n = 6), it is an attractive strategy that draws 
attention (n = 3), it assures customers that they get the lowest price (n = 2), and it 
shows that the company cares for the customer (n = 2). The open question regarding 
the most effective compensation policy to retain existing customers revealed very 
similar reasons as the ones reported here. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of respondents who have chosen each of the compensation options as 
most effective advertisement strategy to attract new customers (Panel A) and as most effective 
compensation policy to retain existing customers (Panel B) in Study 1. 
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Discussion 
The present study indicates that in our sample about 60% of the marketers 
and shop owners indicated that a price-beating guarantee would be the best approach 
to attract new customers as well as to maintain existing customers to their business. 
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Note that this finding also entails that 40% of our respondents did not believe that 
price-beating is superior to price-matching. However, for those who preferred price-
matching, frequently mentioned reasons referred to matching as “being enough” and 
to the “profitability” of this strategy, which seems to suggest that the additional costs 
of price-beating might have influenced marketers and shop owners’ choices. That is, 
many among those preferring price-matching do not seem to discount the 
effectiveness of the price-beating strategy, but they are concerned about the extra 
costs.  
Because beating a price difference is expensive for companies, the question 
that arises is whether price-beating guarantees are indeed well received by potential 
customers. The next study was set up to answer this research question. This question 
is important to investigate because it is only cost-effective for companies to beat 
price differences if price-beating guarantees are more effective to attract customers 
than price-matching guarantees. If price-beating is just as effective (or possibly even 
less effective) than price-matching, companies would have no incentive to employ 
such a strategy. 
 
Study 2a 
Method 
Participants and design 
  A total of 147 US citizens (55.1% men; Mage = 36.39, SD = 11.96), recruited 
through MTurk, completed an online scenario study in exchange for payment 
($0.50). To safeguard data quality, we implemented multiple attention checks spread 
throughout the study. In total, 25 participants (17.0%) were excluded from further 
analyses. Of these participants, 11 were excluded because they indicated to be a 
marketer or a shop owner. An additional 12 participants were excluded because they 
were unable to answer our refund depth manipulation check correctly, and an extra 
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two participants because they failed on our attention checks. Of the remaining 122 
participants, 0.8% had no degree, 30.3% had a high school degree, 55.7% a 
Bachelor’s degree, 9.8% a Master’s degree, and 3.3% a PhD degree.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 5-level (refund 
depth: 0% vs. 100% vs. 150% vs. 200% vs. 500% of the price difference) between-
subjects design.
 
Hence, in addition to a price-matching condition (100%) and three 
price-beating conditions (150%, 200%, and 500%), we also included a control 
condition in which no low-price guarantee was offered by the store (0%). Although 
the explicit statement of no low-price guarantee in the control condition might be 
somewhat unusual, the inclusion of this condition is important in order to be able to 
unravel the true value of the different refund depth effects.  
Procedure 
To administer our refund depth manipulation, participants read a scenario 
which presented them with a store advertising that in a situation in which a customer 
purchases a product at their business and then finds it cheaper in another store, this 
company will (not) reimburse this customer. More specifically, in the control 
condition it was stated that the company will not reimburse customers for price 
differences. In the price-matching condition the company will compensate 
customers with a refund that exactly covers the price difference (i.e., 100% refund 
depth condition). Finally, in the three price-beating conditions the company will 
reimburse customers with a refund that covers one and a half times the price 
difference in the 150% refund depth condition, two times the price difference in the 
200% refund depth condition, and five times the price difference in the 500% refund 
depth condition. 
Measures 
Manipulation and realism check. To verify that participants noticed the 
refund depth manipulation successful, we asked them, “The store advertises that in 
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case of a price difference the store will pay the customer back … the price 
difference” (0 times; 1 time; 1.5 times; 2 times; 5 times). As mentioned above, 
participants who were unable to identify the correct refund level were not included 
in the analyses. We also measured the mundane realism of the presented scenario 
with the following item, “To what extent could you imagine the described 
situation?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much; M = 4.91, SD = 2.11). A one sample t-test 
revealed that the mean score on this realism check significantly differed from the 
scale’s midpoint (t(121) = 4.77, p < .001), which indicates that the scenarios were 
viewed as realistic by the participants. 
Outcome measures. The outcome measures were all measured using seven-
point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagrees, 7 = strongly agree). First, participants’ 
trust in the store was probed with the eight-item trust scale of Zhang and colleagues 
(2011), of which a sample item is, “I think that this store has high integrity.” Brand 
perception was then measured using the five-item scale developed by Bayol, de la 
Foye, Tellier, and Tenenhaus (2000). A sample item of this scale is, “I think that this 
store has a positive image.” We also used the five-item customer loyalty scale of 
Lam, Shankar, Erramilli, and Murthy (2004) to probe participants’ recommendation 
and purchase intentions, which are two central dimensions of the customer loyalty 
construct. A sample item is, “It is likely that I will recommend other people to 
purchase products at this store.” Shopping intentions were finally measured with the 
three-item scale of Kukar-Kinney, Xia, and Monroe (2007), of which a sample item 
is, “It is very likely that I would shop at this store.” Table 1 provides the means, 
standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas for each of these outcome measures. 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations (Study 2a). 
Measure M SD α 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Trust 5.25 1.58 .97 -    
2. Brand perception 5.04 1.65 .95 .92*** -   
3. Customer loyalty 5.06 1.83 .97 .89*** .93*** -  
4. Shopping intentions 5.41 1.75 .95 .84*** .84*** .92*** - 
5. General attitudes 5.18 1.62 .99 .97*** .97*** .97*** .92*** 
Note. *** p < .001. 
 
Results 
Correlation analysis and factor structure 
The correlations between the four outcome measures were all positive and 
significant (all rs > .84; all ps < .001; see Table 1). Because of these high 
correlations, and the fact that in prior studies similar concepts have been collapsed 
into one general measure (e.g., see Ambrose, Hess, & Ganesan, 2007), we checked 
whether the different outcome measures loaded on one single underlying attitudinal 
dimension by conducting a Principal Component Analysis. Only one component 
with an eigenvalue greater than 1.00 was found. This component had an eigenvalue 
of 16.41 and explained 78.1% of the total variance. Based on this one strong factor 
we have chosen to collapse the items of the four outcome measures into one general 
measure that reflects participants’ general attitudes towards the store (see Table 1). 
General attitudes towards the store 
A 5-level (refund depth: 0% vs. 100% vs. 150% vs. 200% vs. 500%) 
ANOVA on the general attitudes scale showed a significant main effect of refund 
depth, F(4, 117) = 16.49, p < .001, η²p = .36. We subsequently conducted a post-hoc 
test (LSD) in order to investigate which of the refund depth conditions significantly 
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differed from each other. The results of these comparisons are displayed in Table 2. 
This table reveals that only the 0% refund depth condition (M0% = 3.21, SD = 1.71) 
differed significant from all the other refund depth conditions (M100% = 5.37, SD = 
0.87; M150% = 5.72, SD = 1.21; M200% = 5.90, SD = 1.46; M500% = 5.57, SD = 1.23). 
The price-matching condition did not differ significantly from the three price-
beating conditions. ANOVAs and subsequent post-hoc tests for the individual trust, 
brand perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions scales revealed similar results as 
the ones reported here for the total scale. 
 
Table 2. Results of post-hoc test (Study 2a). 
Contrast General attitudes 
 ∆M SE p 
0% vs. 100% -2.16*** 0.38 <.001 
0% vs. 150% -2.51*** 0.38 <.001 
0% vs. 200% -2.70*** 0.38 <.001 
0% vs. 500% -2.37*** 0.38 <.001 
100% vs. 150%  -0.35 0.37 .349 
100% vs. 200% -0.53 0.37 .153 
100% vs. 500% -0.21 0.37 .575 
150% vs. 200% -0.18 0.38 .627 
150% vs. 500% 0.14 0.38 .704 
200% vs. 500% 0.33 0.38 .385 
Note. *** p < .001. 
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Discussion 
The present study revealed that when a store advertises to beat price 
differences, customers’ general attitudes in terms of trust, brand perception, loyalty, 
and shopping intentions were not significantly improved compared to when it was 
announced that price differences would be matched. Thus, although the presence 
(versus absence) of a low-price guarantee is able to positively affect customers’ 
responses, matching a price difference seems to be just as effective as beating this 
difference.  
However, it is possible that although the advertisement of a price-beating 
refund does not attract more customers, providing such a refund will result in a 
higher repurchase intention. This research question was investigated in the next 
study in which we examined the effectiveness of price-beating refunds as a 
compensation policy to retain customers. 
 
Study 2b 
Method 
Participants and design 
A total of 299 US citizens (43.1% men; Mage = 39.78, SD = 12.71), recruited 
through MTurk, completed an online scenario study in exchange for payment 
($0.50). Here, a total of 16 participants (5.3%) were excluded from further analyses. 
Ten participants were excluded because they indicated to be a marketer or a shop 
owner. An extra four participants were excluded because they were unable to answer 
our manipulation checks correctly, and two additional participants because they 
failed on our attention checks. Of the remaining 283 participants, 0.7% had no 
degree, 36.7 % a high school degree, 46.6% a Bachelor’s degree, 13.4% a Master’s 
degree, and 2.5% a PhD degree.  
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We included the same five refund levels as in the previous study. Moreover, 
because in case of a price difference the magnitude of the product price might alter 
customers’ responses towards the store (see Garret, 1999; Smith, Bolton, & Wagner, 
1999), in the present study we also manipulated the size of the product price by 
including a product with a rather low price ($50 product, with a price difference of 
$10) and a product with a much higher price ($500 product, with a price difference 
of $100). In the present study participants were thus randomly assigned to a 2 
(product price: $50 vs. $500) × 5 (refund depth: 0% vs. 100% vs. 150% vs. 200% vs. 
500% of the price difference) between-subjects design. 
Procedure 
As in the previous study, participants first read a scenario which presented 
them with a store advertising that when a customer purchases a product at their 
business and finds it cheaper at another store, the store will not reimburse this 
customer in the no refund condition; whereas in the refund conditions a 
compensation that exactly, one and a half times, two times, or five times covers the 
price difference was promised. Subsequently, participants were asked to imagine 
that their old blender [refrigerator] broke down and that they decided to go to this 
specific store for the purchase of a new one. Here, they bought a new one for the 
price of $50 [$500]. Later, they discovered that another store sells exactly the same 
blender [refrigerator] for only $40 [$400], which is thus $10 [$100] less than they 
paid. Participants were then asked to imagine that the store provided participants no 
refund in the control condition. In the 100% refund depth condition participants 
were offered a refund of $10 [$100], which thus exactly covered the price difference 
between the two stores. In the 150% refund depth condition participants received an 
additional refund of $5 [$50] on top of the price difference of $10 [$100], which is 
thus a reimbursement that covers the price difference one and a half times. A total 
refund of $20 [$200], which is two times as large as the price difference, was offered 
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in the 200% refund depth condition. Finally, in the 500% refund depth condition a 
total reimbursement of $50 [$500], which covered five times the price difference, 
was provided. 
Measures 
Manipulation checks and realism check. We first checked if participants 
were able to correctly identify the price of the product for which the price difference 
occurred, by asking them, “How much did you pay for the product?” ($50; $500). 
Next, to verify that participants perceived the refund depth manipulation successful, 
they were asked, “After finding a product cheaper elsewhere, the store payed you 
back … the price difference” (0 times; 1 time; 1.5 times; 2 times; 5 times). As 
mentioned above, participants who were unable to answer these manipulation checks 
correctly were excluded from the analyses. The realism of the presented scenario 
was probed with the same item as in Study 2a (M = 5.08, SD = 1.94). Again, a one 
sample t-test revealed that the mean score on this item differed significantly from the 
scale’s midpoint (t(282) = 9.41, p < .001). The scenarios were thus viewed as 
realistic by the participants. 
Outcome measures. Trust (8 items), brand perception (5 items), customer 
loyalty (5 items), and shopping intentions (3 items) were probed with the same items 
as in Study 2a. Table 3 provides the means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s 
alphas for each of these measures.  
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Table 3. Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations (Study 2b). 
Measure M SD α 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Trust 5.62 1.47 .97 -    
2. Brand perception 5.09 1.49 .94 .88*** -   
3. Customer loyalty 5.43 1.81 .98 .92*** .83*** -  
4. Shopping intentions 5.67 1.80 .98 .89*** .79*** .95*** - 
5. General attitudes 5.46 1.53 .99 .98*** .92*** .97*** .94*** 
Note. *** p < .001. 
 
Results 
Correlation analysis and factor structure 
As in the previous study, the correlations between the four outcome 
measures were all positive and significant (all rs > .79; all ps < .001; see Table 3). 
Again, we extracted a component from the inter-correlations among the items, which 
had an eigenvalue of 16.60 with an explained variance of 79.0%. We thus again 
collapsed the items of the four outcome measures into one general measurement that 
reflects participants’ general attitudes towards the store (see Table 3). 
General attitudes toward the store 
A 2 (product price: $50 vs. $500) × 5 (refund depth: 0% vs. 100% vs. 150% 
vs. 200% vs. 500%) ANOVA on the general attitudes scale showed a significant 
main effect of refund depth, F(4, 273) = 131.91, p < .001, η²p = .66. The main effect 
of product price and the interaction effect between product price and refund depth 
were both non-significant, F(1, 273) = 0.13, p = .719, η²p = .00 and F(4, 273) = 
1.94, p = .105, η²p = .03, respectively. A subsequent post-hoc test (LSD; see Table 4) 
revealed that solely the 0% refund depth condition (M0% = 2.92, SD = 1.14) differed 
significant from all the other refund depth conditions (M100% = 5.86, SD = 0.94; 
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M150% = 6.11, SD = 0.86; M200% = 6.14, SD = 0.78; M500% = 6.10, SD = 0.78). As in 
the prior study, the price-matching and the three price-beating conditions did thus 
not differ significantly from each other. Here too, ANOVAs and subsequent post-
hoc tests for the individual scales revealed similar results as the ones reported for the 
aggregated scale. 
Table 4. Results of post-hoc test (Study 2b). 
Contrast General attitudes 
 ∆M SE p 
0% vs. 100% -2.94*** 0.17 <.001 
0% vs. 150% -3.19*** 0.17 <.001 
0% vs. 200% -3.22*** 0.17 <.001 
0% vs. 500% -3.18*** 0.17 <.001 
100% vs. 150%  -0.25 0.17 .136 
100% vs. 200% -0.28 0.17 .097 
100% vs. 500% -0.24 0.17 .162 
150% vs. 200% -0.03 0.17 .863 
150% vs. 500% 0.02 0.17 .921 
200% vs. 500% 0.05 0.17 .785 
Note. *** p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
The present study expands the results of the previous studies by showing 
that when customers receive an advertised price-beating refund in the aftermath of a 
price difference, this reimbursement was not more effective to enhance customers’ 
general attitudes towards the store – under the form of improved trust, brand 
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perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions – compared to when a price-matching 
refund was provided. Actually, the current study revealed that a price-matching 
refund already affected customers’ responses very positively (i.e., an average score 
of almost six on a scale that ranges from one to seven). Importantly, these 
observations applied to both included product prices, thereby increasing the 
generalizability of the present findings.  
The findings of our first study suggest that 60% of the marketers and shop 
owners believe that a price-beating strategy is particularly effective, but our latter 
two studies show that this is not the case. However, it is possible that people are 
more sensitive to differences in refund strategies when they can evaluate them 
jointly (like in the within-subjects design of Study 1 in which marketers and shop 
owners evaluated different strategies simultaneously), while this sensitivity might be 
lower when people are confronted with only one of them (like in the between-
subjects designs of Studies 2a and 2b in which participants evaluated these strategies 
in isolation). This discrepancy between a within and between design can offer an 
explanation why we find a disconnection between what most marketers and shop 
owners believe the best strategy would be and how customers actually evaluated 
these strategies. In order to rule out an explanation in terms of evaluability of 
information (for more information on the evaluability framework; see Hsee, 1996; 
Hsee, Loewenstein, White, & Bazerman, 1999; Hsee & Zhang, 2010), in the 
following studies we aimed to replicate the findings of Studies 2a and 2b by using a 
within-subjects design. In these subsequent studies we particularly focused on the 
contrast of matching price differences versus beating price differences in fivefold. 
We did this because from a calculative perspective, it can be predicted that the larger 
the magnitude of a price-beating refund, the more favorable the outcome should be. 
In the following studies we also took mediation role of fairness perceptions into 
account. 
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Study 3a 
Method 
Participants, design, and procedure 
A sample of 201 US citizens (47.3% men; Mage = 38.48, SD = 12.79) were 
recruited through Mturk for the completion of an online scenario study in exchange 
for payment ($0.50). In this study 20 participants (10%) were excluded from further 
analyses. Six participants were excluded because they failed to answer our 
manipulation checks correctly and 14 additional participants because they failed on 
our attention checks. Of the remaining 181 participants, 32% had a high school 
degree, 53% a Bachelor’s degree, 12.7% a Master’s degree, and 2.2% a PhD degree.  
In the present study we employed a 2-level (refund depth: 100% vs. 500% of 
the price difference) within-subjects design.
 
Each participant was thus asked to 
evaluate both these refund depth conditions. The order of the conditions was 
randomized. We used the same scenario descriptions as in Study 2a.  
Measures 
Manipulation and realism check. The same manipulation and realism check 
were used as in Study 2a. Participants who were unable to identify the correct refund 
levels were not included in the analyses. A one sample t-test revealed that the mean 
score on the realism check (M = 4.73, SD = 1.30) significantly differed from the 
scale’s midpoint (t(180) = 7.56, p < .001), which indicates that the scenarios were 
viewed as realistic. 
Fairness perceptions and general attitudes towards the store. In our within-
subjects design participants had to rate the included measures for each condition. 
Therefore, in the present study we used a two-item fairness scale and an abridged 
four-item version of our general attitudes scale. Fairness perceptions were measured 
using the following two items, “To what extent do you find this low-price guarantee 
fair / adequate” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). These items are based on the fairness 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRICE-BEATING GUARANTEES 
 
169 
scale of Gelbrich et al. (2015). For the general attitudes scale we selected one item 
of each of the individual scales (trust, brand perception, loyalty, and shopping 
intentions). Specifically, the items that displayed the strongest factor loading in the 
factor analysis of Study 2a were included (these particular items are provided as 
sample items in our description of Study 2a). Table 5 provides the means, standard 
deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations for each measure, separately for the 
100% and the 500% refund depth condition. 
Table 5. Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations (Study 3a). 
Measure M SD α 1. 2. 3. 
1. Fairness 100% 5.62 1.29 .77 -   
2. Fairness 500% 5.22 1.78 .76 .00 -  
3. General attitudes 100% 5.54 1.16 .94 .61*** -.01 - 
4. General attitudes 500% 5.74 1.51 .95 .03 .60*** .25*** 
Note. *** p < .001. 
Results 
Fairness perceptions and general attitudes towards the store 
A paired sample t-test on the fairness scale revealed that the 500% refund 
depth condition was perceived as significantly less fair than the 100% refund depth 
condition (t(180) = -2.41 p = .017). However, for the general attitudes scale these 
two conditions did not differ significantly from each other (t(180) = 1.55, p = .124).  
Mediating role of fairness perceptions 
To test whether fairness perceptions mediate the null effect of refund depth 
on general attitudes towards the store, a within-subjects mediation analysis was 
conducted using the MEMORE macro in SPSS (Montoya & Hayes, 2016; based on 
1,000 bootstrap samples). The results of this analysis revealed a negative and 
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significant indirect effect of refund depth (which contrasted the 500% refund depth 
condition with the 100% refund depth condition) on general attitudes through 
fairness perceptions (b = -0.20, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.37, -0.04]). The direct effect 
of refund depth on general attitudes was positive and significant (b = 0.39, SE = 
0.09, t(178) = 4.25, p < .001). Note that in the literature this type of mediation, in 
which the indirect effect and the direct effect have opposite signs (which can cancel 
out the total effect, as such causing the reported null effect), is often referred to as an 
inconsistent mediation effect (also called suppression; see Davis, 1985; also see 
MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; McFatter, 1979). 
Discussion 
In the present study we employed a within-subjects design in order to 
replicate the results of Study 2a. We again found that customers’ general attitudes 
towards the store were not significantly improved when a store announced to beat 
price differences in fivefold compared to when a store announced to match price 
differences. The findings further indicate that a large price-beating guarantee that 
promises to cover price difference in fivefold is perceived as less fair than a price-
matching guarantee. Moreover, our mediation analysis showed that fairness 
perceptions mediate the null effect of price-matching versus price-beating in fivefold 
on general attitudes towards the store. The findings of this study as such illustrate 
that a large price-beating guarantee is not more effective than price-matching 
because such a guarantee is perceived as less fair. Fairness thus acts as a suppressor 
variable in the relationship between refund depth and general attitudes. 
 The aim of the following study was to replicate the findings of Study 2b, in 
which the effectiveness of the provision of an announced price-beating refund was 
examined. Hence, in the next study we focused on the effectiveness of price-beating 
as a compensation policy to retain customers (instead of an advertisement strategy to 
attract customers). Perceived fairness was again included as the mediator variable. 
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Study 3b 
Method 
Participants, design, and procedure 
The sample consisted of 200 US citizens (47% men; Mage = 37.62, SD = 
13.05), who were recruited through Mturk. Participants completed an online 
scenario study in exchange for payment ($0.50). Ten participants (5%) were 
excluded from further analyses. One participants was excluded because she failed to 
answer our manipulation checks correctly and nine additional participants because 
they failed on our attention checks. Of the remaining 190 participants, 0.5% had no 
degree, 34.7% a high school degree, 53.2% a Bachelor’s degree, 9.5% a Master’s 
degree, and 2.1% a PhD degree.  
We again employed a 2-level (refund depth: 100% vs. 500% of the price 
difference) within-subjects design. To administer our refund depth manipulation we 
used similar scenario descriptions as in Study 2b. However, while in Study 2b we 
manipulated product price (which did not yield a significant effect), in the present 
study we only included one intermediate product price level (i.e., a vacuum cleaner 
with a retail price of $100). After participants were informed about the store’s low-
price guarantee (see procedure of Study 2b), they were asked to imagine that they 
bought a new vacuum cleaner for the price of $100, and that they later discovered 
that another store sells the exact same vacuum cleaner for only $80. As advertised 
by the store, in the 100% refund depth condition participants were offered a refund 
that exactly covered the price difference between the two stores, whereas in the 
500% refund depth condition participants were offered a refund that covered five 
times the price difference. All participants were presented with both refund depth 
conditions. The order of these conditions was randomized. 
Measures 
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Manipulation and realism check. We used the same manipulation and 
realism check as in Study 2b. Participants who were unable to identify the correct 
refund levels were not included in the analyses. A one sample t-test revealed that the 
mean score on the realism check (M = 4.82, SD = 1.54) significantly differed from 
the scale’s midpoint (t(189) = 7.32, p < .001). This finding again indicates that the 
scenarios were viewed as realistic. 
Fairness perceptions and general attitudes towards the store. Fairness (2 
items) and general attitudes (4 items) were probed with the same items as in Study 
3a (the fairness items were slightly adapted in order to measure the perceived 
fairness of the compensation policy). Here too, participants answered these items for 
both refund depth conditions. Table 6 provides the means, standard deviations, 
Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations for each measure, separately for both refund 
depth conditions. 
Table 6. Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, and correlations (Study 3b). 
Measure M SD α 1. 2. 3. 
1. Fairness 100% 6.34 0.95 .66 -   
2. Fairness 500% 4.85 1.93 .70 .10 -  
3. General attitudes 100% 6.33 0.95 .93 .59*** .01 - 
4. General attitudes 500% 6.22 1.27 .94 .13 .46*** .31*** 
Note. *** p < .001. 
 
Results 
Fairness perceptions and general attitudes towards the store  
A paired sample t-test on the fairness scale revealed that the 500% refund 
depth condition was perceived as significant less fair than the 100% refund depth 
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condition (t(189) = -9.92, p < .001). However, for the general attitudes scale these 
conditions did not yield a significant difference (t(189) = -1.00, p = .321). 
Mediating role of fairness perceptions 
The MEMORE macro of Montoya and Hayes (2016) revealed a negative 
and significant indirect effect of refund depth (which contrasted the 500% refund 
depth condition with the 100% refund depth condition) on general attitudes through 
fairness perceptions (b = -0.58, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.77, -0.41]) as well as a 
positive and significant direct effect of refund depth on general attitudes (b = 0.48, 
SE = 0.11, t(187) = 4.41, p < .001), again indicating inconsistent mediation. 
Discussion 
This study replicates Study 2b showing that an advertised price-beating 
refund is not more effective to enhance customers’ general attitudes towards the 
store than a price-matching refund. This result was obtained by using a within-
subjects design in which participants evaluated these two strategies jointly. 
Moreover, the results indicated that a refund that beats price differences in fivefold 
is perceived as less fair than a refund that matches price differences, which 
according to our mediation analysis can explain the lack of additional positive 
effects of a price-beating refund on our general attitudes measure. 
 
General discussion 
Companies can employ a “lowest price or difference back” (i.e., price-
matching) or a “lowest price or more than the difference back” (i.e., price-beating) 
guarantee. Over the last few decades, companies worldwide have used this latter 
strategy as a tool to signal low product prices to their customers. However, empirical 
research on this topic is still rather scarce. Because beating a price difference may 
entail considerable extra costs for companies, it is vital to investigate whether this 
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strategy results in more positive reactions from customers than matching a price 
difference. This was the main aim of the present research. 
Main conclusions 
The results of the first study revealed that nearly 60% of the marketers and 
shop owners in our sample indicated that beating a price difference would be a more 
effective approach than matching a price difference to attract new customers as well 
as to maintain existing customers. This thinking is in line with the standard 
economic notion that greater compensation should result in more positive behavior 
towards the company. However, with regard to the different price-beating refund 
options, the choice ratio decreased when the refund level became larger. So, this 
latter result does not corroborate the hypothesis that more money is automatically 
better. Taken together, although most marketers and shop owners in our sample 
preferred price-beating above price-matching, smaller price-beating refunds were 
preferred above larger ones. Note that there was also a considerable segment of 
marketers and shop owners that voiced a preference for price-matching, some of 
them presumably taking the extra costs of price-beating into account when 
evaluating the different strategies. 
In Studies 2a and 3a we tested whether an advertised price-beating refund 
was indeed more effective to attract new customers than an advertised price-
matching refund, using a between-subjects and a within-subjects design, 
respectively. In contrast with the beliefs of many marketers and shop owners, the 
results of these studies revealed that when a company promised to beat a price 
difference, customers’ overall attitude towards the store – which was comprised of 
trust, brand perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions – was not substantially 
enhanced beyond the level that was already reached by a price-matching guarantee. 
This observation held true for the three price-beating refund levels that were 
included in Study 2a (i.e., 150%, 200%, and 500%). Our results thus corroborate 
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prior research of Kukar-Kinney (2006) on low-price guarantees, who also found no 
refund depth effects on store loyalty (although in this study only a 100% refund 
versus a 110% refund was compared, whereas in real-life situations greater levels of 
price-beating are prevalent). Additionally, Study 3a revealed that a low-price 
guarantee that promises to beat price differences in fivefold is perceived as less fair 
than a low-price guarantee that promises to match price differences. Moreover, our 
mediation analysis demonstrated that the null effect of price-matching versus price-
beating in fivefold is mediated by these fairness perceptions, as such revealing an 
inconsistent mediation effect (see Davis, 1985; McFatter, 1979). The observation 
that price-beating in fivefold is not more effective than price-matching can thus be 
ascribed to its lower perceived fairness.  
 In Studies 2b and 3b we focused on low-price guarantees as a strategy to 
retain existing customers after they experienced a price difference, by again using a 
between-subjects (Study 2b) and a within-subjects design (Study 3b). The results of 
both studies revealed that when customers received a price-beating refund, their 
general attitudes in terms of trust, brand perception, loyalty, and shopping intentions 
were neither significantly improved relative to the price-matching condition. This 
result also held true for the different price-beating refund levels as well as for the 
different product prices that were included in Study 2b. Although no prior studies, at 
least to our knowledge, specifically investigated which effect receiving a price-
beating refund has on customers’ general attitudes toward this store, the present 
findings are actually in line with many prior studies on overcompensation which 
failed to report a surplus value of overcompensation on top of the impact of a 
compensation that exactly covered the damage (e.g., Estelami & De Maeyer, 2002; 
Garret, 1999; Noone & Lee, 2002; also see Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, De 
Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013; Haesevoets, Van Hiel, Reinders Folmer, & De Cremer, 
2014). Moreover, the results of Study 3b showed that a price-beating refund that 
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covered the price difference five times was perceived as a less fair compensation 
policy than a refund that matched the difference. Here too, fairness perceptions 
mediated the reported null effect of price-matching versus price-beating. 
Taken together, the present findings reveal an interesting contradiction: 
Although most marketers and shop owners thought that the employment of a price-
beating guarantee is especially effective, this assessment is not reflected in our 
subsequent findings that the advertisement as well of the provision of a price-
matching refund is equally effective as a price-beating refund. In sum, the present 
findings thus seem to suggest that, although low-price guarantees can certainly be a 
useful tool for companies, simply matching a price difference is just as effective as 
beating it to enhance positive customer responses. 
Theoretical implications 
With regard to the advertisement effectiveness of price-beating refunds, the 
results presented here sharply contrast with the popular notion that “more is better.” 
First, price-matching and price-beating guarantees were just as effective to attract 
and maintain customers. Secondly, larger price-beating refunds were not more 
effective than smaller ones. Interesting in the present context is the observation that 
psychological models have proposed that the outcomes of a transaction are not 
solely valued in terms of their tangible consequences, but also to the extent that they 
are perceived as fair. In this regard, the literature on advantageous inequality (see 
Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989) provides a theoretical framework that 
can help to explain the present findings.  
This literature has shown that people are strongly influenced by the principle 
of equality. Importantly, this increased preference for equality is not only noted for 
disadvantageous inequality, but also for advantageous inequality (which is an 
inherent aspect of price-beating refunds). Thus, people value equality higher than 
other outcome distributions, even if those other outcomes might objectively have a 
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greater economic value, like when a refund beats the mere price difference. 
Moreover, in this literature it has been argued that in cases of advantageous 
inequality individuals may experience feelings of guilt and distress as they consider 
the refund to be exaggerated (see Garrett, 1999; McCollough, Berry, & Yadav, 
2000). In line with this perceptive the present research revealed that price-beating in 
fivefold is actually perceived as a less fair advertisement strategy and compensation 
policy than matching price differences. As a result of this, the effectiveness of large 
price-beating refunds to enhance positive customer reactions was hampered. Prior 
overcompensation studies have found that the relationship between the level of 
overcompensation and degree of recovery is also mediated by the perceived fairness 
of the provided reimbursement (Gelbrich et al., 2015). Our studies complement this 
prior research by showing that the importance that people attach to fairness can also 
explain the null effects of price-matching versus price-beating that we observed in 
our research (also see Kukar-Kinney, Xia, & Monroe, 2007). 
In this light, it should be noted that in the present study we only tested and 
found the mediating role of fairness perceptions for the largest price-beating 
condition that covered price differences five times. We did this because prior 
research on overcompensation has revealed that people can handle unfairness, at 
least when it is not too large and in their advantage (e.g., see Boshoff, 1997; Gilly & 
Hansen, 1985; Hocutt et al., 2006). Based on these findings, it can thus reasonably 
be expected that a price-beating refund (and thus the degree of advantageous 
inequality) has to be rather large in order to be perceived as less fair than price-
matching (which restores the state of equality). Therefore, our largest price-beating 
condition was most suitable to test for mediation of fairness. 
Practical implications 
Our findings underscore the importance of low-price guarantees for 
companies as the results of our studies clearly indicate that customers’ general 
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attitudes towards a company were more positive in the presence of a low-price 
guarantee than in the absence of such a guarantee. However, a basic question that 
companies face when developing low-price guarantees is: What size of refund 
should best be offered? Price-beating refunds can be costly for companies. From a 
managerial perspective, the lack of additional positive effects of price-beating 
beyond price-matching should thus warn companies that the refund depth should 
best be restricted to matching the lower competitive price (cf. Kukar-Kinney, 2006). 
The high costs of price-beating guarantees can best be illustrated by an 
example of the British supermarket Tesco. As mentioned in the introduction, in 2011 
Tesco advertised to double the difference if customers found products cheaper at an 
Asda store. According to a report in the Daily Mail (“Customers make a killing after 
Tesco is forced to pay out refunds as price pledge backfires,” 2011), one shopper 
bought two bottles of Chardonnay, two bottles of Magners pear cider, two Nivea 
rich body moisturizers, and a pack of mature cheddar. The basket of items came to 
£17.48 at Asda and £38.46 at Tesco – a difference of £20.98. Tesco was forced to 
give this customer a voucher equivalent to £41.96. Hence, this customer ended up 
with free products and some extra money. On a Manchester United web forum one 
customer even claimed to have made £600 from Tesco. Later that year, Tesco 
blamed consumers for over-exploiting the deal and had withdrawn its pledge to pay 
customers double the difference. In sum, these examples highlight that the 
announcement of price-beating refunds can imply serious cost for companies. 
Because customers seem to benefit little from refunds beyond price-matching, price-
beating can be considered to be a cost-ineffective strategy for companies.  
Strengths, limitations, and recommendations for future research 
The price-beating continuum can be seen as an open-ended interval with no 
natural upper boundary. In this light, an important strength of the present research is 
that we included multiple price-beating refund sizes that broadly covered the price-
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beating range. A vital strength of our research, therefore, is that we were able to 
replicate the neutral effect of price-beating (versus price-matching) using moderate 
and strong forms of price-beating, thereby increasing the ecological validity of our 
research. In a related vein, the inclusion of two different product prices in Study 2b 
also increases the generalizability of our findings over different product prices. 
Another important strength of our contribution is that we obtained similar 
findings for price-matching versus price-beating across studies using both between-
subjects and within-subjects designs. The fact that we could replicate these effects 
with both designs further enlarges our confidence in the robustness of our findings. 
Moreover, the use of these different designs also clarifies that a difference in terms 
of evaluability of information (see Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010) cannot explain 
the reported contradiction between what most marketers and shop owners believed 
the best strategy was in our first study, and how customers actually evaluated the 
different strategies in our subsequent studies.  
A limitation of our research, however, is that we relied on scenario-based 
experiments in which participants had to imagine how they would react to an 
advertised price-matching or price-beating refund. An important advantage of using 
scenarios is that it enhances internal and statistical conclusion validity by controlling 
manipulated variables and by reducing random noise in the outcome measures (see 
Cook & Campbell, 1979; Churchill, 1995; also see Havlena & Holbrook, 1986; 
Wirtz & Bateson, 1999). Although by the use of consumer samples and realistic 
scenarios our studies showed a reasonable degree of mundane realism, an important 
disadvantage is that reading a hypothetical scenario is still different from actually 
experiencing a specific event. In this vein, Garret’s (1999) field experiment on 
overcompensations revealed that when companies actually provided dissatisfied 
customers a cash-based overcompensation, customers’ satisfaction and repurchase 
intentions were not enhanced relative to an exact compensation. A similar result was 
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more recently obtained in a laboratory experiment by Haesevoets and colleagues 
(2014). Future research should investigate whether our findings also hold true when 
participants actually expect or benefit form a price-beating refund in a field setting. 
Another limitation of the present study is that other factors (besides fairness) 
that could influence the effectiveness of different low-price guarantees might have 
been overlooked. Prior research of Kukar-Kinney and Walters (2003) found that the 
competitive scope (i.e., the number of competitors eligible for the low-price 
guarantee) also affected patronage intentions. Moreover, Kukar-Kinney, Walters, 
and MacKenzie (2007) reported that the effects of refund depth on purchase 
behavior varied across more and less price conscious consumer segments. Future 
research should also take these and other situational and personality variables into 
account when investigating the effectiveness of price-matching versus price-beating. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRICE-BEATING GUARANTEES 
 
181 
References 
Ambrose, M., Hess, R. L., & Ganesan, S. (2007). The relationship between justice 
and attitudes: An examination of justice effects on event and system-related 
attitudes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 103(1), 
21-36.  
Bayol, M. P., de la Foye, A., Tellier, C., & Tenenhaus, M. (2000). Use of PLS path 
modeling to estimate the European consumer satisfaction index (ECSI) 
model. Statistica Applicata, 12(3), 361-375. 
Bigley, G. A., & Pearce JL. (1998). Straining for shared meaning in organization 
science: Problems of trust and distrust. Academy of Management Review, 
23(3), 405-421. 
Biswas, A., Pullig, C., Yagci, M. I., & Dean, D. H. (2002). Consumer evaluation of 
low price guarantees: The moderating role of reference price and store 
image. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 12(2), 107-118.  
Boshoff, C. (1997). An experimental study of service recovery options. International 
Journal of Service Industry Management, 8(2), 110-130.  
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk a 
new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 6(1), 3-5.  
Churchill, G. A. (1995). Marketing research: Methodological foundations. Fort 
Worth, TX: Dryden Press. 
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and 
analysis for field settings. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. 
Customers make a killing after Tesco is forced to pay out refunds as price pledge 
backfires, (2011, March 25), Available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1369749.htm [acceded on 12 July 
2016]. 
Chapter 6 
 
 
182 
Davis, M. D. (1985). The logic of causal order. In J. L. Sullivan & R. G. Niemi 
(Eds.), Sage university paper series on quantitative applications in the social 
sciences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997). An examination of the nature of trust in 
buyer-seller relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 61(2), 35-51.  
Estelami, H., & De Maeyer, P. (2002). Customer reactions to service provider 
overgenerosity. Journal of Service Research, 4(3), 205-216.  
Garbarino, E., & Johnson M. S. (1999). The different roles of satisfaction, trust, and 
commitment in customer relationships. The Journal of Marketing, 63(2), 70-
87.  
Garrett, D. E. (1999). The effectiveness of compensation given to complaining 
consumers: Is more better? Journal of Consumer Satisfaction, 
Dissatisfaction, and Complaining Behavior, 12, 26-34. 
Gelbrich, K., Gäthke, J., & Grégoire, Y. (2015). How much compensation should a 
firm offer for a flawed service? An examination of the nonlinear effects of 
compensation on satisfaction. Journal of Service Research, 18(1), 107-123.  
Gilly, M. C., & Hansen, R. W. (1985). Consumer complaint handling as a strategic 
marketing tool. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 2(4), 5-16.  
Haesevoets, T., Reinders Folmer, C., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2013). Money 
isn’t all that matters: The use of financial compensation and apologies to 
preserve relationships in the aftermath of distributive harm. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 35, 95-107. 
Haesevoets, T., Van Hiel, A., Reinders Folmer, C., & De Cremer, D. (2014). What 
money can’t buy: The psychology of financial overcompensation. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 42, 83-95. 
Haesevoets, T., Van Hiel, A., Pandelaere, M., Bostyn, D., & De Cremer, D. (in 
press). How much compensation is too much? An investigation of the 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRICE-BEATING GUARANTEES 
 
183 
effectiveness of financial overcompensation as a means to enhance customer 
loyalty. Judgment and Decision Making. 
Hauser, D. J., & Schwarz, N. (2016). Attentive Turkers: MTurk participants perform 
better on online attention checks than do subject pool participants. Behavior 
Research Methods, 48(1), 400-407. 
Havlena, W. J., & Holbrook, M. B. (1986). The varieties of consumption experience: 
comparing two typologies of emotion in consumer behavior. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 13(3), 394-404. 
Hocutt, M. A., Bowers, M. R., & Donavan, T. D. (2006). The art of service 
recovery: fact or fiction? Journal of Services Marketing, 20(3), 199-207. 
Hsee, C. K. (1996). The evaluability hypothesis: An Explanation for preference 
reversals between joint and separate evaluations of alternatives. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67(3), 247-257. 
Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., White, S. B., & Bazerman, M. H. (1999). 
Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: A 
review and theoretical analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125(5), 576-590. 
Hsee, C. K., & Zhang, J. (2010). General evaluability theory. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 5(4), 343-355.  
Jain, S., & Srivastava, J. (2000). An experimental and theoretical analysis of price-
matching refund policies. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(3), 351-362. 
Kukar-Kinney, M. (2006). The role of price-matching characteristics in influencing 
store loyalty. Journal of Business Research, 59(4), 475-482.  
Kukar-Kinney, M., & Walters, R. G. (2003). Consumer perceptions of refund depth 
and competitive scope in price-matching guarantees: Effects on store 
patronage. Journal of Retailing, 79(3), 153-160.  
Chapter 6 
 
 
184 
Kukar-Kinney, M., Walters, R. G., & MacKenzie, S. B. (2007). Consumer responses 
to characteristics of price-matching guarantees: The moderating role of price 
consciousness. Journal of Retailing, 83(2), 211-221. 
Kukar-Kinney, M., Xia, L., & Monroe, K. B. (2007). Consumers’ perceptions of the 
fairness of price-matching refund policies. Journal of Retailing, 83(3), 325-
337.  
Lam, S. Y., Shankar, V., Erramilli, M. K., & Murthy, B. (2004). Customer value, 
satisfaction, loyalty, and switching costs: an illustration from a business-to-
business service context. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
32(3), 293-311.  
Loewenstein, G. F., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Social utility and 
decision making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social 
psychology, 57(3), 426-441.  
Lurie, N. H., & Srivastava, J. (2005). Price-matching guarantees and consumer 
evaluations of price information. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 15(2), 
149-158. 
MacKinnon, D. P., Fairchild, A. J., & Fritz, M. S. (2007). Mediation analysis. 
Annual review of psychology, 58, 593-614. 
Martenson, R. (2007). Corporate brand image, satisfaction and store loyalty: A study 
of the store as a brand, store brands and manufacturer brands. International 
Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 35(7), 544-555. 
McCollough, M. A., Berry, L. L., Yadav, M. S. (2001). An empirical investigation 
of customer satisfaction after service failure and recovery. Journal of 
Service Research, 3, 121-137. 
McFatter, R. M. (1979). The use of structural equation models in interpreting 
regression equations including suppressor and enhancer variables. Applied 
Psychological Measurement, 3(1), 123-135. 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PRICE-BEATING GUARANTEES 
 
185 
Montoya, A. K., & Hayes, A. F. (in press). Two-condition within-participant 
statistical mediation analysis: A path-analytic framework. Psychological 
Methods. 
Noone, B. M., & Lee, C. H. (2011). Hotel overbooking the effect of 
overcompensation on customers’ reactions to denied service. Journal of 
Hospitality & Tourism Research, 35(3), 334-357. 
Sirdeshmukh, D., Singh, J., & Sabol, B. (2002). Consumer trust, value, and loyalty 
in relational exchanges. Journal of Marketing, 66(1), 15-37. 
Sivakumar, K., & Weigand, R. E. (1996). Price match guarantees: rationale, 
implementation, and consumer response. Pricing Strategy and Practice, 
4(4), 4-13. 
Smith, A. K., Bolton, R. N., & Wagner, J. (1999). A model of customer satisfaction 
with service encounters involving failure and recovery. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 36(3), 356-372. 
Srivastava, J., & Lurie, N. (2001). A consumer perspective on price-matching refund 
policies: Effect on price perceptions and search behavior. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 28(2), 296-307. 
Srivastava, J, & Lurie, N. H. (2004). Price-matching guarantees as signals of low 
store prices: survey and experimental evidence. Journal of Retailing, 80(2), 
117-128. 
Wirtz, J., & Bateson, J. E. (1999). Consumer satisfaction with services: Integrating 
the environment perspective in services marketing into the traditional 
disconfirmation paradigm. Journal of Business research, 44(1), 55-66. 
Zhang, Y., Fang, Y., Wei, K. K., Ramsey, E., McCole, P., & Chen, H. (2011). 
Repurchase intention in B2C e-commerce – A relationship quality 
perspective. Information & Management, 48(6), 192-200.  
 
  
187 
Chapter 7  
 
Money isn’t all that Matters: The use of Financial 
Compensation and Apologies to Preserve 
Relationships in the Aftermath of Distributive 
Harm  
 
 
Abstract 
When a recipient suffers from financial harm, allocators can use repair strategies that 
address financial or relational interests to promote relationship repair. Research to 
date, however, has neglected to study the effects of financial and relational strategies 
on relationship preservation simultaneously. In the present contribution, we examine 
this question. Based on the equality norm, we hypothesized that a financial 
compensation that fails to redress the harm suffered by the recipient (i.e., 
undercompensation) will be less effective in preserving a relationship than a 
financial compensation that do redress it (i.e., equal compensation and 
overcompensation). Moreover, we expected that relational strategies (i.e., apologies) 
would promote relationship preservation in contexts where the financial 
compensation alone is insufficient to redress the harm to the recipient, thus in cases 
of undercompensation. The results of a scenario study and a lab experiment using 
the dictator game confirmed our hypotheses. Consequently, our studies demonstrate 
that even in purely economic settings, relational strategies can facilitate relationship 
preservation over and above financial strategies.  
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., Reinders Folmer, C., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. 
(2013). Money isn't all that matters: The use of financial compensation and apologies to preserve 
relationships in the aftermath of distributive harm. Journal of Economic Psychology, 35, 95-107. 
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Introduction 
In economic situations in which monetary resources have to be allocated 
between two or more parties, most people prefer allocations to be divided fairly 
(Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, & De Cremer, 2003; Pillutla & 
Murnighan, 1996). One allocation norm that is particularly favored in this context is 
the equality norm (Handgraaf et al., 2003; Messick, 1993; Samuelson & Allison, 
1994). The equality norm is a social standard that dictates an equal allocation of the 
resources between all the members of some specified group (Deutsch, 1975; Kahn, 
1972; Lerner, 1975; Leventhal, 1976; Sampson, 1969, 1975). According to Straub 
and Murnighan (1995), these 50-50 offers are regarded as “perfectly fair”, because 
they satisfy most, if not all, criteria for fairness (see Allison & Messick, 1990; also 
see Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Consequently, allocations that meet the equality 
norm are associated with a range of positive consequences, such as trust (e.g., De 
Cremer, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2011) and cooperation (e.g., 
Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002). Offers that violate the equality 
norm, however, are often perceived as unfair, and consequently may evoke a host of 
negative reactions, like negative emotions (e.g., anger, disappointment, sadness, and 
wounded pride; see Fehr & Baldwin, 1996; Jones & Burdette, 1994; Joskowicz-
Jabloner & Leiser, 2011; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) and behaviors (e.g., verbal 
aggression; see Haden & Hojjat, 2006; Ochs & Roth, 1989). One of the most 
important consequences of such violations is that trust in the allocating party 
decreases (Bottom et al., 2002; Bottom, Eavey, & Miller, 1996; De Cremer, 2010; 
Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). 
Moreover, following interpersonal transgressions, victims often experience some 
motivation to seek revenge or to avoid the transgressor (i.e., transgression-related 
interpersonal motivations or TRIMs, see McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & 
Johnson, 2001; McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003; McCullough & Hoyt, 2002; 
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McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). Hence, violations of the equality norm may 
threaten the continuation of the relationship between the allocator and the recipient, 
thus potentially denying them the economic benefits of future cooperation. 
For this reason, it is important that the allocator reduces negative reactions 
and promotes the continuation of the relationship after unfair resource allocations. In 
this respect, it is important that people also possess cognitive forgiveness 
mechanisms designed to change vengeful motivations and promote the restoration of 
relationships (Burnette, McCullough, Van Tongeren, & Davis, 2012). When victims 
forgive, they become less avoidant, less vengeful, and more benevolent towards the 
transgressor (McCullough et al., 2006). Previous studies have identified several 
factors that may promote forgiveness (e.g., high relationship value and low 
exploitation risk; see Burnette et al., 2012). Particularly interesting, however, are 
positive actions that transgressors can employ to promote forgiveness (see Jones & 
Davis, 1965; McCullough, 2000; McCullough, Rachal, Sandage, Worthington, 
Brown, & Hight, 1998; Ristovski & Wertheim, 2005; Tabak, McCullough, Luna, 
Bono, & Berry, 2012). In the context of financial exchanges, one prominent 
response is to offer a financial compensation (e.g., Desmet et al., 2011). By 
providing financial compensation, the transgressor addresses his or her misbehavior 
by returning a portion of the resources to the recipient, thereby reducing or undoing 
the financial damage that was sustained through the transgression. Because concerns 
about the outcome dominate decisions in economic decision making situations 
(Camerer, 1995), compensating the recipient may promote the continuation of the 
relationship (De Cremer, 2010; Desmet et al., 2011). Nevertheless, some scholars 
have argued that financial compensation alone may not be sufficient to restore the 
relationship (e.g., see Okimoto & Tyler, 2007). Specifically, as unfair allocations 
constitute a violation of the norms of interpersonal trust and fairness, responses that 
address these relational aspects of the transgression may also be required (Tyler, 
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Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). One such response is to apologize for the harm. 
Apologies communicate that the transgressor feels remorse and is willing to take 
responsibility for maintaining the relationship (Scher & Darley, 1997). In this way, 
apologies constitute a non-financial means of addressing transgressions (e.g., Kim, 
Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Lazare, 2004) that satisfies relational concerns by affirming 
the victim’s social standing and respect for the victim (Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008). 
So far, little research has investigated the impact of financial compensation 
on the restoration of relationships (Desmet et al., 2011; De Cremer, 2010). 
Moreover, hardly any research has addressed the relationship between financial and 
relational responses to fairness violations. In the current studies, we focus on 
financial compensation and apologies, and compare their effectiveness as a means to 
facilitate relationship preservation in the aftermath of distributive harm. When a 
transgression has been made and a compensation or an apology is offered, victims 
may choose to continue or discontinue their relationship with the transgressor; 
therefore, we will focus on relationship preservation as the dependent variable. 
Research aims 
In the present contribution, we aim to address two major questions. First, we 
aim to investigate the effectiveness of financial compensation as a means to preserve 
a relationship after an unfair allocation of resources. Previous research has provided 
some indication that financial compensation may be a useful way to repair 
relationships (Desmet et al., 2011); however, it is unclear how the amount of 
compensation may affect its effectiveness. To determine the conditions that are 
necessary for compensation to be effective, we directly compare the effectiveness of 
three levels of compensation: undercompensation (i.e., compensation that reduces 
the inequality of the allocation but fails to restore equality), equal compensation (i.e., 
compensation that returns sufficient resources to restore equality), and 
overcompensation (i.e., compensation that not only restores equality but exceeds it, 
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resulting in an outcome that is more favorable to the victim than to the offender). 
Secondly, we examine when relational responses may be more effective than 
responses that directly address the financial aspects of transgressions in promoting 
willingness to continue the relationship with the transgressor. More specifically, we 
suggest that relational restoration responses, such as apologies, may be particularly 
helpful in preserving relationships in situations where the transgressors are unable or 
unwilling to fully compensate victims for the financial harm inflicted by their 
transgressions (i.e., in cases of undercompensation). 
Financial compensation: An economic perspective 
Financial interests dominate in decision-making situations (Camerer, 1995). 
Moreover, some scholars have argued that in economic exchanges, the continuation 
of a relationship between the parties involved is driven primarily by a concern for 
tangible outcomes (e.g., see Lewicki, Wiethoff, & Tomlinson, 2005). Consequently, 
financial compensation should facilitate the preservation of a relationship because it 
directly addresses these financial interests.  
Financial compensation and the equality norm 
How might the amount of compensation affect its effectiveness as a means 
to facilitate relationship preservation? To answer this question, it is important to 
understand that undercompensation, equal compensation, and overcompensation 
differ in two distinct dimensions, i.e., the outcomes that compensation provides for 
the victim and the extent to which the compensation redresses inequality. 
First, in terms of economic outcomes, greater compensation yields better 
outcomes for the victim. This suggests that to the extent that victims’ decisions in 
economic decision making situations depend on financial interests, greater 
compensation will result in greater willingness to preserve a relationship. Indeed, in 
line with this argument, previous research has indicated that under certain 
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circumstances overcompensation yields better results than equal compensation and 
undercompensation (Desmet et al., 2011).  
Secondly, undercompensation, equal compensation, and overcompensation 
also differ in the extent to which they redress inequality. Undercompensation may 
reduce the inequality that results from an unfair allocation, but it fails to restore 
equality, and the parties’ final outcomes remain unequal. In addition, while 
overcompensation may result in favorable outcomes for the recipient, it also results 
in inequality, as the recipient’s final outcome exceeds the allocator’s final outcome. 
If compensation is appreciated for the extent to which it redresses inequality, then 
the effectiveness of undercompensation and overcompensation may not be 
proportional to their economic consequences. In line with this idea, research on 
fairness has revealed that people’s appreciation of equal and unequal outcomes may 
not match their objective monetary value (see Adams & Freedman, 1976; Berkowitz 
& Walster, 1976; De Cremer & Van Kleef, 2009; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & 
Wilke, 1997). Rather, the utility that people derive from advantageous inequality is 
by far exceeded by the disutility they derive from disadvantageous inequality 
(Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). These findings suggest that the 
relationship between the compensation amount and its effectiveness in preserving 
the relationship may not be linear (i.e., directly proportional to the recipient’s 
economic outcome); rather, it may be curved so that greater compensation may 
produce less of a benefit for the relationship after the amount exceeds the equality 
norm.  
While predictions based on these two dimensions may differ regarding the 
effectiveness of overcompensation, both perspectives suggest that compensation that 
falls short of equality may be relatively less effective than compensation that 
restores equality or exceeds it. Nevertheless, undercompensation is attractive for 
transgressors, who may not be able or willing to sustain the considerable financial 
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costs associated with equal compensation and overcompensation. A real-life 
example of this is the case of a major Belgian bank that compensated customers who 
had purchased bonds in southern European countries (an investment that the bank 
had presented as “safe”). Rather than offering a full compensation, the bank 
compensated its customers for the nominal amount (i.e., after deduction of costs and 
with no interests), causing them to suffer losses of at least 15% of their original 
investment. In response, many of these investors planned to sue the bank in order to 
obtain at least an equal compensation. Moreover, transgressions for which 
transgressors are unwilling to fully compensate are common in the context of 
customer service complaints, where customers and companies disagree about the 
level of service that is acceptable, and the level of compensation that is appropriate 
in this situation. For example, manufactures and customers may often have different 
perceptions of the length of the service life that is appropriate for appliances, with 
customers often expecting a longer service life than manufacturers. This discrepancy 
is particularly poignant in situations where breakages occur when the warranty has 
just expired. In this case, customers are likely to receive no or only a small 
compensation (e.g., a small discount on the purchase of a new appliance), while 
feeling entitled to a higher compensation (e.g., a free new appliance). Thus, in 
situations like these, customers are likely to feel undercompensated. As both 
examples illustrate, transgressors often may offer an undercompensation, even 
though by doing so it is less likely that the relationship will be preserved. A critical 
question that arises here is whether the effectiveness of undercompensation can be 
bolstered through other means. This raises the issue of non-financial strategies. 
Specifically, we suggest that in situations where transgressors are unwilling or 
unable to fully compensate the financial harm inflicted by their transgressions, 
relational restoration responses, such as apologies, may help to preserve the 
relationship. 
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Apologies: A relational perspective 
 It is increasingly acknowledged that non-financial motives are important, 
even in economic situations (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) in which people also 
experience relational concerns (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; De Cremer, 2002). 
In this respect, unfair allocations do not only violate distributive fairness concerns, 
but also constitute a violation of relational fairness concerns; which reflect the 
degree to which people are treated with politeness, dignity, and respect (Bies & 
Moag, 1986). This notion suggests that relationship repair may also be facilitated by 
strategies that address relational harm. One prominent way in which transgressors 
can appeal to these relational concerns is by offering an apology (Lazare, 2004; Kim 
et al., 2009). Darby and Schlenker (1982, p. 742) define an apology as “an 
admission of blameworthiness and regret for an undesirable event”.  
 Apologies address these relational fairness concerns because they convey 
the message that the transgressor admits the wrongdoing, feels remorse for it, and is 
willing to take responsibility for repairing the broken relationship (Barclay & 
Skarlicki, 2008; Scher & Darley, 1997). By doing so, apologies restore the victim’s 
dignity and affirm respect for the victim (Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008), thereby 
restoring the relational aspects of fairness that were harmed by the transgression. A 
second reason why apologies address these relational fairness concerns is because 
they reduce uncertainty, which may be evoked by the transgression (e.g., see the 
uncertainty management model; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). An apology signals 
that the transgressor will be trustworthy in the future, which leads to less fear and 
uncertainty about the transgressor’s intentions. In the current context, this would 
imply that an apology operates as a reassurance that signals that “everything is OK”. 
Apologies and the equality norm 
 In the context of compensation, when might apologies particularly facilitate 
relationship preservation? We suggest that relational means of addressing 
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transgressions may be particularly useful when compensation alone is insufficient to 
effectively restore the relationship. More specifically, we expect an interaction effect 
between financial compensation and apologies. When a financial compensation 
meets (i.e., in case of an equal compensation) or exceeds (i.e., in case of an 
overcompensation) the equality norm, the recipient’s distributive fairness concerns 
are satisfied, as the initial state of disadvantageous inequality has been redressed. 
Due to the importance people adhere to fair distributions, we predict that a ceiling 
effect will occur, whereby that once unfairness has been resolved, people may 
benefit little from additional – tangible or intangible – restitutions (i.e., further 
financial compensation, such as overcompensation, or relational actions, like 
apologies). This implies that, starting from the level of equal compensation, an 
apology no longer has an additional effect on the level of relationship preservation. 
In case of an undercompensation, however, the state of disadvantageous inequality 
has not been redressed. Thus, as undercompensation fails to undo the recipient’s 
unfairness, additional relational actions of the transgressor may be expected in order 
to preserve the relationship. The idea that relational strategies, such as apologies, 
may compensate for the unequal distribution of tangible outcomes received some 
initial support from the work by Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996, see also Tata, 
1999), who showed that relational fairness concerns (e.g., being treated fairly and 
with respect) are especially important in the context of low levels of distributive 
fairness. Taken together, we suggest that apologies may be particularly effective 
when fairness concerns are not met, like in case of an undercompensation. In this 
domain, we expect that receiving an apology in addition to a financial compensation 
will have a more positive effect on relationship preservation compared to when only 
a financial compensation is provided. 
The present studies 
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 In the present studies, we focus on the combined effects of financial 
compensation and apologies in an economic situation. To create a fairness 
transgression in an economic context, we will use a dictator game (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), which implies that we focus on economic situations, in 
which outcome-related concerns are particularly salient (Desmet et al., 2011). Based 
on the theoretical framework that we have outlined above, we developed the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: (1a) Undercompensation is less effective in preserving relationships 
than equal compensation and overcompensation [under < equal + over], but (1b) 
overcompensation is not more effective in preserving relationships than equal 
compensation [equal = over]. 
Hypothesis 2: Undercompensation with an apology is more effective in preserving 
relationships than undercompensation without an apology [under with apology > 
under without apology]. 
Hypothesis 3: (3a) Equal compensation with an apology is not more effective in 
preserving relationships than equal compensation without an apology [equal with 
apology = equal without apology], and (3b) overcompensation with an apology is 
not more effective in preserving relationships than overcompensation without an 
apology [over with apology = over without apology]. 
 We present two studies to test these hypotheses. Study 1 was designed to 
test the first two hypotheses, while Study 2 was designed to test all three hypotheses. 
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design 
 The participants were 22 postgraduate students (5 men, 16 women, and one 
person who did not specify a gender; Mage = 29.81, SD = 6.53). In this study, we 
opted for a scenario study (see De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders Folmer, 2011, Study 
1). We employed a four-level (undercompensation vs. undercompensation with 
apology vs. equal compensation vs. overcompensation) within-subjects design. 
Procedure 
  Participants were asked to take part in a game. It was explained that they 
would play a dictator game with another student who was supposedly present in 
another room. First, the participants read a paper with instructions. They learned that 
in the game, two players would decide over the division of ten lottery tickets, with 
which a 10 euro gift voucher could be earned. One player (the allocator) would 
unilaterally divide the tickets; the other player (the recipient) could not influence this 
division. All participants played the role of the recipient; the allocator was 
simulated. After a pause, the experimenter brought a form on which the allocator 
supposedly had written his or her decision to allocate two of the ten tickets to the 
recipient. 
  Before continuing the game, the participants were asked to evaluate four 
possible responses by which the allocator could react to the unequal allocation: 1) by 
giving fewer extra tickets than the number needed to reach an equal distribution (i.e., 
one ticket in the undercompensation condition), 2) by giving fewer extra tickets than 
the number needed to reach an equal distribution and an additional apology (i.e., one 
ticket and an apology in the undercompensation with apology condition), 3) by 
giving the exact number of extra tickets needed to reach an equal distribution (i.e., 
three tickets in the equal compensation condition), and 4) by giving more extra 
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tickets than needed to reach an equal distribution (i.e., five tickets in the 
overcompensation condition). After each response, we measured participants’ 
intentions to replace the allocator (“To what extent would you wish to replace the 
allocator?”; 1 = not at all, 7 = very much), and their behavioral intentions to give the 
allocator a second chance (“Would you be willing to give the allocator a second 
chance in the next round?”; 0 = no, 1 = yes). The four responses were presented in a 
fixed order. One participant did not answer these questions and therefore was 
excluded from further analyses. 
The study was then stopped, and the participants were thanked and 
debriefed. 
Results 
Intentions to replace the allocator 
 A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the continuous 
measure of relationship preservation for the four responses as within-subject 
variables, revealed that the intention to replace the allocator was significantly 
affected by the allocator’s response, F(3, 18) = 16.16, p < .001, η²p = .73. The 
contrasts were planned in accordance with our hypotheses. Supporting Hypothesis 
1a, participants indicated significantly stronger intentions, F(1, 20) = 28.60, p < 
.001, η²p = .59, to replace the allocator after receiving undercompensation with or 
without an apology (M = 4.69, SD = 1.50) than after receiving equal and 
overcompensation (M = 2.57, SD = 1.48). Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 1b, 
participants did not indicate stronger intentions, F(1, 20) = 0.25, n.s., η²p = .01, to 
replace the allocator after receiving equal compensation (M = 2.48, SD = 1.78) 
compared to overcompensation (M = 2.67, SD = 1.65). Finally, in support of 
Hypothesis 2, participants had significantly stronger intentions, F(1, 20) = 5.99, p < 
.05, η²p = .23, to replace the allocator after receiving undercompensation without an 
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apology (M = 4.95, SD = 1.43) than after receiving undercompensation with an 
apology (M = 4.43, SD = 1.72). 
Behavioral intentions to give the allocator a second chance 
  A repeated measures ANOVA, using the dichotomous measure of 
relationship preservation for the four responses as within-subject variables, revealed 
that the behavioral intention to give the allocator a second chance was significantly 
affected by the allocator’s response, F(3, 18) = 12.00, p < .001, η²p = .67. Again, the 
contrasts were planned in accordance with our hypotheses. It was revealed that, in 
agreement with Hypothesis 1a, participants were significantly less likely, F(1, 20) = 
29.41, p < .001, η²p = .60, to give the allocator a second chance after receiving 
undercompensation with or without an apology (M = 0.38, SD = 0.44) than after 
receiving equal and overcompensation (M = 0.86, SD = 0.28). Further, as predicted 
by Hypothesis 1b, overcompensation did not increase intentions to preserve the 
relationship. Indeed, participants were even significantly less likely, F(1, 20) = 4.71, 
p < .05, η²p = .19, to give the allocator a second chance after receiving 
overcompensation (M = 0.76, SD = 0.44) than after receiving equal compensation 
(M = 0.95, SD = 0.22). Finally, in support of Hypothesis 2, participants were 
significantly less likely, F(1, 20) = 4.71, p < .05, η²p = .19, to give the allocator a 
second chance after receiving undercompensation without an apology (M = 0.29, SD 
= 0.46) than after receiving undercompensation with an apology (M = 0.48, SD = 
0.51). Table 1 reports, for each of the four responses, the number and the percentage 
of participants who would (or would not) give the allocator a second chance. 
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Table 1. The number and percentage of participants that would (or would not) give the 
allocator a second chance in the next round in Study 1 (N = 21) 
Allocator’s response Give the allocator a second chance? 
 Yes No 
 n % n % 
Undercompensation 6 28.6 15 71.4 
Undercompensation with an apology 10 47.6 11 52.4 
Equal compensation 20 95.2 1 4.8 
Overcompensation 16 76.2 5 23.8 
 
Discussion 
 The present study provides some initial evidence that in a financial 
exchange, apologies might encourage relationship preservation when the recipients 
receive a compensation that is too low to achieve equality. Furthermore, the results 
showed that overcompensation is not more effective than equal compensation in 
achieving this positive reaction. Both of these results thus indicate that in financial 
situations, it is not only monetary concerns that play a role. 
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design 
 A total of 302 undergraduate students at Erasmus University Rotterdam in 
the Netherlands (175 men, 127 women; Mage = 20.56, SD = 1.69) participated in the 
study in exchange for course credits. Unlike Study 1, Study 2 was a lab experiment. 
Moreover, compensation and apologies were now manipulated orthogonally, and we 
included a no compensation condition as a control group. Therefore, the study 
employed a full factorial 4 (compensation: no compensation vs. undercompensation 
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vs. equal compensation vs. overcompensation) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. 
apology) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
 Upon arrival in the laboratory, each participant was placed in a separate 
experimental cubicle in front of a computer. First, the dictator game was explained. 
As in Study 1, all participants played the role of the recipient and received two of the 
ten lottery tickets from the simulated allocator. To assess their comprehension of the 
task, the participants completed three comprehension checks: (1) who would divide 
the ten lottery tickets, (2) to what extent the recipient would be able to influence the 
allocator's decision, and (3) what the lottery tickets were worth. The participants 
who failed to answer at least two of the three checks correctly were excluded from 
the analyses (1 participant, 0.3%). In addition, 12 participants (4.0%) were excluded 
because they voiced suspicion about the task.  
 To be able to examine actual relationship repair, it is necessary that 
participants experience the allocator’s initial division of the lottery tickets as a 
transgression. Therefore, we assessed participants’ satisfaction with the division by 
asking them to select one of two messages to send to the allocator (i.e., “I am 
satisfied with how you divided the lottery tickets” or “I am NOT satisfied with how 
you divided the lottery tickets”). For participants who indicated that they were 
satisfied with the division (42 participants, 14.5%), and consequently did not 
experience it as a transgression, the experiment ended at this point. Participants who 
indicated that they were not satisfied with the division (247 participants, 85.5%), and 
consequently experienced it as a transgression, proceeded to the manipulations.  
 In response to their message to the allocator, participants in the apology 
condition received an apology (“I want to apologize for the division”), while the 
participants in the no apology condition received no apology. The participants in the 
no compensation condition received no compensation, while the participants in the 
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under-, equal, and overcompensation conditions received a compensation of 
additional tickets (“I give you – 1, 3, or 5 – extra ticket(s),” respectively).  
 To measure participants’ intentions to preserve the relationship with the 
allocator, we used six items based on the Transgression-Related Interpersonal 
Motivations (TRIM) Inventory—18 (McCullough et al., 1998). The TRIM—18 
measures three dimensions of forgiveness motivation: avoidance, revenge, and 
benevolence (see McCullough et al., 2006). As our focus is on relationship 
preservation, we selected items from the benevolence subscale  which measures 
benevolence motivation towards a transgressor  and the avoidance subscale  
which measures motivation to avoid a transgressor  that were applicable to our 
experimental situation. Four items based on the benevolence subscale were used to 
measure participants’ intentions to continue the relationship with the transgressor: 
“To what extent would you be likely to give the allocator a second chance?”, “To 
what extent would you be likely to give the allocator the benefit of the doubt?”, “To 
what extent would you be inclined to work with the allocator again?”, and “To what 
extent would you not mind working with the allocator again?” Two items based on 
the avoidance subscale were used to measure participants’ intentions to discontinue 
the relationship with the transgressor: “To what extent would you be inclined to quit 
working with the allocator?” and “To what extent would you prefer to work with 
someone else in the future?” All six items were measured using seven-point scales 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much); the two avoidance items were reverse-coded. 
Mirroring the results of McCullough et al. (2006), a factor analysis with oblique 
rotation indicated the avoidance and benevolence items to load on a single factor 
(eigenvalue = 3.14, explained variance = 52.37%); therefore, all items were 
combined into a single scale (alpha = 0.79, M = 3.61, SD = 1.78) measuring 
relationship preservation. 
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 To examine whether the apology and the compensation manipulations were 
successful, we used three manipulation checks: “To what extent did the allocator 
apologize for his or her actions?”, “To what extent did the allocator say sorry about 
his or her actions?”, and “To what extent would you say the allocator gave you many 
tickets back?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Because scholars have argued that the 
use of manipulation checks may influence participants’ responses on the dependent 
variable (Goodwin, 2009; Stangor, 2010), the manipulation checks were solicited at 
the end of the experiment, after the relationship preservation questionnaire. 
Finally, the experiment was stopped, and the participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and dismissed. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
 Two ANOVAs revealed, for both apology manipulation checks, a significant 
main effect of apology, F(1, 239) = 24.99, p < .001, η²p = .10 and F(1, 239) = 52.88, 
p < .001, η²p = .18, respectively. Participants interpreted the behavior of the allocator 
on both items as more apologetic in the apology condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.87 and 
M = 4.24, SD = 1.75, respectively) than in the no apology condition (M = 3.00, SD = 
1.88 and M = 2.77, SD = 1.81, respectively). Further, these two ANOVAs also 
revealed, for both apology manipulation checks, a significant main effect of 
compensation, F(3, 239) = 37.40, p < .001, η²p = .32 and F(3, 239) = 24.62, p < .001, 
η²p = .24, respectively. A post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants interpreted 
the behavior of the allocator on both items as not more apologetic (n.s.) in the 
overcompensation condition (M = 4.72, SD = 1.40 and M = 4.51, SD = 1.51, 
respectively) than in the equal compensation condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.66 and M 
= 4.22, SD = 1.74, respectively). Further, participants interpreted the behavior of the 
allocator on both items as more apologetic (ps < .001) in the equal compensation 
condition than in the undercompensation condition (M = 2.85, SD = 1.63 and M = 
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2.90, SD = 1.67, respectively). Finally, the participants interpreted the behavior of 
the allocator on the first item as more apologetic (p < .05) and on the second item as 
not more apologetic (n.s.) in the undercompensation condition than in the no 
compensation condition (M = 2.25, SD = 1.78 and M = 2.50, SD = 1.91, 
respectively). The fact that there is a significant main effect of the compensation 
condition on the apology manipulation checks, seems to imply that equal 
compensation and overcompensation implicitly convey the message that a 
transgressor feels sorry, and that a compensation is an expression of this regret. 
Consequently, in an economic situation, these monetary resources seem to “make-up 
for” unfair decision-making (see Okimoto, 2008).  
 Finally, an ANOVA for the financial compensation manipulation check 
revealed only a significant main effect of compensation, F(3, 239) = 132.21, p < 
.001, η²p = .62. Participants indicated receiving more tickets back from the allocator 
in the overcompensation condition (M = 5.58, SD = 1.15) than in the equal 
compensation condition (M = 4.58, SD = 1.61), in the equal compensation condition 
than in the undercompensation condition (M = 2.17, SD = 1.38), and in the 
undercompensation condition than in the no compensation condition (M = 1.61, SD 
= 1.00). A post hoc test (LSD) showed that the contrasts between all these conditions 
were significant (p < .001, p < .001, and p < .05, respectively). 
Relationship preservation 
A 4 (compensation) × 2 (apology) ANOVA on the relationship preservation 
scale showed a significant main effect of compensation, F(3, 239) = 40.20, p < .001, 
η²p = .34, no main effect of apology, F(1, 239) = .05, n.s., η²p = .00, and a significant 
interaction effect of compensation and apology, F(3, 239) = 2.58, p = .05, η²p = .03. 
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for each condition. 
 The main effect of compensation was further explored using Helmert 
contrasts. In support of Hypothesis 1a, significantly lower intentions to preserve the 
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relationship (contrast estimate = -0.78, SE = 0.15, p < .001) were revealed in the 
undercompensation condition compared to the equal and overcompensation 
conditions (M = 4.27, SD = 0.93). In addition, in support of Hypothesis 1b, the 
intentions to preserve the relationship did not differ significantly (contrast estimate = 
0.09, SE = 0.18, n.s.) between the equal compensation condition and the 
overcompensation condition. 
Next, we examined the significant interaction effect between compensation 
and apologies by using planned contrasts (Field, 2005). We computed four contrasts 
regarding the impact of the apology conditions within the compensation conditions. 
In agreement with Hypothesis 2, in the undercompensation condition, an apology 
significantly increased intentions to preserve the relationship, F(1, 239) = 4.06, p < 
.05, η²p = .02. In agreement with Hypotheses 3a and 3b, an apology did not increase 
intentions to preserve the relationship in the equal compensation condition, F(1, 
239) = 0.65, n.s., η²p = .00, or the overcompensation condition, F(1, 239) = 3.03, 
n.s., η²p = .01. Finally, an apology did not increase intentions to preserve the 
relationship in the no compensation condition, F(1, 239) = 0.03, n.s., η²p = .00.  
 Based on our theoretical framework, we computed two contrasts regarding 
the impact of the compensation conditions within the apology conditions (i.e., a first 
contrast to compare undercompensation with equal and overcompensation, and a 
second contrast to compare equal compensation with overcompensation). The first 
contrast revealed that in the no apology condition, undercompensation significantly 
decreased intentions to preserve the relationship compared to equal and 
overcompensation (M = 4.42, SD = 0.82), F(1, 239) = 30.27, p < .001, η²p = .11. 
However, in the apology condition, there was no difference in intentions to preserve 
the relationship between, on the one hand, undercompensation, and on the other 
hand, equal and overcompensation (M = 4.10, SD = 1.02), F(1, 239) = 2.92, n.s., η²p 
= .01. For the second contrast, there was no significant increase in intentions to 
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preserve the relationship in the overcompensation condition compared to the equal 
compensation condition, including both the apology condition, F(1, 239) = 0.02, 
n.s., η²p = .00, and the no apology condition, F(1, 239) = 0.64, n.s., η²p = .00. These 
final results support our predictions in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for each condition in Study 2 (N = 247). 
Compensation condition Apology condition 
 No apology Apology Total 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  
No compensation 2.66 1.00  2.70 1.10  2.68 1.04  
Undercompensation 3.22 1.07  3.73 0.73  3.48 0.94  
Equal compensation 4.40 0.73  4.19 0.84  4.29 0.79  
Overcompensation 4.43 0.90  3.99 1.22  4.24 1.06  
Total 3.62 1.22  3.61 1.14  3.61 1.18  
Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater intentions to preserve the relationship.  
 
Discussion 
 Study 2 provides further evidence that in financial exchanges, apologies 
increase the effectiveness of undercompensation as a means to preserve a 
relationship. Furthermore, as expected, the results show that undercompensation is 
less effective than equal compensation, and equal compensation is as effective as 
overcompensation in preserving relationships. 
 
General discussion 
 An unfair division of available resources can lead to mistrust, 
disappointment, and anger between the parties involved, which makes forgiveness 
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and relationship preservation less likely to occur (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; 
McCornack & Leveni, 1990). Therefore, it is important to understand the 
mechanisms by which relationship preservation can be enhanced in such situations. 
Prior research has revealed that in interdependent situations, allocators can make use 
of repair strategies that address the recipient’s financial interests (i.e., financial 
compensation; see Desmet et al., 2011) or strategies that address relational interests 
(i.e., apologies; see De Cremer, 2002; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Both strategies are 
thought to be successful because they signal that the allocator takes responsibility for 
the transgression and is trying to reduce the harm that has been performed by the 
transgression. This idea was confirmed by Bottom et al. (2002), who identified 
financial compensation, explanations, and apologies as effective strategies to 
enhance cooperation. Although prior research has suggested that financial 
compensation alone may not be sufficient to effectively restore the relationship (e.g., 
Curhan et al., 2006; De Cremer, 2002), the research to date has neglected to study if 
and when there is a simultaneous effect of financial compensation and apologies on 
relationship preservation. 
 The present studies had two important aims. The first aim was to investigate 
the relationship between the amount of compensation and the extent to which the 
relationship was preserved. The second aim was to demonstrate that in cases of 
undercompensation, non-financial means can have an important secondary value in 
preserving relationships. We tested our hypotheses in two studies that presented a 
financial allocation situation. In both of these studies, the participants played the role 
of the recipient in a dictator game with a simulated allocator. The allocator inflicted 
financial harm on the recipient in the first phase of the experiment, that he or she 
then tried to minimalize or undo by offering an apology (or not) and/or financial 
compensation (or not).  
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Our hypotheses were confirmed by the results. Both of our studies showed 
that the participants who received equal compensation or overcompensation had 
greater intentions to preserve the relationship than the participants who received 
undercompensation (Hypothesis 1a). These results corroborate previous research 
that revealed that financial compensation encourages relationship repair, and greater 
compensation elicits more favorable reactions than lesser compensation (Desmet et 
al., 2011). From an economic perspective, greater compensation should result in 
higher tendencies toward relationship preservation. However, both of our studies 
revealed that overcompensation does not increase intentions to preserve the 
relationship more than equal compensation does (Hypothesis 1b). This result 
corroborates the findings of Desmet et al. (2011), that showed similar effects of 
compensation size on trust restoration when the initial malicious intentions of the 
allocator were clear to the recipient.  
Further, both of our studies showed that the participants’ intentions to 
preserve the relationship with the allocator were higher after receiving 
undercompensation with an apology than after receiving undercompensation without 
an apology (Hypothesis 2). From a relational perspective, these results confirm that 
in cases of undercompensation, when compensation alone is insufficient to reach 
equality, an apology offers important additional value in preserving relationships. In 
other words, in these situations, apologies constitute a non-financial means to 
preserve relationships. Furthermore, the results of Study 2 revealed that apologies 
did not promote relationship preservation in the context of equal compensation 
(Hypothesis 3a) or overcompensation (Hypothesis 3b). Hence, when an allocator 
provides the necessary financial means to satisfy or exceed the equality norm, there 
is no need for additional non-financial strategies to preserve the relationship. 
In the remainder of the discussion, we focus on the relative importance of 
financial and non-financial motives of the people who have to decide whether to 
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preserve the relationship with a party who harmed them financially. We also discuss 
the relationship between the amount of compensation and the willingness to preserve 
the relationship. Finally, we describe in depth some limitations of the present 
studies. 
Financial and relational motives 
Classical economic theory assumes that people are both rational and selfish 
(i.e., maximize their own outcomes), while other motives are largely ignored 
(Camerer & Thaler, 2003; Dawes & Thaler, 1988). The present studies, however, 
highlight that financial outcomes alone may not be sufficient to understand 
relationship preservation. Rather, our findings are in line with the idea that people’s 
appreciation of restoration attempts also depends on fairness concerns, such as fair 
treatment and respect (see Bies & Moag, 1986; Tyler & Bies, 1990). Compensation 
particularly resulted in greater relationship preservation if it restored equality, and 
the impact of further compensation beyond that was limited, and far smaller than the 
impact of failing to restore equality (cf. Loewenstein et al., 1989). Moreover, 
relationship preservation could further be bolstered by apologies, at least in cases of 
undercompensation. As such, the present findings are in line with research that 
stresses the importance of appealing to relational motives in order to achieve trust 
repair (Bottom et al., 2002; Lazare, 2004; Kim et al., 2009). 
The provision of apologies did not universally facilitate relationship repair. 
Its impact was limited in situations where equality was met or exceeded, or when no 
compensation was given. How can these findings be understood, in light of previous 
research that has indicated that apologies alone (i.e., without financial 
compensation) can promote reconciliation (e.g., Bottom et al., 2002; Exline, Deshea, 
& Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989)? Scholars have argued that 
when actors enter in an economic exchange situation (like the dictator game), which 
mainly consists of resource allocations between two or more agents, trust is typically 
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calculus-based (i.e., outcome-related concerns imply that broken trust can be 
repaired most effectively by financial strategies, such as a financial compensation) 
rather than identification-based (i.e., trust driven by affect and interpersonal 
concerns – which implies that broken trust can be repaired most effectively by 
relational strategies, such as an apology; see Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998; Lewecki et al., 2005). Accordingly, Joskowicz-Jabloner and Leiser (2011) 
reported that different betrayal-domains lead to different negative emotions and 
different strategies to relieve these emotions. More specifically, for the social norms 
domain (i.e., trust-betrayal between strangers), emotions of indignation and anger 
are strongest and financial strategies, such as a financial compensation, reduce these 
emotions most effectively. For the personal domain (i.e., trust-betrayal in an ongoing 
interpersonal relationship), however, emotions of disappointment and hurt are 
strongest and non-financial strategies, such as an apology, reduce these emotions 
most effectively.  
In the present context, where transgressions occurred in an economic 
exchange situation between strangers (see Desmet et al., 2011; Joskowicz-Jabloner 
& Leiser, 2011), these processes suggest that financial outcomes are likely to have 
dominated evaluations, thereby reducing the impact of apologies in situations where 
the distributive injustice is already redressed (i.e., after equal compensation or 
overcompensation). The impact of apologies may similarly have been reduced when 
no compensation is given, as in this situation  contrary to previous research  the 
allocator is offering no compensation despite being capable of fully compensating 
the recipient. Therefore, in the present context, an apology could even be seen as 
hypocrisy, because of the apparent contradiction between words (expressing regret) 
and behavior (giving nothing). In sum, these notions suggest that relational 
strategies, like apologies, might have a stronger impact on relationship repair in 
contexts that are less economic, such as in non-financial situations, or in interactions 
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among partners or friends in ongoing relationships. Nevertheless, the present 
findings illustrate that even in a strongly financial frame, relational means can 
contribute to relationship preservation. Hence, the present research underlines the 
importance of relational motives in economic situations, and shows that even 
undercompensation can be persuasive, as long as the allocator takes responsibility 
for unfair behavior by showing remorse. 
Towards a model of the relative values of financial compensation and apologies 
We were the first to investigate the impact of different compensation sizes 
and apologies on relationship repair simultaneously. Our findings can be captured in 
a more general model. Because people want equality to be restored they respond 
positively to equal compensation and overcompensation, which implies that the 
outcome an sich is not the most important. This idea is also evident from the study 
of Loewenstein et al. (1989), who demonstrated that the utility that people derive 
from advantageous inequality is by far exceeded by the disutility they derive from 
disadvantageous inequality.  
In this respect, in the aftermath of distributive harm, the offer of an 
additional equal compensation or overcompensation provides (post-hoc) satisfaction 
of the equality norm, because the compensation readdress the initial state of 
disadvantageous inequality. Implicitly, this means that allocators distance 
themselves from their previous unfair behavior, by eventually conforming to (or 
exceeding) the applicable standard. This dissociation encourages the repair of the 
damaged or broken relationship. Moreover, there is a positive (linear) relationship 
between the amount of financial compensation and the level of relationship 
preservation until the level of equal compensation, after which the curve flattens. 
Thus, once equality is reached, an additional action by the transgressor has no 
additional value in promoting the relationship; however, if equality has not been 
reached (i.e. in cases of undercompensation) there is still room to encourage the 
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repair of the broken or damaged relationship. For this reason, the impact of 
relational strategies, such as apologies, will especially be pronounced when the point 
of equality is not yet reached. Stated otherwise, undercompensation combined with 
an apology is considered fairer  and consequently closer to the equality norm  
than undercompensation without an apology. 
As seen in Figure 1, apologies help to encourage relationship preservation, 
such that the value of a particular amount of resources used as compensation (e.g., 
‘x’, or 50 euro) increases up to a higher level of compensation (e.g., ‘x + 1’, or 70 
euro). In other words, in this model, apologies can be expressed in terms of how 
much monetary value can be saved to preserve the relationship (e.g., 20 euro). 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between the amount of compensation and relationship preservation.  
Note. The solid line indicates financial compensation and the dashed line indicates the additional value of 
an apology. 
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As seen in Figure 2, one possibility is that over the continuum of possible 
undercompensation values, apologies represent a constant which should simply be 
added to the effect of undercompensation (curve a). Another possibility, also 
depicted in Figure 2, is that the power of apologies to preserve a relationship 
depends on the amount of compensation, such that apologies become more effective 
when the point of equality is approached (curve b), or a reversed pattern might even 
emerge (curve c). 
 
Figure 2. Three possibilities for the additional value of an apology on relationship preservation.  
Note. The solid line indicates financial compensation and the dashed lines indicate the additional value of 
apologies: the dashed line and square indicate curve a; the dashed line and circle indicate curve b; the 
dashed line and triangle indicate curve c. 
 
Amount of compensation 
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
 p
re
se
rv
at
io
n
 
equal 
 
To test this more general model, further studies should systematically vary 
the amount of extra resources offered by the allocator, which would allow mapping 
of the relative contributions of apologies and compensation in preserving a 
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relationship. Furthermore, the added value of an apology to a financial compensation 
for relationship preservation could potentially be influenced by other factors that are 
involved in relationship repair. Here, we can think of potential mediators, such as 
perceived remorse and perceived admittance (see Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008; Scher 
& Darley, 1997), reaffirmed respect and status of the victim (see Barclay & 
Skarlicki, 2008), forgiveness (see McCullough, 2000; McCullough et al., 1998, 
2006), and trust (see Kramer, 1999; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Lorenz, 1999; Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995), and potential moderators, like the specific situation (e.g., 
economic vs. non-economic situation; see Desmet et al., 2011), the transgression 
type (e.g., integrity- vs. competence-based trust violation; see Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, 
& Dirks, 2007; Kim et al., 2004), and relationship closeness (e.g., transgressor is a 
stranger vs. a friend; see Joskowicz-Jabloner & Leiser, 2011). 
Limitations 
Before closing, some limitations must be discussed. First, both of our studies 
made use of a dictator game. The dictator game has the advantage that the recipient 
is not able to reject the offer, which allowed us to directly assess the separate 
impacts of financial compensation and apologies when the outcomes were identical 
for each participant (see De Cremer, 2010). A downside to this procedure is that 
real-life situations are often more complex. For example, some recipients may enact 
vengeance or avoid further contact before the allocator has had the chance to fix the 
harm. Moreover, the dictator game is an economic situation, in which outcome-
related concerns are particularly salient. This means that although our findings 
reveal that particularly strategies that address financial outcomes are effective as 
means to restore relationships, it is possible that relational strategies would be more 
effective in non-economic situations. Therefore, while the present studies provide a 
useful starting point to understand the impacts of economic and relational strategies 
on the repair of relationships, future research should examine these strategies in 
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION AND APOLOGIES 
 
 
215 
more complex settings (e.g., using the ultimatum game) and in more relational 
contexts (e.g., non-financial decisions and ongoing relationships).  
Secondly, to be able to investigate relationship preservation in the aftermath 
of distributive harm, it is important that recipients experience the allocator’s decision 
about the division of the available resources as a transgression. Previous studies, 
however, indicate that attributing transgressions to clear malicious intent is 
associated with a decline in forgiveness (Boon & Sulsky, 1997) and trust (Desmet et 
al., 2011). This implies that in our studies there could be an effect of perceived 
intentionality of the transgressor, e.g., in terms of blame attribution (see Shaver, 
1985). Therefore, further research should take the intentionality of the transgression 
into account. 
Finally, the exact mechanism through which an apology exerts its positive 
influence on relationship preservation in cases of undercompensation remains 
unclear in our studies. Therefore, a valuable avenue for future research would be to 
examine the different factors that can explain the added value of an apology in 
addition to financial undercompensation for relationship repair. 
Conclusion 
The present studies show that when financial harm has been inflicted in an 
economic context, financial strategies (i.e., financial compensation) and relational 
strategies (i.e., apologies) play roles in preserving relationships. More specifically, 
apologies encourage the preservation of the relationship after an unfair resource 
allocation followed by an offer of financial compensation that is too low to satisfy 
the equality norm. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Impact of Decision Timing on the 
Effectiveness of Leaders’ Apologies to Repair 
Followers’ Trust in the Aftermath of Leader 
Failure 
 
Abstract 
The aim of the present research was to investigate how a negative decision outcome 
generated by a leader in a hasty, timely, or delayed manner impacts upon the need 
for, and the effectiveness of apologies to restore followers’ trust. In the aftermath of 
a leader’s failure, followers experienced a delayed incorrect decision as a more 
severe transgression than a hasty or a timely incorrect decision. This effect was 
mediated by procedural fairness concerns (Study 1). The present findings also 
revealed an interesting paradox. Specifically, in the delayed condition followers 
expressed the highest need for an apology (Studies 2 and 3), but at the same time 
expected an apology to be less effective for enhancing trustworthiness than in the 
timely and the hasty condition (Study 3). Moreover, we also showed that the actual 
provision of an apology was effective for restoring both trustworthiness (Study 4) 
and trust (Studies 4 and 5) in the timely and the hasty condition, but ineffective in 
the delayed condition. The present research shows that when the outcome of a 
decision is uncertain, it is better to make a decision (too) soon rather than (too) late.  
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., Joosten, A., Reinders Folmer, C., Lerner, L., De Cremer, 
D., & Van Hiel, A. (2016). The impact of decision timing on the effectiveness of leaders’ 
apologies to repair followers’ trust in the aftermath of leader failure. Journal of Business and 
Psychology, 31(4), 533-551. 
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Introduction 
 On almost a daily basis leaders have to make decisions that can either benefit 
or harm their organization, their employees, and themselves (Messick & Bazerman, 
1996). When leaders make inadequate decisions a host of negative consequences may 
arise, which can hamper followers’ future collaboration and compliance (De Cremer, 
2013). Importantly, prior research has also indicated that leader failure decreases 
followers’ confidence and trust in this leader (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Trust is an 
important element of organizational functioning and influences leadership 
effectiveness considerably (see Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), and for that reason leaders need 
to be able to restore trust once it is violated. One relevant way to address trust violations 
in an effective way is through the delivery of an apology (Lazare, 2004).  
 In the present paper, we investigated the type of transgressions that can be 
restored through the use of apologies in the context of dyadic leader-follower 
relationships. We aim to show that, in the case of an incorrect decision by a leader, the 
timing of when the decision was made can influence how much a trust repair strategy 
(by means of delivering an apology) is needed. Did the leader make the incorrect 
decision in a hasty, timely, or delayed fashion? Leaders can quickly make decisions but 
can also miss deadlines for those same decisions. Although not much research attention 
has been devoted to the issue of timeliness in explaining leadership effectiveness, prior 
research has revealed that delayed decisions lead to negative consequences in terms of 
organizational performance and leadership perceptions (e.g., Cha & Edmonston, 2006; 
Gilliland, 1993; Truxillo, Bauer, Campion, & Paronto, 2002). The present research 
aimed to show that the timing of a leader’s incorrect decision also influences the 
effectiveness of an apology for enhancing trust repair. 
Trust in leader-follower relationships 
 Almost any decision or exchange that we engage in includes some sort of trust 
evaluation, either towards a person, an organization, or even society as a whole. As 
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR 
 
227 
such, trust represents a fundamental ingredient to coordinate and facilitate social 
relationships (Bohnet & Croson, 2004). In this regard, the integrative model of Mayer, 
Davis, and Schoorman (1995) makes an important conceptual distinction between 
trustworthiness and trust. Trustworthiness is a multidimensional construct that 
comprises the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee (Colquitt, Scott, & 
LePine, 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). These three facets are viewed as antecedents of trust, 
which has been defined as the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive 
expectations of the actions of another person (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998). In the current contribution, we take trustworthiness and trust into account when 
investigating the reconciliation process in the aftermath of leader failure, because the 
leader-member exchange theory describes both these concepts as crucial elements of 
effective relationships between leaders and their followers (see Liden & Graen, 1980). 
 Indeed, researchers have identified the presence of trust as a critical 
prerequisite for leaders to empower their followers (see Gómez & Rosen, 2001; Mayer 
et al., 1995). Because of high trust employees effectively complete their jobs and go 
above and beyond the call of duty in their work without clear compensation (Dirks & 
Skarlicki, 2004). In addition, a meta-analysis of Dirks and Ferrin (2002) revealed that 
trust in leadership also has significant positive relationships with employees’ outcomes, 
including organizational citizenship behavior, job satisfaction, and commitment to the 
leader’s decisions. Yet, in everyday life leaders are confronted with many challenging 
situations which offer numerous opportunities for violating their followers’ trust. One 
way in which leaders may violate trust is by making decisions that fail to reach desired 
goals and subsequently produce unfavorable outcomes for their followers. 
Acknowledging the ubiquity of such leaders’ failures, a vital question that arises is how 
followers’ trust can be regained in the aftermath of leader failure. 
Trust repair: The use of apologies 
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  The trust repair strategy that received by far the most research attention is the 
provision of an apology (De Cremer, 2010). An apology is generally defined as a 
combined statement of an acknowledgement of wrongdoing and an expression of guilt 
(Lazare, 2004). Another crucial element of a persuasive apology is an explicit promise 
of future trustworthy behavior (Scher & Darley, 1997). In the aftermath of a trust 
violation, an apology can thus be seen as an adequate response because it implies that 
the transgressor distances him- or herself from prior actions. 
 A considerable body of research has shown that offering a sincere apology 
might indeed be an effective strategy to enhance trust (e.g., Ohbuchi, Kameda, & 
Agarie, 1989; Schwartz, 1978; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). Specifically, 
these studies found that transgressors who apologize are rated more favorably and as 
less culpable than transgressors who do not apologize. However, evidence is growing 
that apologies do not always facilitate the repair of trust (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012). 
The theory of impression management suggests that apologies can be ineffective due to 
the acknowledgment of guilt (Schlenker, 1980). In line with this theory, Sigal, Hsu, 
Foodim, and Betman (1988) found that a denial of misconduct is a more effective 
strategy to obtain votes for a political candidate than the provision of an apology. 
Moreover, prior research revealed that the type of violation plays a crucial role in 
determining whether apologies are effective to repair broken trust (e.g., Ferrin, Kim, 
Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & 
Dirks, 2004). Specifically, apologies are effective to enhance trust after a competence-
based trust violation. However, when the transgression reflects a lack of integrity (such 
as the sexual or financial misconduct in the study of Sigal and colleagues) apologies are 
ineffective to repair broken trust. A similar result was obtained by Leunissen, De 
Cremer, Reinders Folmer, and van Dijke (2013), who found that an apology leads to 
more forgiveness after unintentional than after intentional transgressions. However, 
apologies may not only be ineffective, but even counterproductive. In this regard, 
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Kellogg (2007) has referred to apologies as “highly risky strategies” that can make “a 
bad situation worse” (p. 21). Empirical research supports the idea that apologies can 
backfire and lead to a further decline of trust (Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004). 
 How can the mixed results of these prior studies be explained? Previous 
research has shown that the effectiveness of an apology as a means to repair broken 
trust is dependent on whether people are willing to rebuild their relationship with the 
transgressor (Tomlinson et al., 2004). This willingness strongly depends on how the 
trust violation occurred. Although much is known about how the type of violation (for 
instance in terms of competence versus integrity or unintentional versus intentional 
violations) influences the trust repair process, a crucial category of organizational trust 
violations − that is, delayed decisions and missed deadlines − has not yet been 
examined. In the present research, we argue that a leader’s decision timing, another 
important dimension of transgression, is a crucial antecedent of whether apologies will 
be able to positively influence trustworthiness and trust.  
The role of decision timing 
 There is some prior research that indicated the importance of the role of timing 
for the trust repair process. In this venture, Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, and Murnighan 
(2008) found that the timing of a trust breach (i.e., whether the breach occurred at an 
early or later phase of the relationship) influences the restoration process. Investigating 
another aspect of timing, Frantz and Benningson (2005) reported that whether an 
apology was offered at the beginning or the end of a conversation impacts its 
effectiveness to enhance recovery. Specifically, these studies revealed that getting off 
on the wrong foot has especially devastating long-term consequences for trust and that 
later apologies are more effective to restore trust than earlier ones. However, no 
previous studies investigated how the timing of an incorrect decision influences the 
need for and the effectiveness of apologies as a trust repair strategy. This lack in the 
literature is regretful because leaders are regularly confronted with deadlines. Delays 
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thus appear to be a ubiquitous problem for organizations (De Cremer, 2013; Tukel & 
Rom, 1998), making attempts to repair trust under such circumstances highly relevant. 
With regard to the timing dimension, leaders’ decisions can either be generated hasty 
(when the decision is made too early, without considering all relevant information), 
timely (when the decision is made at the appropriate or opportune moment in time), or 
delayed (when the decision is made too late, for example after the passing of a 
predefined deadline).  
 What happens when decisions are delivered in a timely fashion, too soon, or 
too late? Hogan and Kaiser (2005) have argued that “good leaders make good decisions 
in a timely way” (p. 173). In line with this statement, timeliness has been associated 
with positive outcomes in terms of leadership effectiveness and organizational 
performance (see Bluedorn & Denhardt, 1988; Jacobs, 2005; Snowden & Boone, 
2007). With regard to the outcomes of decisions, from this literature it is not clear 
whether these positive consequences are only applicable to timely decisions that had 
positive outcomes, or also when the outcome of the decision process was negative. 
With regard to the consequences of hasty decisions the results are more mixed. On the 
one hand, some studies have shown that an overly fast decision-making style may 
reflect negatively upon leaders (e.g., Gavin & Roberto, 2001). On the other hand, there 
are also studies which have indicated that a fast decision-making style is positively 
related to organizational performance, as fast decisions are associated with efficiency 
and effectiveness (e.g., Bluedorn, 2002). With respect to delayed decisions, the results 
of previous studies are more straightforward. People have a strong aversion for delays, 
especially when a delay affects desired outcomes and incur costs (Blount & Janicik, 
2001). Postponing a decision can lead to important deadlines being missed, which can 
have severe consequences for team processes and outcomes (Mohammed, Hamilton, & 
Lim, 2009). Moreover, leaders who employ a delayed decision-making style are 
perceived as ineffective, lazy, and even hypocritical (Cha & Edmonston, 2006).  
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 Taken together, these studies show that particularly a delayed decision-making 
style is harmful for leadership effectiveness and social reputation. What is interesting to 
note, however, is that timing of a decision in most studies refers to the process of 
making decisions, and does not necessarily imply positive or negative outcomes. 
Below, we argue that the timing dimension will be highly relevant to followers in cases 
where they suffer negative outcomes due to a leader’s (hasty, timely, or delayed) 
erroneous decision.  
Being wrong and too late: Implications for trust repair 
 From a purely instrumental perspective, followers should not care about the 
leader’s decision timing when this decision failed to reach a desired outcome. Indeed, 
in such instances the leader’s decision generated a negative outcome, regardless of the 
timing of this decision. However, people are not only influenced by the outcomes of a 
decision, but also by the way the decision has been reached. The distinction between 
distributive and procedural fairness helps to understand why decisions that are incorrect 
and delayed are not well received. Distributive fairness refers to the perception of 
fairness of received outcomes and allocations (Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001). Yet, 
people’s satisfaction with tangible outcomes is also determined by the degree to which 
fair procedures are applied in order to arrive at this outcome. Procedures are considered 
fair when, for example, they are free from bias and when accurate information is 
collected and used in the decision process (Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980).  
 Rutte and Messick (1995) suggested that when people’s outcomes are 
unfavorable, they start to “search for one or more rules that were violated” (p. 247). 
Particularly relevant in the present context is the finding that when outcomes are 
negative and distributive fairness is at a low level, people are especially influenced by 
and concerned with procedural fairness (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Hence, when a 
leader’s decision hurts the interests of his or her followers, followers will pay special 
attention to the way in which the decision was made. In this respect, timeliness can be 
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considered as an important dimension for evaluating procedural fairness (e.g., Bies & 
Moag, 1986; Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996).  
 Indeed, recent justice research investigating the speed of decision-making as a 
procedural fairness principle found that overly slow decision-making processes trigger 
perceptions of unfairness (see Valkeapää & Seppälä, 2014; see also Gilliland, 1993; 
Truxillo et al., 2002). When decisions last much longer than expected, uncertainty 
increases and people may start looking for parties at fault and possible reasons for the 
delays (Lind, 2001). Similarly, a fast decision process might also be perceived as unfair 
as it indicates that there might be problems in the adherence of proper decision-making 
procedures, as full adherence to procedural fairness principles takes time (Scott, 
Colquitt, & Paddock, 2009). Consequently, fast decision-making processes could also 
be negatively related to perceived fairness. Yet, the study of Valkeapää and Seppälä 
provides initial evidence that the negative effects of delayed decisions, in terms of 
lowered procedural fairness concerns, are more pronounced than the negative effects of 
hasty decisions. This finding can be explained when taking the concept of uncertainty 
into account. Indeed, a slow decision creates both uncertainty in the short-term (greater 
time spent under uncertainty) and long-term (concerns about the quality of the decision-
making process), while a fast decision creates only concerns about the quality of the 
decision-making process as it minimalizes short-term uncertainty (see Valkeapää & 
Seppälä, 2014). In sum, it can thus be expected that, compared to timely decisions, 
especially delayed decisions will lead to low procedural fairness perceptions. 
 A range of studies found that negative reactions are most prominent when low 
distributive fairness is accompanied by unfair procedures (for an overview, see 
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Put otherwise, the combination of low procedural 
fairness and low outcome favorability engenders the most negative reactions. Hence, in 
the aftermath of a leader failure which results in a negative decision outcome, followers 
will react most negatively when the procedural aspects of the decision-making process 
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have not been well secured, like when a decision is not reached in a timely fashion. 
These negative reactions occur because unfair procedures convey information about 
one’s poor reputation and social standing in the group (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; 
Tyler & Lind, 1992). In the present research we solely focused on timing effects in the 
case of incorrect decisions.  
Hypotheses 
 Based on the theoretical framework presented above, it can be argued that 
when a delayed decision results in a negative outcome, this can be seen as especially 
harmful as not only outcome-related concerns, but also procedural fairness concerns are 
violated. Hence, in case of a delayed incorrect decision a double transgression has 
occurred, while in case of a timely incorrect decision solely outcome-related concerns 
are violated (i.e., a single transgression). Note that in case of a hasty incorrect decision 
procedural fairness concerns might also be violated, but to a lesser extent than after a 
delayed incorrect decision (cf. Valkeapää & Seppälä, 2014). This reasoning led us to 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: A delayed incorrect decision is perceived as a more severe transgression 
than when the same incorrect decision is generated in a timely or a hasty manner. 
Hypothesis 1b: Procedural fairness concerns mediate the effect of a delayed incorrect 
decision (versus a timely and a hasty one) on harm severity. 
 With regard to the trust repair process, an apology communicates that the 
transgressor feels remorse and is willing to take responsibility for maintaining the 
relationship (Scher & Darley, 1997). Apologies are therefore considered a very 
effective mitigating account, which makes wrongs look a bit more right by working on 
relational needs (Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005). Moreover, in the forgiveness literature it 
is reported that harm severity strengthens the need for and relevance of actions that 
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promote forgiveness (Pronk, Karremans, Overbeek, Vermulst, & Wigboldus, 2010). 
Based on this literature, we formulated the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, followers have a higher need for an 
apology when the leader made the incorrect decision that led to a negative outcome in a 
delayed way, than when this same negative outcome was generated in a timely or a 
hasty manner. 
 Regarding the effectiveness of apologies as a trust repair strategy, two 
competing hypotheses can be formulated. A first explanation is based on need 
satisfaction. When people experience a high need for an apology, it can be reasonably 
expected that the offer of an apology satisfies this need, which should lead to a host of 
positive reactions. Indeed, need satisfaction increases well-being, engagement, and self-
esteem; an effect that can certainly be expected in the context of social relationships 
and social needs (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This explanation leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a: In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, an apology is more effective for 
enhancing trustworthiness and trust repair after a delayed decision than after a timely 
decision or a hasty decision. 
 A second possibility, however, is that even though people express a high need 
for an apology after an incorrect and delayed decision, an apology will not be very 
effective under these circumstances. In this vein, studies on forgiveness have shown 
that harm severity lessens the effectiveness of apologies as a reconciliation strategy 
(Schlenker, 1985; Schoenbach, 1990). Here also, the need for trust restoration is at its 
highest level, but the effectiveness of an apology is hampered. Moreover, research of 
Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989) revealed that when the harm is more severe, the 
effectiveness of apologies was attenuated.  
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 Additionally, prior research has revealed that the presence versus absence of an 
apology is strongly linked to individuals’ perceptions of interactional fairness (see 
Goodwin & Ross, 1992; Smith, Bolton, & Wagner, 1999). Interactional fairness reflects 
the degree to which the people who are affected by certain decisions are treated with 
dignity and respect (Bies & Moag 1986; Goodwin & Ross, 1992). In this regard, 
previous studies which focused on the different fairness dimensions (i.e., distributive, 
procedural, and interactional) in the context of service recovery demonstrated that a 
financial compensation (which often enhances distributive fairness) is less effective for 
enhancing recovery when the other two dimensions of fairness are evaluated poorly 
(e.g., Blodgett, Hill, & Tax, 1997; Tax, Brown, & Chandrashekaran, 1998). In the 
context of the present research in which the leader’s incorrect decision violated 
followers’ outcome-related concerns (i.e., distributive fairness is thus low), it can 
similarly be expected that the provision of an apology (which can be seen as a recovery 
tool that aims to improve interactional fairness) is less effective as a means to repair 
trust when combined with low levels of procedural fairness (like when the decision is 
generated in a delayed manner) than when combined with moderate or high levels of 
procedural fairness (like in the case of a hasty and a timely decision). The following 
hypothesis can thus be formulated: 
Hypothesis 3b: In the aftermath of a leader’s failure, an apology is less effective for 
enhancing trustworthiness and trust repair after a delayed decision than after a timely 
decision or a hasty decision. 
The present studies 
We conducted five empirical studies that investigated how a negative decision 
outcome generated by a leader in a hasty, timely, or delayed manner impacts upon the 
trust repair process. More precisely, Study 1 was set up with the goal to investigate if a 
delayed incorrect decision is indeed perceived as a more severe transgression than a 
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timely or a hasty incorrect decision. In this study, we also explored the mediating role 
of procedural fairness concerns. Next, in Studies 2 and 3, we examined in which 
decision timing condition followers had the highest need for an apology. 
Additionally, in Study 3 we examined differences among timing conditions in when 
followers expected an apology to be the most effective for enhancing 
trustworthiness. Finally, in Studies 4 and 5 the effectiveness of an actual apology 
(versus no apology) was investigated.  
 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and design 
A sample of 82 US employees (53 men, 29 women, Mage = 31.55, SD = 
8.88), which were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed an online 
scenario study in exchange for payment ($0.50). This platform has been 
demonstrated to be an appropriate method for recruiting subjects (see Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling 2011; Hauser & Schwarz, 2015). To safeguard data quality, we 
implemented multiple response reliability checks spread throughout the study (see 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). All participants answered these check 
questions correctly. The participants worked at least 12 hours per week and had a 
direct supervisor at work. On average, the participants worked for 4.30 years (SD = 
4.23) in their current organization. They were randomly assigned to one condition of 
a 3-level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
Participants were presented with a scenario about their supervisor at work. 
In this scenario, participants were asked to imagine as vividly as possible that the 
following situation happened to them: “Your supervisor made an incorrect decision 
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which resulted in a negative outcome for you. As a result of this incorrect decision 
by your supervisor you received an unfavorable outcome.” 
Manipulation of decision timing 
In the hasty condition, participants subsequently read the following text: 
“This incorrect decision was generated by your supervisor in a hasty manner. That 
is, the decision was made very fast and you hardly had to wait before the decision 
was reached.” For participants in the timely condition, it was stated that: “This 
incorrect decision was generated by your supervisor in a timely manner. That is, the 
decision was made at the appropriate moment in time and you only had to wait for a 
little while before the decision was reached.” Finally, in the delayed condition, 
participants learned that: “This incorrect decision was generated by your supervisor 
in a delayed manner. That is, the decision was made very slow and you had to wait 
for a long time before the decision was reached.” It is hard to investigate the effects 
of delays in the context of a scenario study because participants do not actually 
experience the delay. Therefore, in the delayed decision condition we added the 
following sentences in order to strengthen our timing manipulation: “Hence, it took 
your supervisor a very long time before he or she finally made a decision. Moreover, 
your supervisor was urged several times to make a decision, but he or she kept 
postponing the decision.” 
Measures 
Procedural fairness. Participants were asked to evaluate the decision-
making procedures employed in the leader’s decision with the procedural fairness 
scale of Valkeapää and Seppälä (2014). This scale consists of ten items, but one item 
(i.e., “Decisions are made in cabinets”) was excluded because it is not applicable to 
our study context. Before answering the scale participants were provided with the 
following information: “Your supervisor made an incorrect decision that negatively 
affected you. However, this decision might also have had consequences for other 
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people who were also affected by this decision. To what extent do you think that 
your supervisor has made this incorrect decision so that” followed by the items. 
Sample items are: “All parties were treated equally in the decision-making process” 
and “Everyone concerned had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making 
process” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The items were aggregated into a general 
measure of procedural fairness (M = 3.25, SD = 1.26, Cronbach’s α = .92). 
Harm severity. Next, the degree to which participants perceived the 
supervisor’s incorrect decision as a severe transgression was measured with a self-
developed scale that consists of six items. Specifically, we asked participants: “To 
what extent do you find your supervisor’s decision a severe / harsh / serious / mild / 
soft / weak transgression” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The latter three items were 
reverse coded and subsequently the six items were combined into a general measure 
of harm severity (M = 4.47, SD = 1.27, Cronbach’s α = .84). 
Manipulation check. Finally, we checked the effectiveness of the decision 
timing manipulation with the following manipulation check: “How did your 
supervisor reach the decision?” (1 = in a fast manner, 7 = in a slow manner; M = 
4.13, SD = 2.25). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
We tested the effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation using a 3-
level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The main effect of decision timing was significant, F(2, 79) = 225.93, p < .001, η²p = 
.85. A post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 
6.78, SD = 0.70) considered the decision as generated more slowly (ps < .001) than 
participants in the timely condition (M = 3.90, SD = 0.41) and those in the hasty 
condition (M = 1.65, SD = 1.32). Moreover, participants in the timely condition 
considered the decision to be reached more slowly than participants in the hasty 
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condition (p < .001). These results indicate that our decision timing manipulation 
was effective. 
Procedural fairness 
A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on perceived procedural fairness 
showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 79) = 6.17, p = .003, η²p = 
.14. A post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 
2.65, SD = 0.95) perceived the decision as less procedural fair (ps < .05) than 
participants in the timely condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.48) and those in the hasty 
condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.04). Participants in the hasty and the timely condition 
did not differ significantly from each other (p = .160). 
Harm severity 
A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on perceived harm severity also 
showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 79) = 7.09, p = .001, η²p = 
.15. In agreement with Hypothesis 1a, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants 
in the delayed condition (M = 5.15, SD = 1.04) experienced the incorrect decision as 
a more severe transgression (ps < .007) than participants in the timely condition (M = 
4.27, SD = 1.33) and those in the hasty condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.16). Again, 
participants in the hasty and the timely condition did not differ significantly from 
each other (p = .359). 
Mediating role of procedural fairness 
Because the correlation between procedural fairness and harm severity was 
high (r = -.56, p < .001), we first checked whether these scales could be 
distinguished from each other by extracting two components from the inter-
correlations among the items of both scales. The two extracted factors had an 
eigenvalue of 7.31 and 1.87 (explained variance of 48.76% and 12.49%, 
respectively). As expected, all nine procedural fairness items loaded on a first 
component (all component weights > .65, except one item which had a weight of 
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.35), while the six harm severity items constituted a second, distinctive component 
(all component weights > .53). 
To test whether procedural fairness mediates the effects of decision timing 
on harm severity, we followed Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) analysis strategy to 
calculate direct and indirect effects using a multicategorical predictor (by employing 
the SPSS macro MEDIATE). For the dummy that contrasted the delayed condition 
with the timely condition the mediation analysis confirmed that the indirect effect of 
decision timing on harm severity via procedural fairness was significant (b = -0.58, 
SE = 0.18, 95% CI: [-0.94, -0.22]). The direct effect of decision timing on harm 
severity became non-significant for this dummy (b = -0.30, SE = 0.29, p = .308). 
Moreover, the mediation analysis confirmed that for the dummy that contrasted the 
delayed condition with the hasty condition the indirect effect of decision timing on 
harm severity through procedural fairness was also significant (b = -0.34, SE = 0.16, 
95% CI: [-0.68, -0.06]). Here, however, the direct effect of decision timing on harm 
severity remained significant (b = -0.83, SE = 0.29, p = .005). The present results 
thus provide evidence for Hypothesis 1b, which states that procedural fairness 
mediates the effect of a delayed decision (versus a timely and a hasty decision) on 
harm severity. 
Discussion 
 The findings of the present study provide evidence for our first hypothesis. 
That is, in line with Hypothesis 1a, a delayed incorrect decision is indeed perceived 
as a more severe transgression than when the same incorrect decision was generated 
in a hasty or timely manner. Moreover, in agreement with Hypothesis 1b, the results 
also confirmed our expectation that a delayed incorrect decision is perceived as more 
severe because it also violates procedural fairness concerns, in addition to outcome-
related ones. In the Introduction we additionally argued that a hasty incorrect 
decision might also be seen as a more severe transgression than a timely incorrect 
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decision (but still less severe than a delayed incorrect decision). However, in the 
present study the differences between these two timing conditions failed to reach 
statistical significance. The next study was designed to examine how timing impacts 
victims’ need for the restoration of such incidents, by investigating whether the need 
for an apology is higher after a delayed incorrect decision than after a timely or 
hasty incorrect decision (Hypothesis 2). 
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and design 
A sample of 59 US employees (38 men, 21 women, Mage = 33.81, SD = 
10.29) recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk completed an online 
questionnaire study in exchange for payment ($0.50). All participants worked at 
least 12 hours per week and had a direct supervisor at work. Participants worked on 
average 5.73 years (SD = 4.25) in their current organization. Four participants 
(6.8%) were excluded from the analyses because they failed on our check questions. 
We employed a 3-level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) within-
subjects design.  
Procedure 
Participants were presented with a questionnaire study. We used the same 
scenario as in Study 1 in which participants were asked to imagine as vividly as 
possible that their own supervisor made an incorrect decision which resulted in a 
negative decision outcome for them.  
Manipulation of decision timing 
Next, participants were asked to evaluate three situations (i.e., hasty, timely, 
and delayed) in which this incorrect decision could have been reached by their 
supervisor. These three decision timing conditions were framed in the same way as 
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in Study 1. An important difference, however, is that in the present study decision 
timing was manipulated within instead of between subjects. In order to avoid 
sequential effects, the three decision timing conditions were presented to participants 
in a random order. 
Measures 
Need for apology. For each of the three decision timing conditions, we 
probed participants’ need for an apology with three items (based on Leunissen et al., 
2013): “To what extent does your supervisor need to apologize?”, “To what extent 
do you desire an apology from your supervisor?”, and “To what extent is it 
necessary that your supervisor offers his or her apologies?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very 
much). For each decision timing condition these items were combined into a need 
for apology measure (Cronbach’s α = .86, .89, and .84, for the hasty, timely, and 
delayed condition, respectively). The correlations among these three need for 
apology measures were rather high (all rs > .41, ps < .002). 
Manipulation check. We checked the effectiveness of the decision timing 
manipulation with the following manipulation check: “To what extent was your 
supervisor’s decision delayed?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). Participants rated 
this question for each of the three decision timing conditions. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
We conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which 
we included the manipulation check for each of the three decision timing conditions 
as within-subjects variables. The results of this analysis revealed a significant 
difference between the timing conditions on the manipulation check, F(2, 108) = 83.69, 
p < .001, η²p = .61. As expected, the delayed decision (M = 5.84, SD = 1.66) was 
perceived by participants as more delayed than the timely decision (M = 2.67, SD = 
1.63), F(1, 54) = 80.44, p < .001, η²p = .60, and the hasty decision (M = 2.07, SD = 
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1.62), F(1, 54) = 116.89, p < .001, η²p = .68. Furthermore, the timely decision was also 
perceived as more delayed than the hasty decision, F(1, 54) = 7.57, p = .008, η²p = .12. 
These findings thus indicate that our decision timing manipulation was effective. 
Need for apology 
Next, a repeated measures ANOVA with the three need for apology 
measures as within-subjects variables was conducted. The results of this analysis 
revealed a significant difference between the decision timing conditions on the need for 
apology measure, F(2, 108) = 8.84, p < .001, η²p = .14. The contrasts were planned in 
accordance with Hypothesis 2. As predicted, after the delayed decision (M = 5.37, SD = 
1.29) participants had a higher need for an apology than after the timely decision (M = 
4.64, SD = 1.47), F(1, 54) = 13.18, p = .001, η²p = .20, and the hasty decision (M = 
4.99, SD = 1.47), F(1, 54) = 4.04, p = .049, η²p = .07. In addition, after the hasty 
decision participants also indicated a higher need for an apology than after the timely 
decision, F(1, 54) = 8.26, p = .006, η²p = .13. 
Discussion 
In line with Hypothesis 2, our results showed that after the delayed incorrect 
decision the need for an apology was higher than after both the hasty and the timely 
decision. Moreover, in the present study this need was also significantly greater after 
the hasty than after the timely decision, thus indicating that a hasty decision might be 
seen as a more severe transgression than a timely decision. Study 3 aims to replicate the 
present findings using a lab experiment instead of a questionnaire study. Moreover, we 
also measured the expected effectiveness of an apology in Study 3 in order to 
investigate whether participants anticipated an apology to be more effective 
(Hypothesis 3a) or less effective (Hypothesis 3b) as a means to enhance trustworthiness 
after a delayed incorrect decision than after a timely or hasty incorrect decision. 
 
Chapter 8  
 
 
244 
Study 3 
Method 
Participants and design 
A sample of 95 undergraduate college students (12 men, 83 women, Mage = 
19.68, SD = 1.61) participated in this experiment for course credit. One of these 
participants was not included in the analyses due to a data storage error. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one condition of a 3-level (decision timing: hasty vs. 
timely vs. delayed) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were each seated in front of a 
computer. They were informed that they would work together with other participants 
present in the lab on several tasks, and that one participant was assigned as their 
leader (in fact, unbeknownst to participants, the leader and his or her actions during 
the experiment were programmed). Their group was called ‘Team Green’. 
Participants were then informed that the task would consist of two stages. In the first 
stage, participants would perform an individual task, in which they could earn 
money for the group. In the second stage, the simulated leader would make an 
investment decision with the group’s earnings from the first stage. 
After receiving this information, the first stage of the group task started. 
Participants learned that they should solve as many anagrams (e.g., ‘ixat’ = ‘taxi’) as 
possible in six minutes. Each anagram they solved earned money for their group, 
thereby increasing its chance of winning cinema tickets. On average, participants 
solved 19.44 anagrams (SD = 5.31). Upon completion of this task, participants were 
informed that the number of anagrams solved by each individual were pooled 
together to represent a group score, and that this group score was converted into a 
group-revenue.  
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In the second stage of the task, participants were told that the leader (whose 
behavior was simulated) would perform an investment task on behalf of the group, 
in which he or she would decide how the group’s revenue from the first stage would 
be invested. Participants learned that to this end, the leader had to compare two 
possible investment options (i.e., ‘research and development’ and ‘marketing’), and 
decide in which of these options the money would be invested. If the leader selected 
the correct alternative, the revenue that the group had earned would be multiplied, 
and the participants would be certain to earn the prize. However, if the leader 
selected the incorrect alternative, the group’s revenue would be lost, and their 
chance of winning the prize would be squandered.  
Although in this stage only the leader performed a task, participants could 
observe the leader while making this decision. As such, participants were able to 
observe on their screen which information the leader was consulting while 
performing the investment task, and could monitor at which time the leader made his 
or her decision. Through this procedure, we could administer our manipulation of 
decision timing. Importantly, in all three decision timing conditions, the leader 
consulted the information regarding the two investment options in a fixed, consistent 
order.  
Manipulation of decision timing 
Before the start of the second stage, we explained participants that the leader 
received six minutes to complete the investment task, and that it was crucial that the 
leader made his or her decision before the deadline. We provided such an explicit 
standard because in real-life leaders are often confronted with predefined deadlines. 
The first three minutes (i.e., the ‘reading phase’) were intended for the leader to 
carefully read the description of the two investments, whereas the final three minutes 
(i.e., the ‘decision phase’) were intended for the leader to decide between the two 
investment options. Our manipulation of decision timing varied how much time the 
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leader took to make his or her decision. Participants could follow this time course by 
a clock that was displayed on the middle of their screen.  
In the hasty condition, the leader was preprogrammed to decide already after 
45 seconds, long before the reading phase had concluded and the decision phase had 
commenced. In the timely condition and the delayed condition, after exactly 3:00 
minutes a message was displayed which informed the leader that the reading phase 
was over and the decision phase would start. Subsequently, in the timely condition, 
the leader decided after 3:45 minutes. Yet, in the delayed condition the leader kept 
further postponing his or her decision. After 5:45 minutes a last warning message 
appeared on the screen which informed the leader that time was running out and that 
he or she immediately had to make a decision. However, in this condition the leader 
decided just after six minutes, the moment that the decision deadline passed.
1
 
Finally, the outcomes of the task were revealed. In all three decision timing 
conditions, the leader selected the incorrect investment option, which yielded an 
unfavorable outcome as it caused the participants to lose all the money that they had 
earned in stage 1.  
Measures 
Need for apology. We measured participants’ need for an apology with the 
same three items as in Study 2 (M = 4.52, SD = 1.67, Cronbach’s α = .90). 
Effectiveness of apology. To probe the extent to which participants expected 
an apology to be an effective strategy to enhance the trustworthiness of their leader, 
we used an abridged version (nine items) of the trustworthiness scale of Mayer and 
                                                 
1
 To provide an additional point of reference for the timeliness of the leader’s decision, in all 
three decision timing conditions, we also displayed a notice when the leader of ‘Team Red’ − 
another group that simultaneously performed the study − had made his or her decision. This 
message was shown after 3:45 minutes (on average; the program randomly selected a value 
between 3:43 and 3:47). Although both groups performed the task individually and were not 
in competition for the prize, highlighting the timing of ‘Team Red’ provides a useful 
reference point for participants to judge the timeliness of their leader’s decision. 
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Davis (1999) that was adapted to the context of the offer of an apology. Sample 
items are: “To what extent would an apology be effective to restore your faith in 
your leader’s competence?” and “To what extent would an apology be effective to 
restore your faith that your leader is concerned about the welfare of his or her 
followers?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The items were aggregated into a general 
measure of the perceived effectiveness of an apology (M = 4.27, SD = 1.10, 
Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the decision timing manipulation 
was measured with the same manipulation check as in Study 2 (M = 4.06, SD = 
2.33). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
We tested the effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation using a 3-
level (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) ANOVA. The main effect of 
decision timing was significant, F(2, 91) = 162.11, p < .001, η²p = .78. A post hoc 
test (LSD) showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 6.83, SD = 0.60) 
considered the decision as more delayed (ps < .001) than participants in the timely 
condition (M = 3.91, SD = 1.33) and those in the hasty condition (M = 1.79, SD = 
1.19). Furthermore, participants in the timely condition considered the decision more 
delayed than those in the hasty condition (p < .001). The decision timing 
manipulation was thus effective. 
Need for apology 
A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on participants’ need for an apology 
showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 91) = 20.08, p < .001, η²p = 
.31. In agreement with Hypothesis 2, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that participants 
in the delayed condition (M = 5.86, SD = 0.90) had a higher need for an apology (ps 
< .001) than participants in the timely condition (M = 3.67, SD = 1.62) and those in 
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the hasty condition (M = 4.16, SD = 1.55). In the present study, participants in the 
hasty and the timely condition did not differ significantly from each other (p = .160). 
Effectiveness of apology 
A 3-level (decision timing) ANOVA on participant’s perceived 
effectiveness of an apology showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 
91) = 4.91, p = .009, η²p = .10. As predicted by Hypothesis 3b, a post hoc test (LSD) 
showed that participants in the delayed condition (M = 3.78, SD = 1.41) expected an 
apology to be less (instead of more) effective (ps < .05) to enhance their 
trustworthiness of the leader compared to participants in the timely condition (M = 
4.61, SD = 0.98) and those in the hasty condition (M = 4.37, SD = 0.74). Here too, 
the difference between the hasty and the timely condition was non-significant (p = 
.356). 
Discussion 
 The present results provide further evidence for Hypothesis 2, by showing 
that participants have a higher need for an apology when they experience a negative 
outcome generated by their leader in a delayed way than when this same outcome 
was produced in a timely or hasty manner. At the same time, participants expected 
an apology to be less effective to enhance trustworthiness of their leader after a 
delayed decision than after a timely or hasty decision (Hypothesis 3b). These 
findings thus show a remarkable paradox: The need for an apology is highest when a 
decision is delayed, but at the same time an apology is expected to be the least 
effective strategy under such circumstances. This is also reflected in the negative 
correlation between the need for an apology and the effectiveness of an apology in 
the delayed decision timing condition (r = -.34, p = .07). Note that in the previous 
study participants in the hasty condition reported a higher need for an apology than 
participants in the timely condition. In the present study this difference was non-
significant. However, the present study only informs us about the expected 
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effectiveness of an apology but not about the actual effectiveness of such an 
apology. Therefore, in the next study we explicitly tested the effectiveness of an 
apology (versus no apology). 
 
Study 4 
Method 
Participants and design 
A sample of 146 undergraduate university students (31 men, 109 women, 
Mage = 19.09, SD = 1.87) participated in this study for course credit. Gender and age 
of six participants were not recorded due to a programming error. We employed a 3 
(decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. apology) 
between-subjects design. 
Procedure 
We adopted the same procedure and the same decision timing manipulation 
as in Study 3, only now, the leader either did or did not provide an apology for his or 
her incorrect decision. On average, participants solved 18.86 anagrams (SD = 5.98) 
in the first stage of the group task. 
Manipulation of apology 
After the negative outcome of the investment task had been revealed, 
participants were informed that the leader had the opportunity to send them a 
message. In the no apology condition, participants were told that the leader had not 
taken up the possibility to send them a message. In the apology condition, the leader 
stated: “I want to apologize to everyone. I made a mistake. I promise you that this 
will never happen again.” Note that the apology message was targeted at all group 
members and contained the acceptance of responsibility, admittance of wrongdoing, 
and a promise of forbearance, three essential components of a persuasive apology 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Scher & Darley, 1997).  
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Measures 
Trustworthiness. To assess perceived trustworthiness of the leader, we 
employed the full ability, benevolence, and integrity subscales of the trustworthiness 
measure (17 items) developed by Mayer and Davis (1999). Sample items are: “I 
have faith in the qualities of the leader (ability)”, “The leader places importance on 
the welfare of me and the team (benevolence)”, and “The leader’s actions and 
behaviors are not very consistent (integrity)” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree; negative item reverse-coded). Because of the high correlations between the 
three facet scales (all rs > .65, ps < .001), the 17 items were aggregated into a 
general scale measure of trustworthiness (M = 3.79, SD = 0.85, Cronbach’s α = .94).  
Trust. To probe participants’ trusting intentions towards the leader we 
employed the six item trust scale of Desmet, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2011). 
Sample items are: “I trust the leader” and “I think that the leader would deceive me 
if he or she would benefit from it” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; 
negative items reverse-coded). The six trust items were aggregated into a scale 
measure of participants’ trusting intentions (M = 4.05, SD = 0.98, Cronbach’s α = 
.86). 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the decision timing manipulation 
was checked with the same manipulation check as in Study 2 (M = 4.08, SD = 2.15). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
We tested the effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation using a 3 
(decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. apology) 
ANOVA. The results showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 140) 
= 98.84, p < .001, η²p = .59. As expected, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that 
participants in the delayed condition (M = 6.35, SD = 1.26) considered the decision 
as more delayed (ps < .001) than participants in the timely condition (M = 3.45, SD = 
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1.46) and those in the hasty condition (M = 2.49, SD = 1.47). Furthermore, 
participants in the timely condition considered the decision more delayed than those 
in the hasty condition (p = .001). The main effect of apology and the interaction 
effect were non-significant (both Fs < 0.67, ps > .414). Again, the results indicate 
that our decision timing manipulation was effective. 
Trustworthiness 
A 3 (decision timing) × 2 (apology) ANOVA on trustworthiness
2
 showed 
significant main effects of decision timing, F(2, 140) = 5.96, p = .003, η²p = .08, and 
apology, F(1, 140) = 16.23, p < .001, η²p = .10. The results showed that these effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction between decision timing and apology, 
F(2, 140) = 4.17, p = .017, η²p = .06. We conducted simple effects tests to further 
analyze this interaction. Means and standard deviations for the corresponding 
conditions are presented in Table 1. 
In line with the predictions made in Hypothesis 3b, an apology was less 
effective in enhancing trustworthiness in the delayed condition than in the timely 
condition (p < .001) and the hasty condition (p = .006). Moreover, an apology was 
slightly more effective in the timely condition than in the hasty condition (p = .091). 
When participants did not receive an apology, there was no significant difference 
between the hasty, timely, and delayed conditions (ps > .536). Whereas these results 
indicate that an apology is less effective in enhancing trustworthiness after a delayed 
decision than after a timely and a hasty one, it does not inform us about how 
effective an apology exactly is in each of the three decision timing conditions. We 
therefore performed additional simple effects tests which revealed that an apology is 
more effective to enhance trustworthiness than no apology after both a hasty 
                                                 
2
 ANOVAs and subsequent simple effects tests for the trustworthiness facet scales of ability, 
benevolence, and integrity led to similar conclusions as the ones reported here for the total 
scale. 
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decision (p = .018) and a timely decision (p < .001). After a delayed decision, 
however, an apology is not more effective than no apology to increase 
trustworthiness (p = .803). 
Trust 
A 3 (decision timing) × 2 (apology) ANOVA on trust showed significant 
main effects of decision timing, F(2, 140) = 4.79, p = .01, η²p = .06, and apology, 
F(1, 140) = 15.63, p < .001, η²p = .10. The interaction effect of decision timing and 
apology, however, revealed a tendency towards statistical significance, F(2, 140) = 
2.86, p = .060, η²p = .04. We further analyzed this almost significant interaction with 
simple effects tests in order to explore whether we could replicate the results 
reported for trustworthiness for actual trust. Because the interaction failed to reach 
statistical significance at the .05 level, the results presented below should be 
interpreted with caution. Means and standard deviations for the corresponding 
conditions are presented in Table 1.  
In agreement with Hypothesis 3b, an apology was less effective to repair 
trust in the delayed condition than in the timely condition (p < .001) and the hasty 
condition (p = .017); while there was no significant difference between the hasty 
condition and the timely condition (p = .153). Moreover, when participants did not 
receive an apology, the three timing conditions did not differ significantly from each 
other (ps > .493). Additional simple effects tests showed that an apology is more 
effective to repair trust than no apology in both the hasty condition (p = .023) and 
the timely condition (p < .001). After a delayed decision, an apology is not more 
effective than no apology in restoring trust (p = .566). Hence, the analyses revealed 
similar results for trustworthiness and trust, which can be ascribed to the high 
correlation between these two concepts (r = .79, p < .001). 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for trustworthiness and trust in Study 4 (N = 146). 
Dependent 
variable 
Decision 
timing 
condition 
Apology condition 
  No apology Apology Total 
  M SD  M SD  M SD  
Trustworthiness Hasty 3.60 0.66  4.12 0.56  3.87 0.66  
 Timely 3.53 0.82  4.48 0.71  4.02 0.90  
 Delayed 3.46 0.94  3.51 0.85  3.49 0.89  
 Total 3.53 0.81  4.05 0.81  3.79 0.85  
Trust Hasty 3.83 0.63  4.42 0.81  4.14 0.78  
 Timely 3.76 1.12  4.79 0.97  4.28 1.16  
 Delayed 3.65 0.95  3.80 0.87  3.72 0.90  
 Total 3.74 0.91  4.35 0.96  4.05 0.98  
Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater trust(worthiness).  
Discussion 
In support of Hypothesis 3b, the current study demonstrates that in the 
aftermath of a leader failure, the provision of an apology is less effective in restoring 
trustworthiness and trust after a delayed incorrect decision compared to a timely and 
a hasty incorrect decision. Moreover, the difference between the hasty and timely 
condition was marginally significant for trustworthiness, but non-significant for 
trust. It should, however, be noted that the decision timing by apology interaction 
revealed only a tendency towards statistical significance for the trust scale, and the 
results of the simple effects tests should therefore be interpreted with caution. In 
order to replicate the present results we conducted an additional study in which we 
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used an employee sample to investigate the effectiveness of an apology in restoring 
trust. 
 
Study 5 
Method 
Participants and design 
A sample of 151 US employees (87 men, 64 women, Mage = 34.92, SD = 
10.48) was recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. They completed an online 
scenario study in exchange for payment ($0.50). All participants worked at least 12 
hours per week and had a direct supervisor at work. Participants worked on average 
5.97 years (SD = 5.13) in their current organization. Twelve participants (7.9%) 
were excluded from further analyses because they failed on our check questions. As 
in the previous study, we employed a 3 (decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. 
delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. apology) between-subjects design.  
Procedure 
As in Study 1, participants were presented with a short scenario in which 
they were asked to imagine as vividly as possible that their supervisor made an 
incorrect decision which resulted in a negative decision outcome for them.  
Manipulation of decision timing 
Similar to the first study, in the hasty condition participants read that the 
incorrect decision by their supervisor was made in a hasty manner, in the timely 
condition the incorrect decision was generated in a timely fashion, and in the 
delayed condition the incorrect decision was described as being delayed (for the 
precise formulations, see the Method section of Study 1). 
Manipulation of apology 
In the no apology condition, it was stated that no further communication 
regarding this incidence took place. In the apology condition, participants were told 
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that their supervisor apologized for what happened by stating: “I want to apologize 
to you. I made a mistake. I promise you that this will never happen again.” As in the 
previous study, the apology message contained the three essential components of a 
persuasive apology.  
Measures 
Trust. We measured participants trust in their leader with the same six items 
as in Study 4 (M = 4.02, SD = 1.55, Cronbach’s α = .95). 
Manipulation check. The effectiveness of the decision timing manipulation 
was probed with the same manipulation check as in Study 2 (M = 3.55, SD = 2.35).  
Results 
Manipulation check 
The effectiveness of our decision timing manipulation was tested using a 3 
(decision timing: hasty vs. timely vs. delayed) × 2 (apology: no apology vs. apology) 
ANOVA. The results showed a significant main effect of decision timing, F(2, 133) 
= 128.23, p < .001, η²p = .66. As expected, a post hoc test (LSD) showed that 
participants in the delayed condition (M = 6.27, SD = 1.14) considered the decision 
as more delayed (ps < .001) than participants in the timely condition (M = 2.47, SD = 
1.63) and those in the hasty condition (M = 2.04, SD = 1.37). Although the 
difference is in the expected direction, the timely and the hasty condition did not 
differ significantly from each other (p = .145). The main effect of apology and the 
interaction effect were non-significant (both Fs < 2.14, ps > .146).  
Trust 
A 3 (decision timing) × 2 (apology) ANOVA on trust showed significant 
main effects of decision timing, F(2, 133) = 11.39, p < .001, η²p = .15, and apology, 
F(1, 133) = 19.72, p < .001, η²p = .13. The results showed that these effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction between decision timing and apology, F(2, 133) 
= 3.57, p = .031, η²p = .05. We conducted simple effects tests to further analyze this 
Chapter 8  
 
 
256 
interaction. Means and standard deviations for the corresponding conditions are 
presented in Table 2.  
In agreement with Hypothesis 3b, an apology was less effective to repair 
trust in the delayed condition than in the timely condition (p < .001) and the hasty 
condition (p = .012). Moreover, in the hasty condition an apology was less effective 
than in the timely condition (p = .007). As in the previous study, when participants 
did not receive an apology, the three decision timing conditions did not differ 
significantly from each other (ps > .129). Additional simple effects tests showed that 
an apology is more effective to repair trust than no apology in both the hasty 
condition (p = .016) and the timely condition (p < .001). After a delayed decision, an 
apology is not more effective than no apology for restoring trust (p = .463). 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for trust in Study 5 (N = 139). 
Decision timing 
condition 
Apology condition 
 No apology Apology Total 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  
Hasty 3.57 1.36  4.52 1.22  4.04 1.37  
Timely 3.80 1.82  5.61 1.08  4.69 1.75  
Delayed 3.19 1.42  3.49 1.01  3.33 1.24  
Total 3.52 1.54  4.56 1.39  4.02 1.55  
Note. Higher mean scores indicate greater trust.  
Discussion 
 The present study replicates the findings of Study 4. That is, in agreement 
with Hypothesis 3b, the results showed that an apology is less effective in restoring 
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trust after a delayed incorrect decision compared to a timely and a hasty incorrect 
decision. Here, the difference between the hasty and the timely condition was 
significant, once again indicating that a hasty decision might be seen as a more 
severe transgression than a timely decision. 
 
General discussion 
 Although trust is a vital ingredient of effective leader-follower relationships, 
it is not uncommon that leaders violate their followers’ trust by making decisions 
that result in a negative outcome. When the failure to reach a desired outcome is 
ascribed to the leader, followers’ trust in the leader will subsequently decline. One 
way in which leaders can repair broken trust is by apologizing for their mistakes. 
Importantly, however, restoration of trust may depend not only on the negative 
outcomes that result from such decisions, but also on the timing of those decisions. 
In spite of the ubiquity of timing errors in daily life, such transgressions have 
received only scant attention in research. To the best of our knowledge, no research 
has focused on the role of timeliness of decisions in trust repair yet. We therefore 
investigated decision timing as an important feature of decision style that may 
influence the effectiveness of apologies as a trust repair strategy in leader-follower 
relationships. 
Main conclusions 
In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, the results of Study 1 revealed that when 
a negative outcome is generated by a leader in a delayed manner, this is perceived by 
followers as a more severe transgression than when the same negative outcome is 
generated in a timely or hasty fashion. Moreover, our findings revealed that 
procedural fairness mediates the effect of a delayed decision on harm severity 
(Hypothesis 1b). Hence, our findings indicate that a delayed incorrect decision can 
be seen as a more severe transgression as it violates both outcome-related and 
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procedural fairness concerns. The present findings thus corroborate recent research 
by Valkeapää and Seppälä (2014), who also reported that especially slow decision-
making styles violate procedural fairness concerns.  
Moreover, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, the results of Studies 2 and 3 
showed that the need for an apology is higher after a delayed incorrect decision than 
after a timely and a hasty incorrect decision. This result supports findings done in 
fairness research, which have convincingly showed that negative decision outcomes 
prompt people to be more sensitive for unfair procedures (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 
1996). A combination of low procedural fairness and low outcome favorability – 
like in the case of a delayed incorrect decision – can thus be expected to elicit a high 
need for actions that reestablish the social relationship, such as the offer of an 
apology (see De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The results of our 
studies also corroborate prior forgiveness research, which has shown that the need 
for actions that promote reconciliation is strengthened by harm severity (Pronk et al., 
2010).  
Finally, in accordance with Hypothesis 3b (and opposite to the predictions 
made by the competing Hypothesis 3a) Study 3 also revealed that followers expected 
an apology to be less (instead of more) effective to increase trustworthiness when 
the negative decision outcome was delayed relative to timely or hasty. In Study 4, 
we replicated this effect for actual apologies on trustworthiness and trust. Although 
in this instance the effect on trust was only marginally significant, and therefore 
should be interpreted with caution, this effect was replicated with statistical 
significance in Study 5. These results thus corroborate forgiveness research, which 
has demonstrated that after severe transgressions, when the need for trust restoration 
is at a high level, apologies are ineffective to enhance reconciliation (e.g., see 
Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Schlenker, 1985; Schoenbach, 1990). Moreover, the finding 
that in the aftermath of an incorrect decision (which results in low distributive 
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fairness) the provision of an apology (which aims to enhance interactional fairness) 
was ineffective to repair trust when procedural fairness concerns were also violated 
(like in the case of a delay) is also in line with previous research that focused on the 
different fairness dimensions in the context of service recovery efforts. Specifically, 
this prior research has demonstrated that the effectiveness of a recovery strategy that 
enhances one specific fairness dimension is lessened when the other two fairness 
dimensions are not well secured (see Blodgett et al., 1997; Tax et al., 1998). 
Taken together, the present findings thus present us with an interesting 
paradox: Even though the need for an apology is highest when a decision is delayed 
(compared to timely or hasty), an apology proved to be the least effective to enhance 
trustworthiness and repair actual trust in the delayed decision timing condition. In 
the remainder of the discussion, we first elaborate on the differences between hasty 
and timely decisions. Secondly, we focus on the theoretical and practical 
implications that can be derived from the current research. Next, we address the 
question whether trust can be repaired after a delayed decision. Finally, we describe 
some strengths and limitations of the present studies, and formulate some 
recommendations for future research.  
Differences between hasty and timely decisions 
 Note that the present research mainly focused on delayed decisions, which 
were contrasted with hasty and timely decisions. However, as argued in the 
introduction, it is possible that hasty decisions might also differ from timely ones. 
Based on prior research of Valkeapää and Seppälä (2014), it can be predicted that in 
the case of a hasty decision procedural fairness concerns will also be violated (but to 
a lesser extent than after a delay). As a result, a hasty incorrect decision might be 
seen as a more severe transgression, which engenders a higher need for an apology, 
than a timely incorrect decision. Our results partially confirmed these predictions.  
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 That is, although no significant differences between the hasty and the timely 
condition emerged in terms of perceived procedural fairness and harm severity 
(Study 1), need for and expected effectiveness of an apology (Study 3), and 
enhanced trust and trustworthiness after receiving an apology (Study 4); we obtained 
significant results for need for an apology in Study 2 and for trust in Study 5. This 
inconsistency between Studies 2 and 3 can possibly be ascribed to the fact that the 
second study employed a within-subjects design to manipulate decision timing. Such 
a design results in substantially more sensitivity to a manipulation than a between-
subjects design that contains approximate the same number of observations 
(Greenwald, 1976).  
 To conclude, based on our findings it thus seems plausible that hasty and 
timely decisions are also experienced differently. It might be interesting for future 
research to further investigate the difference between hasty and timely decisions, 
and, more specifically, when hasty and timely decisions exactly differ and when they 
do not. 
Theoretical and practical implications  
The first important contribution of the present research is that it shows that a 
lack of timeliness is a crucial transgression dimension that has powerful effects on 
trust and trustworthiness. Prior research has focused heavily on trust violations as 
being either competence- or integrity-based (for an overview on this matter, see 
Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). However, our results show that while an apology 
(compared to no apology) was effective in enhancing trustworthiness and trust repair 
following a leader’s incorrect hasty and timely responses, this was no longer the case 
after a delay. Our findings thus suggest that, besides competence and integrity 
violations, delays can be considered a distinct type of trust violation. Based on our 
findings, it can be concluded that timeliness represents an important extension for 
literature on trust repair. 
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This research also highlights an additional issue that deserves particular 
attention of leaders who in everyday life must make numerous decisions that can 
affect their followers. Specifically, in our studies we examined timing errors in a 
context in which followers depended on the actions of their leader, and the leader’s 
delay constituted a clear threat to their interests. Such situations frequently occur in 
organizations, where leaders are regularly faced with deadlines. Prior work on 
timing in organizations has suggested that subordinates develop strong temporal 
expectations, which often get violated in the form of delays (Blount & Janick, 2001; 
Tukel & Rom, 1998). Moreover, ample research has shown that delayed decisions 
can have severe consequences in terms of negative leadership perceptions, lowered 
team effectiveness, and decreased organizational performance (e.g., Cha & 
Edmonston, 2006; Jacobs, 2005; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005; Mohammed et al., 2009). 
Our findings supplement the adverse consequences of delays by showing its 
negative effects on trustworthiness and trust. Together these findings show that even 
when leaders are overwhelmed by the large number of decisions they have to 
address, it is better for them to give preference to fast over delayed actions. This 
view is congruent with literature on action bias (e.g., Bar-Eli, Azar, Ritov, Keidar-
Levin, & Shein, 2007), which states that people tend to evaluate others more 
positively if they take action rather than do nothing, regardless of whether this action 
proves optimal relative to the outcome. From the above, we can thus conclude that 
leaders should be informed that missing a deadline can have severe ramifications, 
which can be hard to reconcile by usual means such as the offer of an apology. 
Can trust be repaired after a delayed incorrect decision? 
The question that arises is whether trust can be repaired in the aftermath of a 
delayed incorrect decision. While in the present research apologies were ineffective 
for restoring trust after delays (despite containing the three essential components, see 
Scher & Darley, 1997), it is possible that more elaborated, complex, or intense 
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apologies might be more effective. Schlenker and Darby (1981), for example, 
suggested that people tend to use more complex apologies involving a larger number 
of components as the harm done gets more serious. For instance, a more explicit 
promise of future trustworthy behavior may be necessary in order to restore trust 
after a delayed incorrect decision. Moreover, after a delayed incorrect decision an 
apology might be seen as only a first and necessary step that subsequently needs to 
be backed up with more reliable behavior in order to successfully repair trust. The 
process of trust repair in response to a delayed decision may thus be a process of 
longer duration, in which trust can only be rebuilt gradually over time.  
In addition, prior trust repair research has revealed that, besides apologies, 
there are many other strategies that can repair broken trust. For instance, because in 
the present research the leader’s decision resulted in a negative decision outcome, 
strategies that address violated outcome-related concerns might be necessary to 
repair broken trust. The offer of a financial compensation is an example of such a 
strategy (see Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013; Desmet 
et al., 2011). It is thus possible that the ‘cheap talk’ of an apology should be 
substantiated with at least some sort of tangibility in order to initiate the recovery 
process.  
Strengths and limitations  
Evidence for our hypotheses was obtained using five empirical studies in 
which we manipulated decision timing (in Studies 1 through 5) and apology (in 
Studies 4 and 5). An advantage of studying human behavior using experimental 
manipulations is that it allows us to investigate the processes of decision timing and 
trust repair in a controlled environment. In the experimental studies, we thus gave 
priority to the goals of precision, controllability, and consistency. However, these 
priorities were emphasized at the expense of generalizability. In order to enlarge the 
generalizability of our findings, three of our studies (i.e., Studies 1, 2, and 5) were 
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conducted among followers who answered our study questions for their own leader. 
The inclusion of followers in organizational settings provides evidence for the 
robustness of our findings. 
Secondly, despite the conceptual differences between trustworthiness and 
trust (see Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995), our results revealed that an 
apology was effective to enhance both trustworthiness and actual trust after a hasty 
and a timely decision, but ineffective after a delayed decision. The observation that 
we could replicate this effect across both trust concepts further underlines the 
robustness of our findings. However, this result is not too surprising because despite 
their differences these two concepts are also closely related to each other (i.e., “one 
trusts someone because she is trustworthy, and one’s trustworthiness inspires trust”; 
see Flores & Solomon, 1998, p. 209). This is also reflected by the high correlation (r 
= .79) between trustworthiness and trust in our fourth study.  
A major limitation of the present research, however, is that in our studies the 
concepts of trust and trustworthiness were both measured using a snapshot approach. 
In real-life trust is a more dynamic construct that fluctuates over time (Dirks, 
Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009). The investigation of trust as a dynamic construct thus 
requires multiple measurements over time. A vital recommendation for further 
research is therefore to take the dynamic nature of trust into consideration when 
investigating the trust repair process.  
Moreover, a specific restriction of our Mechanical Turk studies (i.e., Studies 
1, 2, and 5) is that the scenarios that we employed were all framed in rather general 
terms. That is, in these studies no specific information regarding the decision-
making process was provided because this would make it increasingly likely that 
certain parts of the scenario would diverge from what participants actually 
experience in their daily life. Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that the use of 
context free scenarios may have led to a decreased intensity of the participants’ 
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experiences. This methodological choice may also threaten the ecological validity of 
our findings, as in real-life situations many different factors − such as for instance 
the intensity of the trust violation and the history of the relationship between the 
leader and his or her followers − may also influence the trust repair process. We 
believe that it would be interesting for further studies to discover important 
contextual factors that might influence the trust restoration process in actual business 
settings and encourage future research to take these different elements into account. 
Directions for future research 
The present research provides only an overall test of the effects of decision 
timing on trust repair in the aftermath of leader failure. As argued above, future 
studies should aim to understand which contextual factors may impact the effect of 
timing on trust, and the processes that may explain this effect.  
First of all, future studies should examine the impact of timing errors in the 
context of correct decisions (instead of incorrect ones). In order to be able to 
investigate the trust repair process, we solely focused on situations in which the 
failure of the leader resulted in an equivalent negative outcome for followers. Based 
on the present results, it is unclear which consequences may arise when a leader 
makes a decision that results in favorable outcomes in a delayed manner. It is 
possible that the adverse effects of delays, which we noted in the present studies, 
will be less pronounced when the output of the decision is positive (cf. Brockner & 
Wiesenfeld, 1996). Additional research is needed to examine this prediction. 
Moreover, to investigate the effectiveness of apologies as a means to repair 
trust in the aftermath of leader failure, in our studies decision timing was 
manipulated in such a way that it was clear to participants that the leader him- or 
herself was responsible for the negative decision outcome. If the cause of a delay 
can be attributed to factors other than the leader, it can be expected that the leader 
will not be seen as the prime responsible, which might alter the effectiveness of the 
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provision of an apology to establish trust repair. The investigation of the role of such 
attributions is an important avenue for future research. 
Additional research should also examine the social context in which the 
timing violation occurred. In this regard, future studies can, for instance, investigate 
the role of leader-member exchanges (LMX) in the trust repair process after 
different timing transgressions (see Gómez & Rosen, 2001; Liden & Graen, 1980), 
as the quality of these leader-member exchange relationships might influence the 
effectiveness of apologies. It is possible that an apology will be more effective to 
enhance trust after a delayed incorrect decision when the quality of the relationship 
between the leader and his or her follower is rated highly. This prediction should 
also be validated in future research. 
Finally, the present research has primarily understood the effect of timing in 
terms of its violation of fairness concerns. Although our results revealed that fairness 
can (partially) explain the effects of delayed decision making, it must be 
acknowledged that in the present research we only took the mediating role of 
procedural fairness into account. Yet, it is possible that timing violations do not only 
violate norms of fair treatment, but also norms of politeness and respect (i.e., 
interactional fairness). Therefore, it is important that future timing research also 
includes a measurement of interactional fairness in addition to procedural fairness. 
Conclusion 
The present research was the first to systematically study how the timing of 
an incorrect decision influences the need for, and the effectiveness of an apology as 
a trust repair strategy. The results of our studies revealed that the need for an 
apology was highest when an incorrect decision was preceded by delay, whereas 
apologies in fact were ineffective for repairing trust in this context. Leaders would 
thus be wise to bear in mind that even when the outcome of a decision is uncertain, it 
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is better to decide (too) soon rather than (too) late, as negative outcomes are 
particularly difficult to restore in the context of delays. 
 
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR 
 
267 
References 
Bar-Eli, M., Azar, O. H., Ritov., I., Keidar-Levin, Y., & Shein, G. (2007). Action 
bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The care of penalty kicks. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 28, 606-621. 
Bies, R. J., & Moag, J. S. (1986). Interactional justice: Communication criteria of 
fairness. Research on Negotiation in Organizations, 1, 43-55. 
Blodgett, J. G., Hill, D. J., & Tax, S. S. (1997). The effects of distributive, procedural, 
and interactional justice on postcomplaint behavior. Journal of Retailing, 73, 
185-210. 
Blount, S., & Janicik, G. A. (2001). When plans change: Examining how people 
evaluate timing changes in work organizations. Academy of Management 
Review, 26, 566-585. 
Bluedorn, A. C. (2002). The human organization of time: Temporal realities and 
experience. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Bluedorn, A. C., & Denhardt, R. B. (1988). Time and organizations. Journal of 
Management, 14, 299-320. 
Bobocel, D. R., & Zdaniuk, A. (2005). How can explanations be used to foster 
organizational justice. In J. Greenberg & J. A. Colquitt (Eds.), Handbook of 
Organizational Justice (pp. 469-498). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Bohnet, I., & Croson, R. (2004). Trust and trustworthiness. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 55, 443-445. 
Brockner, J., & Wiesenfeld, B. M. (1996). An integrative framework for explaining 
reactions to decisions: Interactive effects of outcomes and procedures. 
Psychological Bulletin, 120, 189-208. 
Chapter 8  
 
 
268 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk a 
new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 6, 3-5. 
Cha, S. E., & Edmonston, A. C. (2006). When values backfire: Leadership, 
attribution, and disenchantment in a values-driven organization. The 
Leadership Quarterly, 17, 57-78. 
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and trust 
propensity: A meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk taking 
and job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 909-927. 
Cropanzano, R., & Ambrose, M. L. (2001). Procedural and distributive justice are 
more similar than you think: A monistic perspective and a research agenda. In 
J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.), Advances in organizational justice (pp. 
119-151). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
De Cremer, D. (2010). To pay or to apologize? On the psychology of dealing with 
unfair offers in a dictator game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31, 843-
848. 
De Cremer, D. (2013). The proactive leader: How to overcome procrastination and 
be a bold decision-maker. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
De Cremer, D., & Desmet, P. T. M. (2012). Restoring trust depends on the victim’s 
motives: A motivated trust repair model. In R. M. Kramer & T. Pittinsky 
(Eds.), Restoring trust: Challenges and prospects (pp. 241-256). NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005). Managing group behavior: The interplay 
between procedural fairness, self, and cooperation. In M. Zanna (Ed.), 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 37, pp. 151-218). New 
York: Academic Press. 
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR 
 
269 
Desmet, P. T. M., De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2011). Trust recovery following 
voluntary or forced financial compensations in the trust game: The role of 
trait forgiveness. Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 267-273. 
Dirks, K. T., & Ferrin, D. L. (2002). Trust in leadership: Meta-analytic findings and 
implications for organizational research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 
611-628. 
Dirks, K. T., Lewicki, R. J., & Zaheer, A. (2009). Reparing relationships within and 
between organizations: Building A Conceptual Foundation. Academy of 
Management Review, 34, 68-84. 
Dirks, K., T., & Skarlicki, D. P. (2004). Trust in leaders: Existing research and 
emerging issues. In R. Kramer & K. Cook (Eds.), Trust within organizations 
(pp. 21-40). New York: Sage. 
Ferrin, D. L., Kim, P. H., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2007). Silence speaks 
volumes: the effectiveness of reticence in comparison to apology and denial 
for responding to integrity-and competence-based trust violations. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 92, 893-908. 
Flores, F., & Solomon, R. C. (1998). Creating trust. Business Ethics Quarterly, 8, 
205-232. 
Frantz, C. M., & Bennigson, C. (2005). Better late than early: The influence of 
timing on apology effectiveness. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 41, 201-207. 
Gavin, D. A., & Roberto, M. A. (2001). What you don’t know about making 
decisions. Harvard Business Review, 79.  
Gilliland, S. W. (1993). The perceived fairness of selection systems: An 
organizational justice perspective. Academy of Management Review, 18, 
694-734. 
Chapter 8  
 
 
270 
Goodwin, C., & Ross, I. (1992). Consumer responses to service failures: influence of 
procedural and interactional fairness perceptions. Journal of Business 
research, 25, 149-163. 
Gómez, C., & Rosen, B. (2001). The leader-member exchange as a link between 
managerial trust and employee empowerment. Group & Organization 
Management, 26, 53-69. 
Greenwald, A. G. (1976). Within-subjects designs: To use or not to use?. 
Psychological Bulletin, 83(2), 314. 
Haesevoets, T., Reinders Folmer, R., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2013). Money 
isn’t all that matters: The use of financial compensation and apologies to 
preserve relationships in the aftermath of distributive harm. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 35, 95-107. 
Hauser, D. J., & Schwarz, N. (2015). Attentive Turkers: MTurk participants perform 
better on online attention checks than do subject pool participants. Behavior 
research methods, 1-8. 
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (2014). Statistical mediation analysis with a 
multicategorical independent variable. British Journal of Mathematical and 
Statistical Psychology, 67, 451-470. 
Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B. (2005). What we know about leadership. Review of 
General Psychology, 9, 169. 
Jacobs, P. (2005). Put the right decisions in the right hands. Harvard Management 
Update, 10. 
Kellogg, S. (2007). The art and power of the apology. Washington Lawyer, 21, 20-
26. 
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., & Cooper, C. D. (2009). The repair of trust: A dynamic 
bilateral perspective and multilevel conceptualization. Academy of 
Management Review, 34, 401-422. 
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR 
 
271 
Kim, P. H., Dirks, K. T., Cooper, C. D., & Ferrin, D. L. (2006). When more blame is 
better than less: The implications of internal vs. external attributions for the 
repair of trust after a competence- vs. integrity-based trust violation. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 99, 49-65. 
Kim, P. H., Ferrin, D. L., Cooper, C. D., & Dirks, K. T. (2004). Removing the 
shadow of suspicion: The effects of apology versus denial for repairing 
competence- versus integrity-based trust violations. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 89, 104-118. 
Lazare, A. (2004). On apology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Leunissen, J. M., De Cremer, D., Reinders Folmer, C., & van Dijke, M. (2013). The 
apology mismatch: Asymmetries between victim’s need for apologies and 
perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 49, 315-324. 
Leventhal, G. S., Karuza, J., & Fry, W. R. (1980). Beyond fairness: a theory of 
allocation preferences. In G. Mikula (Ed.), Justice and social interaction 
(pp. 167-218). New York: Springer Verlag. 
Lewicki, R. J., & Bunker, B. (1996). Developing and maintaining trust in work 
relationships. In R. M. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: 
Frontiers of theory and research (pp. 114-139). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Liden, R., & Graen, G. (1980) Generalizability of the vertical dyad linkage model of 
leadership. Academy of Management Journal, 23, 451-465. 
Lind, E. A. (2001). Fairness heuristic theory: Justice judgements as pivotal 
cognitions in organizational relations. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano 
(Eds.), Advances in organizational justice (pp. 56-88). Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Chapter 8  
 
 
272 
Lount, R. B., Zhong, C. B., Sivanathan, N., & Murnighan, J. K. (2008). Getting off 
on the wrong foot: The timing of a breach and the restoration of trust. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1601-1612. 
Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal system 
on trust for management: A field quasi-experiment. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 84, 123-136. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20, 709-735. 
Messick, D. M., & Bazerman, M. (1996). Ethical leadership and the psychology of 
decision making. Sloan Management Review, 37, 9-22. 
Mohammed, S., Hamilton, K., & Lim, A. (2009). The incorporation of time in team 
research: Past, current and future. In E. Salas, G. F. Goodwin, & C. S. Burke 
(Eds), Team effectiveness in complex organizations: Cross-disciplinary 
perspectives and approaches (pp. 321-348), New York: Routledge. 
Ohbuchi, K. I., Kameda, M., & Agarie, N. (1989). Apology as aggression control: its 
role in mediating appraisal of and response to harm. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 56, 219-227. 
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional 
manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 867-872. 
Pronk, T. M., Karremans, J. C., Overbeek, G., Vermulst, A. A., & Wigboldus, D. H. 
J. (2010). What it takes to forgive: When and why executive functioning 
facilitates forgiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 
119-131. 
Robinson, S. L., & Rousseau, D. M. (1994). Violating the psychological contract: 
Not the exception but the norm. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 15, 
245-259. 
APOLOGIES, DELAYS, AND TRUST REPAIR 
 
273 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different 
after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 
23, 393-404. 
Rutte, C. G., & Messick, D. M. (1995). An integrated model of perceived unfairness 
in organizations. Social Justice Research, 8, 239-261. 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of 
intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American 
Psychologist, 55, 68-78. 
Sapienza, H. J., & Korsgaard, M. A. (1996). Procedural justice in entrepreneur-
investor relations. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 544-574. 
Scher, S. J., & Darley, J. M. (1997). How effective are the things people say to 
apologize? Effects of the realization of the apology speech act. Journal of 
Psycholinguistic Research, 26, 127-140. 
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, 
and interpersonal relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Schlenker, B. R. (1985). Identity and self-identification. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), 
The self and social life (pp. 65-99). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Schlenker, B. R., & Darby, B. W. (1981). The use of apologies in social 
predicaments. Social Psychology Quarterly, 271-278. 
Schoenbach, P. (1990). Account episodes: The management of escalation of conflict. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Schwartz, B. (1978). Vengeance and forgiveness: the uses of beneficence in social 
control. School Review, 86, 655-668. 
Scott, B. A., Colquitt, J. A., & Paddock, E. L. (2009). An actor-focused model of 
justice rule adherence and violation: the role of managerial motives and 
discretion. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 756-769. 
Chapter 8  
 
 
274 
Sigal, J., Hsu, L., Foodim, S., & Betman, J. (1988). Factors affecting perceptions of 
political candidates accused of sexual and financial misconduct. Political 
Psychology, 273-280. 
Skarlicki, D. P., Folger, R., & Gee, J. (2004). When social accounts backfire: Effects 
of a polite message or an apology on reactions to an unfair outcome. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 322-341. 
Smith, A. K., Bolton, R. N., & Wagner, J. (1999). A model of customer satisfaction 
with service encounters involving failure and recovery. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 356-372. 
Snowden, D. J., & Boone, M. 2007. A leader’s framework for decision-
making. Harvard Business Review, 85.  
Tax, S. S., Brown, S. W., & Chandrashekaran, M. (1998). Customer evaluations of 
service complaint experiences: implications for relationship marketing. The 
Journal of Marketing, 60-76. 
Tomlinson, E. C., Dineen, B. R., & Lewicki, R. J. (2004). The road to reconciliation: 
Antecedents of victim willingness to reconcile following a broken promise. 
Journal of Management, 30, 165-187. 
Truxillo, D. M., Bauer, T. N., Campion, M. A., & Paronto, M. E. (2002). Selection 
fairness information and applicant reactions: A longitudinal field study. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 1020-1031. 
Tukel, O. I., & Rom, W. O. (1998). Analysis of the characteristics of projects in 
diverse industries. Journal of Operations Management, 16, 43-61. 
Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 115-191. 
Valkeapää, A., & Seppälä, T. (2014). Speed of decision-making as a procedural 
justice principle. Social Justice Research, 27, 305-321. 
 
  
 
 
275 
Chapter 9 
 
Understanding the Effects of Financial 
Compensation on the Repair of Interpersonal 
Trust: Evidence from fMRI in Favor of Forgiveness 
and Social Reward 
 
Abstract 
Trust violations are ubiquitous in organizations, and one possible response to repair 
interpersonal trust involves the provision of a financial compensation. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about the processes that underlie the effect of 
such tangible responses to repair trust in highly interdependent exchange situations. 
We employed advanced techniques in cognitive neuroscience (fMRI) to examine 
those processes. Participants placed in the scanner played the role of recipient in a 
series of dictator games with allocators who (unknown to them) were 
preprogrammed. Trust was violated through an unequal division of resources, while 
afterwards it was repaired by a financial compensation that restored equality. In line 
with our proposed social equilibrium model, our neuroimaging data indicate that 
receiving a financial compensation after an unequal division activates forgiveness 
and social reward related brain areas, but only forgiveness activation mediates the 
link between compensation and trust repair. Our findings further reveal that brain 
responses evoked by financial compensations are relatively stable over time. We 
discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of using financial compensations 
to repair interpersonal trust in organizational exchange settings. 
This chapter is based on Haesevoets, T., De Cremer, D., Van Hiel, A., & Van Overwalle, F. 
Understanding the effects of financial compensation on the repair of interpersonal trust: Evidence 
from fMRI in favor of forgiveness and social reward. Manuscript under revision. 
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Introduction 
Interpersonal trust matters to the effective functioning of organizations 
(Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Kramer, 1999). Research 
has shown that in interdependent work relationships trust predicts job satisfaction, 
cooperation, organizational commitment, organizational citizen behavior, 
information sharing, turnover, and job performance (Bromiley & Cummings, 1996; 
Butler, 1999; Colquitt et al., 2007; Dirks, 2000; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Dirks & 
Skarlicki, 2008; Flaherty & Pappas, 2000). Simpson (2007, p. 587) even noted that 
interpersonal trust acts “as a social lubricant that promotes cooperation between 
group members, sustains social order, and permits beneficial long-term exchanges 
that otherwise might never occur.” For this reason, it is no surprise that for 
organizational behavior researchers the development of interpersonal trust in 
exchange situations is a key component for effective, productive, and sustainable 
organizations to emerge.  
Unfortunately, an important aspect of interpersonal trust is that it can easily 
be broken (see Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & 
Bradlow, 2006). In work settings it has been documented that the majority of 
employees experience trust violations on a quite regular basis (Conway & Briner, 
2002; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Some researchers even suggest that it is the 
norm for employees to experience trust violations by their leader (Dirks, Kim, 
Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011); situations that may pave the way for the emergence of 
negative emotions and destructive behaviors such as revenge-seeking actions, verbal 
aggression, and decreased cooperation (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bottom, Gibson, 
Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; Haden & Hojjat, 2006). Trust violations, for instance, 
occur when leaders fail to provide their employees a promised raise or when bonuses 
or other valuable tangible resources are distributed in an unfair manner between 
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employees. These examples illustrate that trust breaches often result in tangible 
losses for employees. As a result, employees might expect a “substantive” response 
(i.e., involving a tangible element) before they are willing to trust their leader or 
organization again (Dirks et al., 2011; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Financial cues (e.g., 
compensations, profit, and pay increases) are prevalent within organizations, and 
constitute the type of substantive, tangible responses decision-makers can employ to 
(re)establish trust (see Dirks et al., 2011). 
Because the repair of broken trust is vital for organizations, more recent 
organizational behavior research has switched its focus from the implications of 
damaged trust to how it can be repaired (Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Ferrin, 
Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). However, most prior trust repair research has focused 
on the effectiveness of non-substantive (verbal) responses, whereas research on 
more tangible responses is rather scarce. Fortunately, a few studies have started to 
examine to the impact of substantive responses to repair trust (e.g., Bottom et al., 
2002; Desmet, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2010, 2011), with the most notable response 
being the offer of a financial compensation. Overall, prior compensation studies 
have demonstrated that financial compensations can be effective to repair the 
trustworthiness of the transgressor, but even more interestingly, compensations that 
reveal equal final outcomes for both parties were found to be particularly effective to 
enhance trust (see Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, De Cremer, & Van Hiel, 2013; 
Haesevoets, Reinders Folmer, & Van Hiel, 2015; Haesevoets, Van Hiel, Reinders 
Folmer, & De Cremer, 2014). Although this “equality” effect seems to be very 
robust in the context of trust repair, studies have not revealed much evidence yet 
why it is that victims of a trust breach are willing to respond positively in terms of 
trust to a substantive response like a(n) (equal) financial compensation.  
In the present study we adopt a neurocognitive approach to better understand 
what a financial compensation as a means to repair a transgressor’s trustworthiness 
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actually signifies to those whose trust is violated (cf. Dulebohn et al., 2016; for an 
application to the topic of justice). In doing so, we are the first to investigate the 
compensation-based trust repair process by means of looking into the brain. 
Why do we need a brain approach to investigate the repair of interpersonal 
trust? Recently, neuroscience methods have been used extensively to measure 
important psychological processes that might be difficult to measure using only self-
reports or other behavioral methods (e.g., see Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 
2003; Amodio et al., 2004). Interesting in the context of the present study is the 
observation that the human brain has evolved mechanisms that are capable of 
evaluating the trustworthiness of others even without conscious deliberation (see 
Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000; Todorov, 2011; Todorov, Pakrashi, & 
Oosterhof, 2009; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002). Indeed, theory and 
empirical evidence suggests that “humans are hardwired to quickly evaluate the 
trustworthiness of entities in our proximity” (Holtz, 2013, p. 1896). Based on these 
findings it can be concluded that trust-related evaluations are, at least partially, 
formed at a subconscious level. Although trust is increasingly seen as a process that 
also takes place in the brain, it is surprising that brain reactions have not yet been 
studied in the context of trust repair as most prior neuroimaging studies solely 
focused on trustworthiness judgements (e.g., see Baumgartner, Heinrichs, 
Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008; Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; King-
Casas et al., 2005; Krueger et al., 2007). Stated otherwise, studies so far focused on 
the neural substrates that are associated with the presence (or absence) of trust, 
whereas the neural mechanisms associated with the transition from a state of 
violated trust to a state of regained trust have not yet been investigated.  
To address this gap in the literature, in the present paper we examine the 
neurobiological foundation of financial compensations in the context of tangible 
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trust repair efforts in interdependent exchange situations. In doing this, we directly 
respond to calls that “there is a need for more research on neurological responses to 
other signals of trustworthiness” (Holtz, 2013, p. 1915), than only using human 
facial characteristics. Moreover, we also respond to the claim that to date the method 
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has not yet been applied to 
understand the role that organizational signals of trustworthiness can play in the trust 
violation and repair phases (Holtz, 2013).  
The employment of an fMRI approach can help promoting the current trust 
repair literature in terms of both theoretical and practical implications. In terms of 
theory development, fMRI allows the analysis of neural activity to determine which 
neural subsystems are activated in response to compensation-based trust repair 
attempts. In this regard, the employment of an fMRI approach helps us to investigate 
in greater detail which processes do (and do not) play a key role in the effectiveness 
of substantive trust repair attempts. This approach can hence be used to further 
improve existing theoretical notions of the processes underlying trust repair. 
Moreover, this method can also help to identify practical implications for 
organizations as it can, for instance, clarify how people react to multiple trust 
violations and subsequent repair attempts, which are clear characteristics of work 
relationships (Conway & Briner, 2002). 
Theoretical foundations and neural expectations 
The repair of broken trust is a fundamental but surprisingly understudied 
research topic that warrants more empirical study and theoretical development 
(Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). In this regard, Dirks et al. (2009) noted that “a 
unified conceptual foundation for the notion of relationship repair has yet to emerge” 
(p.73). Motivated by this lacuna in the literature, these authors moved on to present 
three perspectives which embody three different ways of looking at the general 
process of trust repair. Especially interesting in the context of our research questions 
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is these authors’ social equilibrium perspective. This perspective is particularly 
suited to investigate the repair of interpersonal trust as it zooms in on the specific 
interpersonal and social aspects of relationships damaged by a transgression. That is, 
the social equilibrium perspective can help us to understand what exactly has been 
damaged by a trust breach, and as such needs to be repaired and how this repair 
process operates. 
With respect to the “what” question, the social equilibrium perspective 
proposes that trust violations call into question the norms that apply to the 
relationship as well as the relative standing of the involved parties, as such creating a 
state of “social disequilibrium” (Dirks et al., 2009). This perspective thus assumes 
that a trust violation leads to a state of disequilibrium at two levels: At the level of 
the interpersonal relationship itself and at the level of the broader social context. 
Hence, in order to repair trust it is crucial to reestablish the balance by both 
reaffirming the norms that govern the relationship and by restoring the social order. 
This can be achieved through various responses, of which the provision of a 
financial compensation is an important example (see Bottom et al., 2002; Desmet et 
al., 2010, 2011). Because a tangible trust violation results in a financial loss for the 
victim, it can be expected that a substantive response undoing the harm will be 
especially effective to repair trust. Why? 
Following the social equilibrium perspective, two processes are expected to 
play a vital role in our proposed compensation-based trust repair process. First, 
offering a financial compensation reestablishes the equilibrium in the relationship at 
hand by eliciting feelings of forgiveness. Second, a financial compensation also 
resolves the disequilibrium in the broader social context and should thus be 
experienced as socially rewarding. Below, we will elaborate on the importance and 
workings of both processes. 
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In light of the first process, forgiveness, it is important to realize that a trust 
violation in interpersonal settings leads to a state of disequilibrium in the 
relationship between the victim and the transgressor. In this regard, trust breaches 
often violate the norms that govern highly interdependent relationships. By 
reaffirming the equality norm (Messick, 1993), a financial compensation returns the 
relationship to a more positive state. To be more precise, an equal compensation 
reaffirms the importance that the transgressor ascribes to the relationship. If a 
transgressor displays the willingness to restore the inflicted harm, this signals that 
the transgressor regrets his or her actions and is motivated to repair the relationship 
with the other (Dirks et al., 2011). In other words, the provision of a financial 
compensation can be interpreted by the victim as a sign of repentance, which is an 
important determinant to elicit forgiveness (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; 
McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). Prior 
research has indeed shown that forgiveness is an important prerequisite to the 
restoration of harmony in relationships (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 
2002), and therefore is considered to be a key initial step for trust repair to happen. 
Although the notion of forgiveness has not received much attention yet in the 
organizational behavior literature, scholars have noted that forgiveness is 
nevertheless an important concern in organizational life (Aquino, Grover, Goldman, 
& Folger, 2003; Cameron & Caza, 2002; Fehr & Gelfand, 2012; Kurzynski, 1998). 
Forgiveness can be defined as the set of motivational changes whereby the victim 
will be motivated less to retaliate against the transgressor and motivated more to 
reconcile and show goodwill toward the transgressor (McCullough, Worthington, & 
Rachal, 1997). From this perspective, forgiveness reflects a prosocial change by 
which victims release their negative emotions towards the transgressor and replace 
them with neutral or even positive ones. 
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Based on this first process of forgiveness, which predictions regarding the 
neural correlates of forgiveness can be made? Recent research by Will, Crone, and 
Güroğlu (2014) has revealed that forgiveness is associated with perspective-taking, 
which results in increased activation in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) as parts of the mentalizing network (see Van 
Overwalle, 2009). Will and colleagues (2014) also argued that it is important that 
victims of a transgression suppress their urge to retaliate, which results in higher 
activation in the posterior medial frontal cortex (pmFC) and the lateral prefrontal 
cortex of the conflict monitoring network (see Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). 
The study of Will et al. (2014) further showed that the anterior insula (AI) – which is 
part of a larger salience monitoring system that integrates interoceptive information 
and important environmental inputs with conflict processing (see Menon & Uddin, 
2010; Taylor, Seminowicz, & Davis, 2009) – also became more active when 
forgiving a transgressor. In line with these prior findings, we advanced the following 
two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1a: A financial compensation activates mentalizing, conflict monitoring, 
and salience monitoring regions in the brain, which are associated with forgiveness. 
Hypothesis 1b: A financial compensation results in trust repair through the 
activation of the forgiveness related brain areas. 
With regard to the second process of affirming the victim’s social standing, 
it is important to realize that a trust breach not only disrupts the relationship itself, 
but also leads to a disequilibrium in the broader social context as it decreases the 
perceived standing of the victim relative to that of the transgressor. In this regard, 
the provision of a financial compensation also reestablishes the standing of the 
victim, which is expected to be experienced as socially rewarding (as one’s 
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perceived social status is restored). Because organizations are characterized by 
highly interdependent situations, conflicts can easily lead to a decrease in 
employees’ standing, which results in negative and socially painful work 
experiences (Deutsch, Coleman, & Marcus, 2006). It can thus be expected that being 
able to repair trust might be associated with rewarding feelings including happiness 
and satisfaction (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012). Stated differently, successful trust 
repair efforts may lead to a positive and rewarding experience related to one’s social 
standing in work relationships. In line with this reasoning, theoretical analyses 
suggest that the impact of tangible responses (like financial compensations) on trust 
judgments indeed operate on the basis of reward/punishment systems (Lewicki & 
Wiethoff, 2000). As such, we delineate that financial compensation will be 
associated with brain regions activated during reward processing. Note that although 
receiving money can be rewarding as such, we hypothesize that the repair of broken 
trust (through financial compensation) is also socially rewarding. 
Key components of the reward system include − besides the amygdala and 
the thalamus involved in affective processing – the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) and the ventral striatum (e.g., see Berridge, 2003; Elliott, Newman, Longe, 
& Deakin, 2003; Hommer et al., 2003; Knutson & Cooper, 2005; O’Doherty, 2004). 
Prior studies on the notion of trust have already demonstrated that the presence of 
trust is associated with activation in reward areas in the brain (e.g., Delgado et al., 
2005; King-Cases et al., 2005). Important with respect to our present focus is the 
observation that social rewards are processed in the brain in a similar manner as non-
social rewards (see Eisenberger & Muscatell, 2013; Zink et al., 2008). More 
precisely, these studies found that areas activated by social rewards greatly 
overlapped with areas activated by monetary rewards. The reward network is hence 
also activated in cases of social pleasures like when being treated fairly by others or 
when being socially esteemed (Izuma, Saito, & Sadator, 2008; Tabibnia, Satpute, & 
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Lieberman, 2008). In a similar vein, we assume that the repair of broken trust might 
also be such a social pleasure. Based on these insights, we developed the following 
two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2a: Even when controlling for receiving monetary reward in itself, a 
financial compensation activates brain areas associated with reward, because the 
affirmation of one’s relative standings is experienced as socially rewarding and 
pleasurable. 
Hypothesis 2b: A financial compensation results in trust repair through the 
activation of the social reward related brain areas. 
 In summary, it is important not only to understand whether trust repair 
attempts work, but also how they work. In this light, the present paper is the first – at 
least to our knowledge – to identify and assess the cognitive mechanisms that are 
evoked by financial compensation. Existing studies, using self-report measures, have 
provided some insight into which mechanisms might be relevant for the trust repair 
process, but the mediating effects have not yet been directly tested in behavioral 
research (for a notable exception, see Dirks et al., 2011), let alone in neuroimaging 
research where the use of mediation analyses is rather scarce. Based on our adopted 
social equilibrium perspective, we predict that forgiveness and social reward 
experiences play a key role in the compensation-based trust repair process. Figure 1 
provides a visual representation of our proposed mediation model. 
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Figure 1. Proposed model of the compensation-based trust repair process in the aftermath of a 
tangible trust violation. 
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty-nine right-handed adult (under)graduate students from a Belgian 
University participated in our study. Two participants were excluded from the 
analyses, one due to movement artifacts and another based on severe suspicion of a 
neurological disorder. The remaining 27 participants (8 males and 19 females) had a 
mean age of 23.59 years (SD = 2.62). All participants were native Dutch speaking 
and had the Belgian nationality. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Informed consent was obtained in a manner approved by the Medical Ethics 
Committee at the University Hospital where the study was conducted. Participants 
received €40 for their participation, plus an additional amount which was said to be 
determined by their outcome in the experiment. In fact, each participant received a 
surplus of €10. 
Dictator game 
In the neuropsychological literature it has been argued that when drawing 
psychological inferences from resulting brain activity “it is critical to use 
psychologically valid behavioral tasks in conjunction with neuroimaging” (Amodio, 
2010, p. 708). Therefore, in our study we employed the dictator game, as this 
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particular game has already been used extensively in prior behavioral and 
neuroimaging research to investigate various trust-related issues (e.g., DeCelles, 
DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; De Cremer, 2010; Strobel et al., 2011; Will et 
al., 2014). In the dictator game, an allocator has absolute power to divide resources 
between him- or herself and a recipient. Following prior behavioral research, trust 
was violated through an unequal division that violated the equality norm (see 
Desmet et al., 2011; Haesevoets et al., 2013; Haesevoets, Van Hiel, et al., 2014). 
Afterwards, trust was repaired by the provision of a financial compensation by the 
allocator that restored equality between both players.  
Procedure and stimulus material 
Pre-scanning 
 Before entering the scanning room, participants received written and oral 
instructions. Participants were informed that during the experiment they would play 
a series of games with other students who were simultaneously conducting a 
behavioral experiment at another building across campus. In reality, however, the 
other players and their behaviors were all simulated. Participants were further told 
that they would play these games for real money. During fMRI-scanning, 
participants first performed the experimental task, followed by a control task. 
Participants were told that during the experimental task their opponents would be 
depicted using college ID photos. To be as realistic as possible, these photos were 
selected from the student pool of our university. Each photo was only presented once 
during the task. Because decisions to trust an unknown person are strongly 
associated with general judgments of facial trustworthiness, we pilot tested (n = 8) 
the trustworthiness of the photos on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all trustworthy, 7 
= very much trustworthy). We selected only photos of which the mean 
trustworthiness score did not differ significantly (p > .05) from the scale’s midpoint 
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(value 4). Before the experiment took place, participants were prescreened to verify 
that they experienced the unequal divisions that were used in our experimental task 
as trust violations. 
Experimental task 
During scanning participants engaged in an experimental task (see Figure 
2A), which was modelled after the dictator game. First, to induce ownership over the 
money that was going to be divided during the task, both players were provided with 
a starting budget of €5, €10, or €15 (see Appendix A), which they both had to invest 
in the task. This information remained on the first screen until the participant pressed 
a response box button (positioned under his or her left hand) to continue. 
Subsequently, the participant was presented a second screen which informed him or 
her that the allocator was in the process of making a decision (3000-5000 ms). On 
the third screen the participant was confronted with the equality manipulation. Here, 
the participant was informed about the allocator’s decision, who either divided the 
resources equally (Equal Division condition) or unequally (Unequal Division 
condition) (3000-5000 ms). The unequal divisions varied from €2 versus €8 to €1 
versus €29 in favor of the allocator (see Appendix A). After the equality 
manipulation, the participant was asked to rate his or her satisfaction with this 
division by pressing the appropriate button on the response box (not 
satisfied/satisfied). After the participant responded, a fifth screen appeared stating 
that the allocator was being informed about the participant’s (dis)satisfaction with 
the division (2000-4000 ms). If the participant indicated that he or she was not 
satisfied with the unequal division, the participant subsequently proceeded to the 
compensation manipulation. The sixth screen was then presented which informed 
the participant that the allocator either provided him or her no additional money (No 
Compensation condition) or a compensation that exactly restored equality 
(Compensation condition) (5000-7000 ms). The financial compensations ranged 
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from €3 to €14 (see Appendix A). Following this compensation manipulation, the 
participant proceeded to the final screen to rate the extent to which he or she trusted 
the allocator on a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = very much). Participants 
receiving an equal division and participants who indicated to be satisfied with an 
unequal division immediately proceeded to rate the trustworthiness of the allocator, 
without having received the compensation manipulation. Participants played 80 
trials of the dictator game. Both the Equal and the Unequal Division condition 
consisted of 40 trials. The Unequal Division condition was further split-up in the No 
Compensation (20 trials) and the Compensation condition (20 trials). All 80 trials 
were presented in a random order and separated by a 30-second pause after 20 trails 
each.  
Control task 
Following the experimental task, a control task (see Figure 2B) was 
presented to identify brain regions activated upon receiving a financial reward, 
independent of any social interaction. During this task, the participant either 
received no monetary reward (No Reward condition) or a monetary reward (Reward 
condition) from the computer (2000-4000 ms). The rewards varied between €3 and 
€14, and were thus similar to the compensations used in the experimental task. After 
the reward manipulation, the participant had to indicate the extent to which he or she 
was happy with the monetary reward on a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = very 
much). Both the No Reward and the Reward condition consisted of 20 trials, which 
were also presented in a random order. 
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Post-scanning 
When the scanning was completed we checked whether participants had 
recognized any of their opponents, which was not the case. Moreover, we also asked 
whether participants were aware that they had played against preprogrammed 
players. Four participants mentioned that they had noticed that the behaviors of the 
other players were simulated. We retained these participants in the analyses because 
excluding these participants revealed the same fMRI clusters with approximately the 
same peaks for the most critical contrast that compared brain activation after 
receiving Compensation versus No Compensation (with exception of the left AI). 
Before leaving, participants were thoroughly debriefed and paid for their 
participation. 
Imaging procedure  
Images were collected using a 3 Tesla Magnetom Trio MRI scanner system 
(Siemens medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany), with a 32-channel radiofrequency 
head coil. Stimuli were projected onto a screen at the end of the magnet bore that 
participants viewed by way of a mirror mounted on the head coil. Stimulus 
presentation was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (www.pstnet.com/eprime; Psychology 
Software Tools) running under Windows XP. Foam cushions were placed within the 
head coil to minimize head movements.  
We first collected a high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan (MP-
RAGE), followed by one functional run (30 axial slices; 4 mm thick; 1 mm skip). 
Functional scanning used a gradient-echo echo-planar pulse sequence. The interval 
between image acquisitions is known as repetition time (TR). The repetition time in 
our study was 2 s. During this time, the signal was recorded sequentially over the 
whole brain in 2-dimensional slices with a 3.5 × 3.5 × 4.0 mm in-plane resolution. 
For functional imaging, we employed the Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) 
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imaging method. This method relies upon local increases in blood flow and blood 
oxygenation to produce an increase in MRI signal from activated brain regions. 
Active regions utilize more oxygenated blood, which changes the magnetic 
properties that consequently cause changes in the BOLD signal. By combining high 
resolution structural brain images with functional scans we are able to accurately 
localize brain functions to specific brain areas. 
Image processing 
Our imaging procedure resulted in a large set of fMRI images, which are 
each composed of thousands of cubic elements called voxels. The spatial resolution 
is defined by the size of the imaging voxels. A voxel typically contains a few million 
neurons and tens of billions of synapses, with the actual number depending on the 
voxel size and the area of the brain being imaged. For functional images there is an 
added dimension of time as the BOLD signal is recorded for each voxel against time 
for the duration of the experiment. Importantly, before fMRI data can be statistically 
analyzed, the data for the functional run have to be preprocessed in order to remove 
sources of noise and artifact. All image processing and subsequent analyses were 
conducted using SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, 
UK).  
Slice timing correction 
Because statistical analyses assume that signals from all the voxels at each 
time point are acquired at the same time, exact timing with respect to the stimulus 
presentation is of crucial importance. However, because the BOLD signal is 
collected slice-by-slice, some slices are collected later during a time point than 
others. Slice time correction involves the calculation of what the signal intensity of 
each voxel in each slice would have been had it been acquired at the same moment 
during a given time point. We used standard software methods to shift the data at 
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each voxel to interpolate the signal intensity at each time point from the same voxel 
in previous and subsequent time points. 
Realignment 
An important concern in most fMRI experiments is head movement during 
data acquisition. In this vein, minimizing head movements is one of the most 
important factors for ensuring good data quality. In cases of excessive head 
movements signal intensity at each voxel can get “contaminated” by the signal from 
its neighbors. We have used motion correction parameters to compensate for total 
amount of movements in six directions of rotation and translation. Functional data 
were realigned within and across runs to correct for head movement, and co-
registered with each participant’s anatomical data. 
Normalization 
Because of inter-subject brain differences it is important to extrapolate 
findings to the population as a whole. In this regard, spatial normalization 
establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the brains of different individuals 
by matching each subject to a standard template. Normalization is thus a key step in 
the data processing because it allows group analyses and generalizations of fMRI 
results. The functional data were transformed into a standard anatomical space (2 
mm isotropic voxels) based on the ICBM152 brain template (Montreal Neurological 
Institute, MNI), which approximates Talairach and Tournoux atlas space. The MNI 
coordinate system is a three-dimensional system in which the location of a specific 
brain region is expressed in three coordinates (i.e., an x, y, and z value). 
Smoothing 
The functional anatomy of the brain may differ across participants. 
Therefore, it is important to spatially smooth the normalized data in order to reduce 
this spatial variance. Smoothing is performed by replacing the value of each voxel 
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with a weighted value of its own value and those of its neighboring voxels by 
averaging each voxel with its neighbors. Put straightforwardly, smoothing entails 
that data points are averaged with their neighbors in order to “blur the sharp edges.” 
In our study the data were spatially smoothed (6 mm full-width at half-maximum, 
FWHM) using a Gaussian Kernel.  
Data movement inspection 
The processed data were finally examined, using the Artifact Detection Tool 
software package (ART; http://web.mit.edu/swg/art/art.pdf; http://www.nitrc.org 
/projects/artifact_detect), for excessive motion artifacts and for correlations between 
motion and experimental design, and between global mean signal and experimental 
design. Outliers were identified in the temporal differences series by assessing 
between-scan differences using the following criteria in ART (Z-threshold: 3.0 mm, 
scan to scan movement threshold: 0.5 mm; rotation threshold: 0.02 radians). By 
default, these outliers were omitted from the analyses by including a single regressor 
for each outlier. No correlations between motion and experimental design or global 
signal and experimental design were identified. Six directions of motion parameters 
from the realignment step as well as outlier time points (defined by ART) were 
included as nuisance regressors. We used a default high-pass filter of 128 s and 
serial correlations were accounted for by the default auto-regressive AR(1) model. 
Statistical analyses 
Fist-level analyses 
In line with most prior neuroimaging studies, fMRI data analyses were 
carried out within the general linear model (GLM) framework. These analyses 
involved first-level, single participant analyses with a regressor for each condition 
time-locked at the presentation of the stimulus slide, six movement artifact 
regressors, and a variable amount of artifact regressors determined by ART. After 
applying a canonical response function with event duration set to 0, using the 
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general linear model of SPM12, a reparameterization procedure (developed by 
Lindquist & Wager, 2007) was applied to estimate the height, latency, and width of 
the hemodynamic response function for each block. The analysis returns Area Under 
the Curve (AUC) images that take into account the time to reach the maximum 
amplitude post stimulus onset, and the duration of the hemodynamic response. 
Second-level analyses 
Analyses of interest were performed at the second, group level on the AUC 
parameter estimates (regressors) associated with each condition using a random-
effects model. Brain activation was measured and whole-brain contrasts were 
computed during four phases in the experimental task: (a) Equality manipulation: 
Immediately after receiving an (un)equal division of resources (Equal vs. Unequal 
Division), (b) Satisfaction rating: After the equality manipulation while rating one’s 
satisfaction with the (un)equal division (Equal vs. Unequal Division: during 
Satisfaction rating), (c) Compensation manipulation: Immediately after receiving 
(no) compensation (Compensation vs. No Compensation), and (d) Trust rating: After 
the compensation manipulation while rating one’s trust in the opponent after 
receiving (no) compensation (Compensation vs. No Compensation: during Trust 
rating). A detailed description of these contrasts is included in Appendix B. 
Importantly, in order to be able to investigate the unique neural correlates of trust 
repair, independently from monetary reward in itself, the contrast analyses for each 
of these four phases were exclusively masked with the Reward > No Reward 
contrast of the control task (i.e., the activation responsible for Reward was left out of 
all activations reported for the experimental task). A voxel-based statistical threshold 
of p < .001 (uncorrected) was used for all analyses with a minimum cluster extent of 
10 voxels. We report only the significant clusters, p < .001 FWE cluster-corrected. 
Regions of interest 
TRUST REPAIR IN THE BRAIN 
 
 
 
295 
Because of our theoretical interest in the striatum and the vmPFC as key 
regions in reward (see Eisenberger & Muscatell, 2013), we also computed Regions 
of Interest (ROIs) as spheres with a radius of 8 mm and for the striatum centered 
around the MNI coordinates (-12 12 -6; 12 10 -6) reported in the meta-analysis of 
Bartra, McGuire, and Kable (2013; their Table 1, positive effects) and for the 
vmPFC centered around the MNI coordinate (0 50 5) averaged from the coordinates 
reported in the meta-analysis of Van Overwalle (2009; his Table 1, reward learning). 
We used the same thresholds as for the whole-brain analyses. However, because the 
number of voxels involved is strongly reduced, the number of comparisons is also 
reduced, so that there is less FWE correction needed (therefore also called “small 
volume” correction) leading to a reduced chance of false negatives. Apart from these 
two reward related ROIs, additional forgiveness related ROIs were identified as 
spheres with a radius of 8 mm and with centers around the peak coordinates of 
significant clusters reported in Table 1 during the compensation phase in the 
bilateral IPL (extending to the TPJ; 36 -40 42; -40 -36 44), bilateral superior frontal 
cortex (32 20 64; -22 -2 56), and bilateral AI (32 20 6; -34 20 0). There were no 
significant clusters of interest during the division phase of the experiment. 
Percent signal change 
To reduce the possibility that change in the baseline BOLD signal from 
person to person would artificially add variance to subsequent analyses, it is 
recommended to convert each participant’s raw BOLD signal at each time point to a 
percentage. In our study, the mean percent signal change in all identified ROIs was 
extracted using the MarsBar toolbox (http://marsbar.Sourceforge.net). We then 
computed correlations between the trust ratings and brain activation in these ROIs 
across participants.  
Mediation analyses 
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Next, to test whether forgiveness and social reward activations mediate the 
effects of compensation on trust repair, we followed Hayes (2016) analysis strategy 
to calculate direct and indirect effects using a categorical predictor (by employing 
Model 4 of the SPSS macro PROCESS; based on 5,000 bootstrap samples). In these 
analyses we used the mean percentage signal change extracted via MarsBar for 
selected forgiveness and social reward related brain areas as mediator variables (for 
a description of these regions, see the Results section). 
Time-related analyses 
Lastly, to investigate if the neurocognitive signals associated with trust 
repair through financial compensation change over the course of our experiment, we 
conducted additional analyses in which we divided the experimental task in four 
evenly spaced time blocks. We subsequently investigated whether the reported 
activations differ across these time blocks. 
 
Results 
Behavioral results 
The participants indicated at several places in the experimental and control 
task how they responded to the manipulations. These responses indicate that the 
great majority of the participants reacted as might be expected during most of the 
trials. First, immediately after the division of resources by the opponent, 99.35% was 
satisfied with an Equal Division, while only 0.65% was satisfied with an Unequal 
Division. Secondly, at the end of each trial, participants indicated that they trusted 
the opponent most after an Equal Division (M = 3.77, SD = 0.35), followed by a 
moderate level of trust after Compensation (M = 2.73, SD = 0.41), and they gave the 
lowest trust rating after No Compensation (M = 1.11, SD = 0.18). A repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the three experimental conditions as 
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within-subjects variables revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 52) = 
613.73, p < .001, η²p = .96. Subsequent paired t-tests revealed that all three 
conditions differed from each other (all ts > 15.90, ps < .001). Furthermore, a paired 
t-test indicated that in the control task participants indicated greater happiness after 
receiving a Reward (M = 3.35, SD = 0.30) than when No Reward was received (M = 
1.09, SD = 0.26), t(26) = 34.45, p < .001. 
Imaging results 
Whole-brain contrast analyses 
Whole-brain analyses are conducted on the whole brain as they search for 
activation in every single voxel in the entire volume of the brain. Whole-brain 
contrast analyses for each of the four experimental phases were performed. The 
results of these analyses are reported in Table 1 (see Appendix B for a detailed 
description of the contrasts). In the experimental task, the Equal > Unequal Division 
contrast resulted in higher activation in the right lingual gyrus extending to the right 
fusiform and calcarine cortex (see Figure 3). The same contrast when participants 
indicated their satisfaction after the equality manipulation revealed that these 
differences had dissipated. The Unequal > Equal Division contrast did not reveal 
clusters of activation (not after the equality manipulation, neither during the 
satisfaction rating). The Compensation > No Compensation contrast did show 
increased activation in the left cerebellum, bilateral IPL extending to the TPJ, 
bilateral superior frontal cortex, bilateral AI, and left inferior frontal cortex (see 
Figure 4A). Note that many of these regions have previously been linked to the 
experience of forgiveness (see Will et al., 2014), which confirms Hypothesis 1a. The 
same contrast when participants gave their trust ratings recruited again the left 
cerebellum and the bilateral IPL, but now showed increased activation in the pmFC 
and the bilateral middle frontal cortex (see Figure 4B). The No Compensation > 
Compensation contrast did not reveal increased activation (not after the 
Chapter 9  
 
 
 
 
298 
compensation manipulation, neither during the trust rating). Finally, in the control 
task – which served as exclusive mask for all previous whole-brain contrasts – 
increased activation for the Reward > No Reward was found in the left calcarine 
cortex, right superior parietal lobule, right cerebellum, left rolandic operculum, and 
right superior medial frontal cortex.  
 
Figure 3. Brain activation related to the processing of Equality of Division. Whole-brain contrasts 
thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected) with a minimum cluster extent of 10 voxels. OC = Occipital 
Cortex. 
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Figure 4 
Figure 4. Brain activation related to the processing of (A) Compensation and (B) Trust 
Rating. Whole-brain contrasts thresholded at p < .001 (uncorrected) with a minimum 
cluster extent of 10 voxels. pmFC = posterior medial Frontal Cortex, SFC = Superior 
Frontal Cortex, IFC = Inferior Frontal Cortex, MFC = Middle Frontal Cortex, Ins = Insula, 
IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, TPJ = Temporo-Parietal Junction, OC = Occipital Cortex. 
 
A 
B 
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 Table 1. Whole-brain comparisons exclusively masked with Reward > No Reward 
contrast of the control experiment. 
  MNI coordinates   
Comparison and Anatomical Area Voxels x y Z t   
Equal > Unequal Division 
 
R Lingual Gyrus 2519 14 -80 -4 5.93 ** 
 
     R Fusiform Gyrus 
 
28 -74 -6 5.75 ** 
 
     R Calcarine Gyrus 
 
10 -68 10 5.54 ** 
Unequal > Equal Division  ---    
 
Equal > Unequal Division: during Satisfaction rating --- 
   Unequal > Equal Division: during Satisfaction rating --- 
   
 Compensation > No Compensation 
 
L Cerebellum Lobule VIIa Crus II  457 -40 -62 -48 5.12 * 
 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule (ext. to TPJ) 2803 36 -40 42 7.96 *** 
 
     R Postcentral Cortex 
 
46 -32 48 7.83 *** 
 
     R Postcentral Cortex 
 
48 -34 60 7.52 *** 
 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule (ext. to TPJ) 1448 -40 -36 44 6.72 *** 
 
     L Inferior Parietal Lobule  
 
-32 -42 40 6.29 *** 
 
     L Inferior Parietal Lobule  
 
-38 -46 44 5.78 ** 
 
L Superior Frontal Cortex 935 -22 -2 56 5.27 * 
 
     Posterior Medial Frontal Cortex 
 
2 26 44 4.93 ° 
 
R Superior Frontal Cortex 868 32 20 64 5.28 * 
 
     R Superior Frontal Cortex 
 
24 2 62 5.11 * 
 
     R Superior Frontal Cortex 
 
24 22 60 4.97 ° 
 
R anterior Insula  2147 32 20 6 5.04 ° 
 
     R Inferior Frontal p. Opercularis 
 
54 16 20 5.04 ° 
 
     R Inferior Frontal p. Opercularis 
 
52 14 28 4.97 ° 
 
L anterior Insula  242 -34 20 0 5.21 * 
 
L Inferior Frontal p. Triangularis 650 -50 46 12 5.05 ° 
 
     L Middle Frontal Cortex 
 
-40 40 16 4.93 ° 
ROI: L Striatum 31 -8 10 -6  * 
   -10 14 0  * 
 ROI: R Striatum 27 14 16 -2  ** 
 ROI: Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex   ---    
No Compensation > Compensation --- 
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Table Continued 
Compensation > No Compensation: during Trust rating 
 
L Cerebellum Lobule VIIa Crus II 536 -36 -56 -44 4.98 ° 
 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule  1841 40 -50 56 5.52 ** 
 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule  553 -40 -48 60 4.23 
 
 
Posterior Medial Frontal Cortex 513 12 16 50 4.52 
 
 
R Middle Frontal Cortex 2114 48 32 32 5.71 ** 
 
L Middle Frontal Cortex 482 -48 36 30 5.00 ° 
No Compensation > Compensation: during Trust rating --- 
   
 Exclusive Mask: Reward > No Reward (Control Task) 
     
 
L Calcarine Gyrus 10444 -4 -86 -4 7.78 *** 
 
     L Middle Occipital Cortex 
 
-20 -86 18 6.97 *** 
 
     L Superior Occipital Cortex 
 
-14 -90 2 6.91 *** 
 
R Superior Parietal Lobule  617 30 -54 64 5.23 
 
 
R Cerebellum Lobule VI 448 24 -52 -30 5.61 * 
 
L Rolandic Operculum 653 -60 0 8 5.21 
 
 
R Superior Medial Frontal Cortex 487 8 34 48 4.46 
 ROI: L Striatum 6 -12 18 -10  ** 
   -8 18 -8  * 
 ROI: R Striatum   ---    
 ROI: Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex   ---    
Note. x, y, and z = Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates of the peak values; t = t-
score of the peak values; L = left, R = right, ext. = extending. Whole brain analyses with cluster 
extent > 10 voxels with p < .001 uncorrected. Listed are clusters that are significant at p < .001, 
cluster FWE-corrected. ROIs were analyzed with a small volume correction, using the same 
thresholds. ROIs were centered around -12 12 -6 and 12 10 -6 (Striatum) and 0 50 5 (vmPFC) 
with a radius of 8 mm. 
° p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (peak FWE-corrected). 
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Regions of interest contrast analyses 
Additional ROI analyses are conducted on ROIs or clusters of voxels that 
are selected because of the specific interest in that particular region. In this light, we 
also conducted ROI analyses for the striatum and the vmPFC, as these are two key 
areas of the reward network. The results of these analyses revealed that for both the 
Compensation > No Compensation contrast (which was again masked with the 
control task) and the Reward > No Reward contrast we found increased activation in 
the striatum (see Table 1). In corroboration with Hypothesis 2a, it can thus be 
concluded that receiving financial compensation is also experienced as socially 
rewarding. 
Correlation analyses 
To avoid chance capitalization, we computed correlations only during the 
compensation phase and for ROIs that were theoretically related to reward or 
showed significant forgiveness related brain activity. This limited the correlations to 
reward related ROIs in the striatum and vmPFC and forgiveness related ROIs in 
significant clusters during the compensation phase in the bilateral IPL (that included 
the TPJ), bilateral superior frontal cortex, and bilateral AI. The results of these 
correlation analyses revealed a positive correlation between trust ratings at the end 
of each trial and activation in the right IPL/TPJ after the compensation manipulation 
(r = .40, p < .05; see Figure 5). A correlation in the similar direction was found in 
the left IPL/TPJ, but this was non-significant.  
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Figure 5 
Figure 5. After receiving Compensation activation in the right inferior parietal lobule 
(extending to the temporoparietal junction) is positively correlated with the trust ratings at 
the end of the trial.  
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Mediation analyses 
We first conducted a mediation analysis in which we used the mean percent 
signal change in the right IPL/TPJ as an indicator of forgiveness activation. We 
selected this forgiveness related brain area because it was most strongly activated 
after receiving compensation (see Table 1) and this activation was correlated with 
ratings of trust. In agreement with Hypothesis 1b, the mediation analysis (see Figure 
6A) confirmed that the indirect effect of compensation on the ratings of trust via 
activation in the right IPL/TPJ was significant (b = .08, Boot SE = .04, 95% CI: [.01, 
.18]). The direct effect of compensation on the trust ratings also remained significant 
(b = 1.54, SE = .09, p < .001), thus indicating partial mediation. The indirect effect 
remained significant even when controlling for activation in left IPL/TPJ (b = .04, 
SE = .03, 95% CI: [.00, .12]). Next, we conducted a similar mediation analysis in 
which we used the mean percent signal change in the bilateral striatum as an 
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indicator of social reward activation, because this area is theoretically related to 
reward and the left and right striatum were both equally strongly activated after 
receiving compensation (see Table 1). Contrary to Hypothesis 2b, the mediation 
analysis (see Figure 6B) revealed that the indirect effect of compensation on the 
ratings of trust via activation in the striatum was not significant (b = .01, SE = .02, 
95% CI: [-.01, .07]). The present results thus reveal that only forgiveness supports 
the link between compensation and trust repair. 
Figure 6. Effect of the compensation manipulation on self-reported trustworthiness through (A) 
activation in forgiveness related brain areas (in term of percent signal change in the right inferior 
parietal lobule, extending to the temporoparietal junction) and (B) activation in social reward related 
brain areas (in terms of percent signal change in the bilateral striatum). Values reflect b with SE 
between parentheses. ° p < .08, * p < .05, *** p < .001. The second value (at the bottom in bold) 
reflects the indirect of forgiveness/reward. 
 
 
 
 
 
Compensation 
 
Trust Ratings 
 
Forgiveness .21 (.06)*** 
 
.37 (.20)° 
1.54 (.09)*** 
.08 (.04)* 
 
A 
 
Compensation 
Manipulation 
Trust Ratings 
 
Social Reward .06 (.08) 
 
.10 (.16) 
1.61 (.09)*** 
.01 (.02) 
 
B 
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Time-related analyses 
Finally, the experimental task was divided in four equal time blocks in order 
to explore whether the neurocognitive signals associated with trust repair by 
financial compensation are stable over time. Activations for significant ROIs during 
the compensation phase (i.e., bilateral IPL/TPJ, bilateral superior frontal cortex, 
bilateral AI, and bilateral striatum) were investigated with repeated measures 
ANOVAs using a 4 (time block) × 2 (compensation) within-subjects design. If 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied. The results of these analyses are visually displayed 
in Figure 7. These analyses confirmed the main contrast of Compensation > No 
Compensation reported earlier for most ROIs, Fs > 4.35, ps < .05, η²ps > .14. The 
only exceptions were the right superior frontal cortex and the left AI, for which the 
main effect of compensation was almost significant, Fs > 3.75, ps < .07, η²ps > .12, 
and the right striatum, for which there was no significant main effect of 
compensation, F(1, 26) = 2.43, p = .13, η²p = .09. Furthermore, for most ROIs the 
results failed to reveal a significant main or interaction effect of time block, Fs < 
2.25, ps > .08, η²ps < .08. Here, the only exceptions were the left superior frontal 
cortex and the right striatum, for which there was a significant main effect of time 
block, Fs > 3.01, ps < .04, η²ps > .10. Subsequent post-hoc tests (with Bonferroni 
correction) revealed that activation in the left superior frontal cortex was 
significantly higher in the second block than in the third block (p = .03). Activation 
in the right striatum was marginally higher in the first two blocks than in the fourth 
block (ps < .10). Overall, it can be concluded that the neurocognitive signals 
associated with forgiveness and social reward are relatively stable as they do not 
substantially change over time. 
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Figure 7. Percent signal change during the compensation phase in function of the time block and the 
compensation manipulation in the (A/B) right/left inferior parietal lobule (extending to the 
temporoparietal junction), (C/D) right/left superior frontal cortex, (E/F) right/left anterior insula, (G/H) 
right/left striatum. Significant main effects of time block were found in D (block 2 > block 3) and G 
(block 1-2 > block 4). 
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Discussion 
Our study set out to investigate, in interdependent exchange situations, the 
neural underpinnings of financial compensation, which is regarded as an effective 
response to improve the trustworthiness of the transgressor (Bottom et al., 2002; 
Desmet et al., 2010, 2011; Haesevoets, Van Hiel, et al., 2014). As organizations are 
defined by means of interdependent relationships, repairing trust when it is violated 
is of great importance to their long-term effectiveness and performance (Kramer & 
Lewicki, 2010). However, researchers (and by extension practitioners) know very 
little about why tangible responses positively affect trust. The present study 
contributes to ample theoretical and practical issues in the trust repair literature, 
which we will discuss below.  
Evaluation of hypotheses 
The first major contribution of our research concerns the finding that trust 
repair efforts – under the form of financial compensations – have a significant effect 
because they elicit forgiveness. Corroborating Hypothesis 1a, our whole-brain 
analyses revealed that receiving a financial compensation (vs. no compensation) was 
associated with increased activation in the IPL extending to the TPJ (mentalizing 
network), inferior and superior frontal cortices (conflict monitoring network), and AI 
(salience monitoring network). According to Will et al. (2014; also see Strang, 
Utikal, Fischbacher, Weber, & Falk, 2014) these regions are all associated with 
forgiving a transgressor, a transition process that requires perspective-taking as 
revealed by the activation of the TPJ (see Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007), 
executive control as shown by the activation of the frontal cortices (see Botvinik et 
al., 2004), awareness of and control over one’s own interceptive sensations and 
feelings shown by the activation in the AI (see Menon & Uddin, 2010), and hence 
the suppression of a prepotent emotional tendency to retaliate (see Chester et al., 
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2013). Moreover, additional analyses revealed that indeed a strong overlap exists 
between Will et al.’s (2014) clusters associated with forgiveness and the activations 
reported in our study after the compensation manipulation. We verified this by using 
the peaks of the TPJ (45 -54 36; -51 -48 36), superior frontal gyrus (9 36 36; -6 18 
51), AI (33 18 -12; -30 21 -6), and lateral prefrontal cortex (-30 51 0) clusters 
reported by Will et al. (2014; 2nd part of their Table 2) as centers of ROIs (with a 
radius varying from 4 mm to 10 mm), which resulted in significant activation in 
these areas in our data. Moreover, in line with Hypothesis 1b, the importance of 
forgiveness was further demonstrated by our mediation approach, which revealed 
that forgiveness activation mediates the effect of financial compensation on 
experienced trust. As such, all our findings, combined with the results of prior 
neuroimaging (see Strang et al., 2014; Will et al., 2014) and behavioral studies (see 
Chung & Beverland, 2006; McCullough et al., 2003; Xie & Peng, 2009), clearly 
underscore that forgiveness is a necessary step for effectively rebuilding trust as it is 
activated by financial compensations, and drives the positive effect of those 
compensations on trust repair.  
The second important contribution of our research concerns the fact that 
social rewards were experienced when interpersonal trust was repaired by means of 
financial compensations. Indeed, our results showed that financial compensation 
elicited activation beyond the mere reception of an equivalent monetary reward, 
which acted as a control task. Specifically, the results of our ROI analyses revealed 
increased activation in the striatum, one of the key components of the reward 
network (Eisenberger & Muscatell, 2013; Elliott et al., 2003), after the provision of a 
monetary reward (vs. no reward) in the control task. Important to note in this respect 
is that prior research has indicated that the reward network is not only activated 
when receiving a monetary reward but also in cases of social rewards (see Izuma et 
al., 2008; Zink et al., 2008). For that reason, we investigated the unique neural 
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correlates of trust repair – independently from monetary reward – by using this 
control task as an exclusive mask in our analyses. Even when controlling for this, the 
ROI analyses revealed that a part of the striatum was significantly activated when a 
financial compensation (vs. no compensation) was offered in reaction to a trust 
breach. These findings corroborate prior research by Izuma et al. (2008) and Zink et 
al. (2008) which reported that activity in the striatum reflects a common signal of 
reward in both financial and social domains. Moreover, in the whole-brain analyses 
we additionally found increased activation in the AI after receiving a financial 
compensation. This area has also been associated with the experience of reward (see 
Bartra et al., 2013; Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000; Taylor et al., 
2004). In line with Hypothesis 2a, our results thus indicate that financial 
compensations activate the reward network, even beyond the experience of a purely 
monetary reward. 
Our mediation analysis, however, failed to reveal a unique mediation effect 
of social reward activation in the relationship between compensation and trust repair. 
Hypothesis 2b is thus not confirmed by the present data. In retrospect, this finding 
may not be that surprising. As mentioned earlier, a trust breach creates 
disequilibrium in both the relationship and the broader social context (see Dirks et 
al., 2009). A financial compensation restores the imbalance in the social context by 
reaffirming the victims’ relative standing, which is experienced as socially 
rewarding. Yet, as our results indicate, it might take more to effectively repair trust 
than just the affirmation of the victim’s standing. Indeed, our results show that to 
effectively repair trust it is of crucial importance that the disequilibrium in the 
specific interpersonal relationship is also dealt with. Here, forgiveness is important 
as it returns the relationship to a more positive state. Our neuroimaging findings thus 
have implications for the social equilibrium model, which suggests an equally 
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important role of forgiveness and social reward experiences in the trust repair 
process. This also underscores the importance that neuroimaging techniques can take 
to further shape and develop theoretical models of the processes that play a critical 
role in the repair of interpersonal trust.  
Another interesting issue to consider is that even if forgiveness occurs, it 
may not be the case that only positive emotions are experienced. Rather, it may well 
be that a residue of negative emotions will remain, a state that requires effortful 
control and resolution of the emotional conflict. Such an effortful conflict resolution 
process is characterized by activation in the lateral frontal cortices, as demonstrated 
by Mak, Hu, Zhang, Xiao, and Lee (2009), who reported increased activation in the 
left superior frontal gyrus when participants were required to regulate negative 
emotions (also see McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, & Gross, 2008; Yoshimura at 
al., 2009). Interestingly, in both our study and the one by Will and colleagues 
(2014), this left superior frontal cortex was also activated when participants forgave 
the transgressor. Further support for the idea that a compensation-based trust attempt 
might lead to both positive and negative emotional reactions was, to a certain extent, 
also provided by our behavioral data. These data showed that although in the 
aftermath of an unfair resource allocation trust ratings were higher after receiving 
compensation compared to no compensation, trust levels after compensation were 
still significantly lower than when no trust violation occurred.  
The important message of our data is that it suggests that although the 
provision of a monetary compensation is able to repair trust through forgiveness, 
full restoration is unlikely to take place. Indeed, the fact that compensations fail to 
fully restore broken trust is likely to be linked to the observation that forgiveness 
carries both positive and negative emotions. As described by Dirks and colleagues 
(2009, p. 79), an appropriate metaphor to distinguish between repair and restoration 
may be “a flower vase in which the broken pieces have been cemented, the joints 
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sanded, and the vase reglazed so that there is absolutely no visible trace of the 
break” (paralleling restoration) versus “a flower vase in which a simple cementing 
process has been used so that the fracture lines and glue joints can still be seen” 
(paralleling repair). In light of this, our research also adds to the literature by 
showing that trust in its post-repair state is not the same as in its pre-repair state, an 
issue which received only scant research attention. Future research is needed to 
further investigate our claim regarding the hypothesized emotional ambivalence 
related to forgiveness. 
Managerial implications 
Our findings also imply important managerial implications. Conflicts can be 
pervasive in organizational settings and therefore managers need to know which 
available means can be used effectively to ensure that trust is not destroyed. Within 
organizations monetary cues are prevalent and the present findings illustrate that 
these cues, as operationalized by a financial compensation, indeed elicit feelings of 
forgiveness and are experienced as socially rewarding. These general findings 
underscore the importance of substantive responses for managers to use when 
dealing with trust crises that have tangible consequences for their employees (cf. 
Dirks et al., 2011; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). 
Another important contribution of the present paper is that our time-stamped 
data allowed us to investigate whether the neurocognitive signals associated with 
forgiveness and social reward change over time, which does not seem to be the case 
as the reported activations were relatively stable over the course of our experiment. 
This finding is important in light of the observation that in organizations employees 
are regularly confronted with trust breaches (see Conway & Briner, 2002; Dirks et 
al., 2011). From this point of view, it is necessary to examine the effects of 
compensation over time in order to examine its true effectiveness. Our results 
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indicate that if compensations are provided for repeated transgressions, they remain 
effective in evoking feelings of forgiveness and social reward, at least in cases of 
different transgressors. The positive effects of compensation in terms of enhancing 
trust are thus not limited to the first few trust repair attempts, but rather show 
stability over multiple trust repair episodes. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
In our study the trust breach resulted in a loss of tangible resources for the 
victim. In those cases, repair attempts in the form of monetary compensations undo 
the inflicted tangible harm, and as such present a condition under which trust can be 
repaired. The social equilibrium model, however, suggests that financial 
transgressions do not only violate victims’ economic concerns, but also important 
relationship norms. As such, tangible trust violations also have relational 
consequences. Yet, when a trust breach is social rather than tangible in nature – like 
when being excluded from an interaction or socially undermined – the effectiveness 
of a financial compensation as a means to repair trust could be limited. Here, efforts 
that specifically focus on the harmed relational needs of the victim may be required 
more in order for trust to be effectively repaired. One such non-tangible response is 
the provision of a sincere apology. The present study’s findings are thus primarily 
applicable to trust repair after tangible transgressions that have taken place.  
This being said, scholars have argued that, despite their obvious difference 
in tangible costs, tangible and non-tangible responses are similar in a more 
fundamental way (see Dirks et al., 2011). More specifically, we may speculate that, 
although they are identified as distinct responses to different types of violations, 
tangible responses and non-tangible responses all repair trust in a similar fashion, 
that is, via the experience of forgiveness. Further research, however, is needed to 
further investigate this claim. Moreover, it is possible that social reward experiences 
are of greater importance for the apology-based trust repair process than for the 
Chapter 9  
 
 
 
 
314 
compensation-based trust repair process, because apologies not only reaffirm the 
victim’s social standing but also convey respect to the victim (cf. Barclay & 
Skarlicki, 2008). Investigating the role of social reward experiences in the 
effectiveness of apologies might therefore also be a valuable avenue for future trust 
repair research. 
Conclusion 
Our study employed the fMRI methodology to examine the neural correlates 
of trust repair by tangible responses. Its findings underscore the use of neuroimaging 
techniques to gather unique insights into the question which processes (forgiveness 
and social rewards) are activated and play a role when trying to repair trust 
violations in settings that define organizations, that is, highly interdependent 
exchange relationships. We hope that the present study encourages future research to 
use this methodology to continue addressing issues related to trust repair in general, 
and the role of forgiveness and social rewards (and other potential mechanisms) in 
the effectiveness of tangible and non-tangible responses more specifically. 
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Appendix A: Overview of trials employed in the experimental task 
 
Number of 
trials 
Start budget of 
both players 
Initial division 
(participant vs. other) 
Compensation 
amount  
Final division 
(participant vs. other) 
  Equal Division condition 
8 5 5 vs. 5 n/a 5 vs. 5 
16 10 10 vs. 10 n/a 10 vs. 10 
16 15 15 vs. 15 n/a 15 vs. 15 
  No Compensation conditon 
2 5 2 vs. 8 0 2 vs. 8 
2 5 1 vs. 9 0 1 vs. 9 
2 10 4 vs. 16 0 4 vs. 16 
2 10 3 vs. 17 0 3 vs. 17 
2 10 2 vs. 18 0 2 vs. 18 
2 10 1 vs. 19 0 1 vs. 19 
2 15 4 vs. 26 0 4 vs. 26 
2 15 3 vs. 27 0 3 vs. 27 
2 15 2 vs. 28 0 2 vs. 28 
2 15 1 vs. 29 0 1 vs. 29 
  Compensation conditon 
2 5 2 vs. 8 3 5 vs. 5 
2 5 1 vs. 9 4 5 vs. 5 
2 10 4 vs. 16 6 10 vs. 10 
2 10 3 vs. 17 7 10 vs. 10 
2 10 2 vs. 18 8 10 vs. 10 
2 10 1 vs. 19 9 10 vs. 10 
2 15 4 vs. 26 11 15 vs. 15 
2 15 3 vs. 27 12 15 vs. 15 
2 15 2 vs. 28 13 15 vs. 15 
2 15 1 vs. 29 14 15 vs. 15 
 
Chapter 9  
 
 
 
 
326 
Appendix B: Detailed description of the different contrasts 
The “Equal > Unequal Division” contrast investigates which brain regions show 
higher activation in the Equal Division condition as compared to the Unequal 
Division condition when the equality manipulation is presented on screen 3 of the 
experimental task (see Figure 2A). The same logic applies to the reverse [i.e., <] 
contrast. Thus, the “Equal < Unequal Division” contrast investigates which brain 
regions show lower activation in the Equal Division condition as compared to the 
Unequal Division condition, or stated differently, show higher activation in the 
Unequal Division condition as compared to the Equal Division condition. 
The “Equal > [<] Unequal Division: during Satisfaction rating” contrast investigates 
which brain regions show higher [lower] activation in the Equal Division condition 
as compared to the Unequal Division condition when participants rate their 
satisfaction with the division on screen 4 of the experimental task (see Figure 2A). 
The “Compensation > [<] No Compensation” contrast investigates which brain 
regions show higher [lower] activation in the Compensation condition as compared 
to the No Compensation condition when the compensation manipulation is presented 
on screen 6 of the experimental task (see Figure 2A). 
The “Compensation > [<] No Compensation: during Trust rating” contrast 
investigates which brain regions show higher [lower] activation in the Compensation 
condition as compared to the No Compensation condition when participants rate the 
trustworthiness of their counterpart on screen 7 of the experimental task (see Figure 
2A). 
The “Reward > [<] No Reward” contrast investigates which brain regions show 
higher [lower] activation in the Reward condition as compared to the No Reward 
condition when the reward manipulation is presented on screen 1 of the control task 
(see Figure 2B).  
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Chapter 10 
 
Research Overview and General Discussion  
 
The present dissertation started out with the question if and how broken trust can be 
repaired in the aftermath of a trust violation. Given that it is not uncommon that 
people violate trust, we examined the extent in which financial compensations and 
apologies can actually increase broken trust as well as what factors influence the 
effectiveness of these two trust repair strategies. This final chapter summarizes the 
main findings reported in our empirical chapters and situates these findings within 
the global research goals of this dissertation. Furthermore, some contributions and 
implications of the present findings are also briefly discussed. We further point to 
the limitations of the present studies and highlight interesting pathways for future 
research. 
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Research overview 
Trust has been considered to be a “social glue” that binds people, making it 
an essential ingredient of social life. Yet, it is not uncommon that people violate 
trust. The axiom that “trust takes years to build, seconds to break, and forever to 
repair” indicates that trust is easier to destroy than to (re)build. This notion has made 
researchers cautious to engage in research that they think is likely to be 
unsuccessful. The literature on trust has even created the idea that restoring trust 
may prove too difficult. Some scholars have even argued that broken trust cannot be 
repaired, and therefore “surprisingly few studies have directly examined how trust 
may be repaired” (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006, p. 50; also see De Cremer, 
2010). In the present dissertation, we departed from this rather negative and 
pessimistic view that has dominated the literature on trust for so long and instead 
adopted a more positive view by claiming that human beings do have the capacity to 
restore trust after it has been violated. In this respect, the trust repair process can be 
compared with the metaphor of a broken bone (see Pratt & Dirks, 2007). A broken 
bone is a painful situation, but it can grow equally strong (or sometimes even 
stronger) than the initial unbroken bone. In a similar vein, in this dissertation we 
started from the assumption that if we develop the necessary understanding on how 
broken trust can effectively be repaired, harmed relationships can be put together 
again in a trustworthy manner.  
In light of this more positive view on trust repair, in our empirical chapters 
we examined by which means and under which conditions effective trust repair is 
possible. We focused on the effectiveness of two different strategies (the offer of a 
financial compensation and the provision of an apology) that can be employed by 
transgressors. Moreover, in light of the factors that can influence trust repair we, for 
example, also investigated if and how the effectiveness of trust repair attempts is 
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influenced by the role of the actor (target versus non-involved observer) and the 
characteristics of the trust violation (competence versus integrity violations). Below, 
we will summarize the main findings of our eight empirical chapters. 
 
Findings organized by chapter 
Trust repair through financial (over)compensation 
Trust breaches, which are prevalent in social life, often result in some sort of 
monetary loss for the victim. When such a tangible damage has been inflicted, 
transgressors can satisfy victims’ outcome-related concerns by providing a financial 
compensation. Although prior studies have shown that financial compensations can 
effectively restore broken trust, it is still unclear whether larger compensations foster 
more trust. 
In Chapter 2 we conducted four empirical studies in order to investigate 
whether costly overcompensations have additional positive effects on top of the 
impact of less costly equal compensations. In line with a more psychological 
perspective on trust, the results of our studies revealed that overcompensation offers 
no positive effects in addition to the impact of equal compensation in terms of 
cooperation and relationship preservation, and that it even provokes negative 
outcomes in terms of lowered trust and less favorable perceptions of the 
transgressor. Our findings thus show that the effectiveness of overcompensation 
varies depending on the outcome that it targets. That is, overcompensation is as 
effective as equal compensation for more calculus-based outcomes like cooperation 
and relationship preservation, whereas overcompensation is less effective than equal 
compensation for more relational-based outcomes such as interpersonal trust and 
perceptions of the transgressor. Taken together, the findings of Chapter 2 provide 
preliminary evidence that overcompensation does not provide any surplus value and 
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can actually even backfire. In the following chapters we aimed to further explore this 
interesting finding. 
In Chapter 3, we decided to move a step further by investigating whether 
the effect of overcompensation depends on the perspective of the person who 
evaluates the compensation. More specifically, we investigated whether target 
versus observer differences exist in the effectiveness of financial overcompensation 
as a trust repair strategy. The implicit message of an overcompensation signals that 
the transgressor is willing to go the extra mile. Intuitively, overcompensation has a 
certain appeal leading to the expectation of positive reactions. However, the findings 
done in Chapter 2 revealed that when victims actually receive overcompensation, it 
did not result in better outcomes than equal compensation. Interestingly, in real-life 
settings transgressors often offer victims an overcompensation, not only to repair 
their relationship with the victim, but also to avoid reputational damage and to 
positively influence the general public. Therefore, we examined if overcompensation 
entails positive effects for observers. In line with the findings of Chapter 2 our data 
revealed that for targets overcompensation resulted in lower levels of trust than 
equal compensation, while for observers equal compensation and overcompensation 
resulted in similar levels of trust. The findings of Chapter 3 thus complement the 
observations of Chapter 2, by demonstrating that overcompensation is neither a cost-
effective repair strategy for third party observers.  
Subsequently, in Chapter 4 we examined how situational characteristics of 
the violation in terms of competence versus integrity violations affect victim’s trust. 
In this vein, in the literature a central distinction has been made between violations 
that can be ascribed to a lack of competence and violations that are due to 
insufficient integrity on part of the transgressor (see Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 
2004; Kim et al., 2006). When a trust violation can be ascribed to a lack of 
competence, the wrongdoing is not indicative that the transgressor is a bad person 
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since everybody can display low performance levels under unfavorable conditions. 
As such, undoing the harm through an equal compensation should be sufficient to 
restore trust, and little benefit is expected to arise from additional compensation 
beyond equality. Yet, when a trust violation can be attributed to a lack of integrity, 
the wrongdoing signals that the perpetrator is a bad person as only people who fall 
short on certain moral values will display dishonest behavior. We expected that 
under these circumstances overcompensation might be needed in order for trust 
repair to occur. Two empirical studies were conducted to test these predictions. The 
results of these studies revealed that equal compensation and overcompensation can 
both effectively promote the restoration of trust for transgressions that indicate a 
lack of competence, whereas in case of integrity faults equal compensation and 
overcompensation are both ineffective to enhance trust. Moreover, for both violation 
types, overcompensation has no positive effects on top of the impact of equal 
compensation.  
The data reported in Chapters 3 and 4 provide additional evidence for the 
finding that overcompensation is not more effective than equal compensation – and 
this is also true for observers and in case of severe transgressions in terms of 
integrity violations. Yet, it is fair to note that there are some researchers who have 
found positive effects of overcompensation on top of equal compensation (e.g., see 
Boshoff, 1997; Gilly & Hansen, 1985; Hocutt, Bowers, & Donavan, 2006; also see 
Desmet, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2011). A closer look at these studies reveals that 
the positive effects of overcompensation were mostly acquired with relatively small 
amounts of overcompensation, whereas in the prior chapters of this dissertation we 
consistently employed rather large overcompensations (i.e., compensations that were 
generally at least two times greater than the inflicted monetary damage).  
Therefore, in Chapter 5 we investigated how the size of the provided 
overcompensation influences its effectiveness. It can be predicted that small 
Chapter 10  
 
 
332 
overcompensations reveal additional positive effects because they signal goodwill 
on part of the transgressor and compensate the victim for potential extra costs that 
might be associated with the trust violation. From a certain point, however, 
additional overcompensation is expected to become ineffective as people experience 
large deviations from equality as unpleasant and unfair (Bazerman, White, & 
Loewenstein, 1995; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). To test these 
predictions, we conducted four empirical studies in which we investigated the 
overcompensation effectiveness in cases of product failures. The use of financial 
compensation as a harm restoration strategy is ubiquitous is these settings, because 
for most companies occasional lapses in product (and service) quality are nearly 
inevitable, making attempts to restore such failures extremely relevant. Here too, 
companies can choose to provide dissatisfied customers more compensation than 
required to undo the failure with the aim to further increase their trust and loyalty. In 
line with our predictions, the data of our studies revealed that mild amounts of 
monetary overcompensation can enhance customer loyalty beyond equal 
compensation. However, once the overcompensation crossed a specific threshold its 
effectiveness started to decline, which aligns well with our prior findings that 
especially large amounts of overcompensation are not well received. Our results 
further indicated that there are also robust individual differences in how customers 
react to increasing levels of overcompensation. 
Overcompensations can not only be used by companies as a compensation 
policy, but also as an advertisement strategy. In this context, promising customers to 
pay them more than the difference when another store sells the exact same item for a 
lower price is a commonly employed advertisement strategy. In the literature, such a 
low-price guarantee is often referred to as price-beating (see Kukar-Kinney, 2006; 
Kukar-Kinney & Walters, 2003). In Chapter 6 we conducted five empirical studies 
in order to investigate if price-beating guarantees are more effective to attract 
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customers to a store than price-matching guarantees. In a first study we examined if 
marketers and shop owners believe that beating price differences is an effective 
advertisement strategy and compensation policy. Our data revealed that the majority 
of marketers and shop owners in our sample thought that beating a price difference 
is a more effective strategy than matching a price difference. However, our 
subsequent studies showed that the advertisement as well as the provision of a price-
beating refund did not enhance customer loyalty beyond the level that was already 
reached by a price-matching refund. Moreover, our mediation analyses revealed that 
the observation that price-beating is not more effective than price-matching can be 
ascribed to its lower perceived fairness. Despite the additional costs that are 
associated with price-beating, price-matching and price-beating thus seem to be 
equally effective.  
Chapters 5 and 6 hence indicate that even when the provider of the 
compensation is a company (rather than another person), the promise as well as the 
provision of (substantive) overcompensation (cf. price-beating) does not lead to 
more positive outcomes than equal compensation (cf. price-matching). 
Overcompensations are thus not only cost-ineffective in interpersonal relationships, 
but also in relationship between customers and companies.  
Trust repair through apologies 
 The prior empirical chapters all focused on the effectiveness of financial 
(over)compensation as a harm restoration strategy. In the following two chapters we 
investigated if verbal strategies under the form of apologies are also of importance 
for the trust repair process.  
 In Chapter 7 we investigated if in the aftermath of a tangible trust violation 
the provision of an apology has any additional positive effect on top of the impact of 
a financial compensation. In other words, we examined the combined effects of 
financial compensations and apologies. The results of two empirical studies revealed 
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that under certain circumstances apologies can enhance trust repair over and above 
financial compensation. More precisely, our findings indicate that apologies further 
encourage trust when the provided financial compensation is too low to undo the 
inflicted harm (i.e., undercompensation). This observation aligns well with prior 
research that stressed the importance of also appealing to relational motives when 
trying to achieve trust repair (e.g., see Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 
2002; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009). 
In Chapter 8 we took a different focus by investigating the effectiveness of 
apologies in relationships at work. In this chapter we started from the assumption 
that leaders regularly have to make decisions, and that incorrect decisions can harm 
their followers. The aim of Chapter 8 was to show that in the case of an incorrect 
decision by a leader, the timing of when this decision was made influences how 
much an apology is needed. With regard to this timing dimension, leaders can make 
decisions in a hasty, timely, or delayed fashion. In this chapter we conducted five 
empirical studies in order to examine how the timing of incorrect decisions impact 
upon the effectiveness of leaders’ apologies to repair followers’ trust. The data of 
our studies revealed that the need for an apology was highest when an incorrect 
decision was preceded by delay, whereas apologies in fact were ineffective for 
repairing trust in this context. That is, our findings showed that the actual provision 
of an apology was effective for restoring both trustworthiness and trust after timely 
and hasty incorrect decisions, but ineffective when the same incorrect decision was 
delayed. Trust violations are thus particularly difficult to restore through apologizing 
in the context of delays. 
Trust repair from a neuropsychological perspective 
The previous empirical chapters of this dissertation all investigated the trust 
repair process by using behavioral research methods. In our last empirical chapter 
we employed a neuropsychological approach to the study of trust repair. An 
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increasing number of scholars have recently started to explore the neurobiology of 
trust. It is remarkable, however, that these prior neuroimaging studies solely focused 
on the neural substrates that are associated with the presence or absence of trust, 
while the neural mechanisms associated with the transition from a state of violated 
trust to a state of regained trust have not yet been empirically investigated. This is 
unfortunate, because trust violations are ubiquitous and neuroimaging techniques 
can serve as an important complement to behavioral methods. By employing an 
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) approach we were able to examine 
how the brain reacts to trust violations and subsequent repair attempts. In doing so, 
we are the first to look at the trust repair process by means of “looking into the 
brain.” 
In Chapter 9 we have investigated the neural correlates of trust repair 
through equal financial compensation. The starting point of this study was the 
observation that although our prior studies all showed that compensations that reveal 
equal final outcomes for both parties are particularly (cost) effective to enhance 
trust, these studies have not revealed much evidence yet why it is that victims of a 
trust breach are willing to respond positively in terms of trust to an equal financial 
compensation. Our neuroimaging data indicated that receiving an equal 
compensation activates forgiveness and social reward related brain areas. Moreover, 
additional analysis revealed that forgiveness activation mediates the link between 
compensation and trust repair. Based on these results it can hence be concluded that 
forgiveness is actually a necessary step for effectively rebuilding trust as it is 
activated by equal compensations, and drives the positive effect of these 
compensations on trust repair. 
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General discussion 
This dissertation provides some new and important insights in the 
effectiveness of financial compensations and apologies as means to repair broken 
trust. Throughout the empirical chapters of this dissertation, we have highlighted the 
major contributions and implications of the findings of each chapter individually. 
Here, we will discuss some general contributions and implications of our research. 
Also, we will formulate some limitations and avenues for future research. 
 
Contributions and implications 
The major contribution of the present dissertation is that in our empirical 
chapters (with the exception of Chapter 8) we investigated the effectiveness of a 
repair strategy that is commonly used, but did not yet receive much empirical 
attention. Indeed, a closer look at the literature on harm restoration reveals that 
scholars have focused almost exclusively on the effectiveness of verbal repair 
strategies like apologies and denials (e.g., see Kim et al., 2004, 2006; Tomlinson, 
Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Although we 
recognize that verbal accounts can be effective to enlarge trust, trust violations often 
induce financial harm to the victim in terms of a monetary loss. Under these 
circumstances verbal responses may not be enough to restore trust because the 
tangible loss also needs to be addressed (Bottom et al., 2002). A common restorative 
tactic used in such situations consists of the transgressor reimbursing the victim for 
the infected loss. Although such financial compensations are prevalently used as a 
restorative response, very little is known about the factors that shape their 
effectiveness. Moreover, most prior compensation studies explored solely 
compensations that are smaller than or about equal to the damage suffered. On the 
basis of these studies, it was concluded that a monetary compensation in response to 
financial harm is an effective tool in restoring the victim’s trust (e.g., see Bottom et 
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al., 2002). It can, however, be argued that effectively restoring broken relationships 
may ask more from a perpetrator than just exactly restoring the damage by providing 
the victim substantive compensation that goes beyond the mere damage.  
In the first five empirical chapters of this dissertation we explicitly focused 
on the effectiveness of overcompensation as a trust restoration tactic. The critical 
question that we tried to answer with our research was whether costly 
overcompensation has beneficial effects in addition to the impact of less costly equal 
compensation. Chapters 2 to 6 revealed that especially large overcompensation is not 
a more effective trust restoration tactic than equal compensation. Importantly, this 
observation applied to different outcomes (calculus-based and relational based-
outcomes; Chapter 2), perspectives (target and observers of the compensation; 
Chapter 3), and violation types (competence and integrity faults; Chapter 4). Similar 
findings were also reported when we investigated the effectiveness of 
overcompensation as a compensation policy and advertisement strategy in business 
settings (i.e., in customer-company relationships; Chapters 5 and 6). Taken these 
findings together, the present dissertation questions the popular belief that more 
money is automatically better, and that exceeding norms and expectations always 
positively influences people’s evaluations. From an applied perspective, based on 
the findings of the current dissertation we would advise practitioners to keep the 
magnitude of compensations restricted to restoring equality (or equality plus just a 
little extra).  
The lack of positive overcompensation effects indicate that it is not only the 
favorability of the outcome (in terms of the financial value of the compensation) that 
drives the process of trust repair. Put differently, outcome favorability is only one 
aspect of people’s reaction to responses to harm. In line with this observation, 
Chapters 7 and 8 revealed that even in case of a purely financial harm, verbal 
response actions in terms of apologies can also facilitate trust repair, and this even 
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beyond the level that is reached by a monetary compensation alone. Additionally, 
the neuroimaging study conducted in Chapter 9 showed that financial compensation 
activates forgiveness and reward related brain areas. These activations were found 
even when controlling for receiving money in itself, which indicates that trust repair 
through financial compensation is also experienced as socially rewarding. The 
findings of these latter chapters further confirm the observation that even in a purely 
financial context, not only money seems to matter. The findings of this dissertation 
thus stress that besides financial motives, various relational concerns and fairness 
considerations should also be taken into account when investigating the trust 
restoration process (see also Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; De Cremer, 2002). 
 
Limitations and directions for future research 
Whereas the present dissertation provides useful new insights in the trust 
repair process, it is not without limitations. A first limitation of this dissertation is 
that we solely focused on trust violations that harmed the victim in a financial way 
by inducing a loss of tangible resources. However, not all trust violations harm 
victims financially. The question rises whether strategies that mainly address 
outcome-related concerns, such as financial compensations, exert similar effects in 
cases of violations that are social in nature, like when being excluded from an 
interaction or socially undermined. Future research is needed to investigate this 
interesting question. 
Moreover, in the present dissertation we investigated trust violations and 
subsequent repair in relationships in which the victim and the transgressor had no 
prior interaction history. In this regard, it is important to mention that prior research 
has shown that violations in the initial stage of a relationship can have devastating 
long-term consequences (Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008). We 
therefore believe that it is of great importance to examine the trust repair process in 
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early stages of relationships. This being said, the intriguing question remains how 
the trust repair process looks like in relationships that have a longer interaction 
history. Future research is needed to investigate the effectiveness of financial 
compensations and apologies in ongoing relationships. 
The studies reported in the present dissertation all have in common that they 
departed from the perspective of the victimized party. That is, we have exclusively 
focused on the possibility of trust repair by examining the impact of financial 
compensations and apologies on victims’ (and observers’) trust in the transgressor. 
This is a logical starting point for investigating the feasibility of trust restoration, but 
an interesting next step is to focus on the transgressor’s perspective by examining 
the circumstances under which a transgressor is actually willing to provide the 
victim a monetary compensation or apologize to the victim (see Desmet & 
Leunissen, 2014). We believe that the investigation of transgressors’ willingness to 
restore harm provides an important avenue for future trust repair studies. 
A final methodological limitation of our research concerns the use of mainly 
laboratory experiments and scenario studies to investigate the effectiveness of 
different trust repair strategies. Although an important advantage of these 
experimental methods is that they allowed us to test our predictions regarding the 
effectiveness of financial compensations and apologies in a controlled setting, an 
important shortcoming of the present dissertation is that we did not replicate our 
findings in more natural settings. It is fair to note that experimental research can 
create artificial situations that do not always represent real-life situations. Future 
research should therefore investigate whether the findings of the present dissertation 
regarding the effectiveness of financial compensations and apologies also hold true 
in field settings.  
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Conclusion 
In the present dissertation we departed from the rather negative and 
pessimistic view that has dominated the literature on trust repair by employing a 
more positive perspective. This positive view holds that under certain circumstances 
broken trust can effectively be repaired. In this dissertation we combined behavioral 
and neuroimaging techniques, which enable us to investigate in more detail by 
which means and under which circumstances violated trust can effectively be 
repaired. As such, the present dissertation contributes important new insights to the 
complex and fascinating research domain of trust repair. 
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Nederlandstalige Samenvatting 
 
Kan gebroken vertrouwen hersteld worden? Een 
sociaal en neuropsychologisch perspectief 
 
Inleiding 
Vertrouwen is een essentieel onderdeel van het sociale leven. Dit komt 
onder meer tot uiting in het gegeven dat vertrouwen op de onderzoeksagenda staat 
binnen een verscheidenheid aan wetenschappelijke disciplines. Deze 
multidisciplinaire aanpak benadrukt dat vertrouwen alomtegenwoordig is in onze 
interacties met anderen. Binnen de psychologische literatuur wordt vertrouwen 
gedefinieerd als een psychologische toestand die de intentie omvat om zich 
kwetsbaar op te stellen naar anderen toe (zie Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998). Eerder onderzoek toont aan dat de aanwezigheid van vertrouwen een 
positieve invloed heeft op interpersoonlijke relaties, het bedrijfsleven en zelfs de 
samenleving als geheel. Ondanks dat vertrouwen een kostbaar goed is, lijkt het ook 
zeer kwetsbaar te zijn. De werkelijkheid leert ons namelijk dat vertrouwen vaak 
geschonden wordt. Gezien vertrouwensbreuken ongunstige effecten kunnen hebben, 
is het van groot belang om te onderzoeken of en hoe gebroken vertrouwen terug 
hersteld kan worden. Het doel van het huidige doctoraatsonderzoek was om meer 
inzicht te verschaffen in de effectiviteit van verschillende vertrouwens-
herstelstrategieën. 
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Vertrouwensbreuken 
Het merendeel van het voortgaand onderzoek naar vertrouwen heeft zich op 
de eerste plaats toegespitst op het begrijpen van wat er gebeurt als vertrouwen 
aanwezig is. Het is echter opmerkelijk dat er nauwelijks wetenschappelijke aandacht 
is besteed aan de overgang van een toestand van geschonden vertrouwen naar een 
toestand van herwonnen vertrouwen (De Cremer & Desmet, 2012). Deze conclusie 
is betreurenswaardig omdat vertrouwen erg fragiel is, en mensen hun alledaagse 
handelingen en beslissingen tal van mogelijkheden bieden om vertrouwen te 
schenden (zie bijvoorbeeld Bottom, Daniels, Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002; Kim, 
Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, 
Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Deze kwetsbaarheid komt tot uiting in het populaire 
gezegde dat het jaren duurt om vertrouwen op te bouwen, seconden om het te breken 
en een eeuwigheid om het terug te herstellen. 
Voorafgaand onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat vertrouwensbreuken kunnen 
leiden tot allerlei schadelijke gevolgen. Zo gaan vertrouwensbreuken vaak gepaard 
met gevoelens van achterdocht en wantrouwen ten opzichte van de overtreder 
(Elangovan, Auer-Rizzi, & Szabo, 2007). Ook wraak gevoelens worden vaak 
gerapporteerd na een vertrouwensschending (Haden & Hojjat, 2006). Verder 
resulteren vertrouwensbreuken veelal in een onmiddellijke daling in coöperatief 
gedrag (Bottom et al., 2002). Deze negatieve gevolgen benadrukken dat het van 
cruciaal belang is om een beter begrip te ontwikkelen van het 
vertrouwensherstelproces (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). De centrale vraag die zich 
stelt is: Hoe kan gebroken vertrouwen terug hersteld worden? 
 
Vertrouwensherstel 
De vraag hoe geschonden vertrouwen terug hersteld kan worden is lang 
onderbelicht gebleven in de wetenschappelijke literatuur. Na afloop van een 
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vertrouwensbreuk kunnen overtreders allerlei verschillende strategieën hanteren met 
als doel het vertrouwen van het slachtoffer terug te winnen. Binnen de literatuur 
wordt er een centraal onderscheid gemaakt tussen verbale en non-verbale (materiële) 
vertrouwensherstelstrategieën. 
Eerder onderzoek heeft zich vooral gericht op de effectiviteit van verbale 
herstelstrategieën, waar het aanbieden van verontschuldigingen, het ontkennen van 
betrokkenheid en het verzinnen van smoesjes enkele belangrijke voorbeelden van 
zijn. Een verscheidenheid aan studies heeft aangetoond dat het aanbieden van een 
oprechte verontschuldiging een effectieve strategie is om aangetast vertrouwen te 
herstellen (zie bijvoorbeeld Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Schwartz, 1978; 
Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). Maar verontschuldigingen blijken niet altijd 
even effectief te zijn om gebroken vertrouwen te herstellen. Zo heeft ander 
onderzoek aangetoond dat verontschuldigingen vaak niet efficiënt en soms zelfs 
contraproductief zijn (zie Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983; Schlenker, 1980; zie 
ook Sigal, Hsu, Foodim, & Betman; 1988). Er kan dan ook geconcludeerd worden 
dat voortgaand onderzoek naar de effectiviteit van verontschuldigingen heeft geleid 
tot tegenstrijdige resultaten.  
Gezien verbale strategieën geen tastbaar element bevatten, hebben 
onderzoekers geopperd dat ze door slachtoffers als goedkoop kunnen worden 
ervaren (Bottom et al., 2002), en dit zal vooral het geval zijn wanneer de 
vertrouwensbreuk tot een financieel verlies voor het slachtoffer heeft geleid. In 
dergelijke situaties kan verwacht worden dat de overtreder actie moet ondernemen 
om de schade ongedaan te maken. Een financiële compensatie kan met andere 
woorden noodzakelijk zijn om gebroken vertrouwen terug te herstellen (Dirks, Kim, 
Ferrin, & Cooper, 2011).  
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Huidig doctoraatsonderzoek 
In het vervolg van deze samenvatting worden de onderzoeksdoelen, de 
methoden en de resultaten van de huidige doctoraatstudies kort toegelicht. 
 
Vertrouwensherstel: De effectiviteit van financiële compensaties 
De meest prominente non-verbale vertrouwensherstelstrategie is het 
aanbieden van een financiële compensatie. Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat 
financiële compensaties effectief kunnen zijn om het vertrouwen van het slachtoffer 
in de overtreder te herstellen (zie Bottom et al., 2002; Desmet, De Cremer, & van 
Dijk, 2010, 2011). Echter, de meeste vorige compensatie studies onderzochten enkel 
de effectiviteit van compensaties die kleiner of gelijk zijn aan de schade die door het 
slachtoffer werd geleden. Er kan nochtans worden verondersteld dat succesvol 
vertrouwensherstel meer vraagt van de overtreder dan enkel en alleen het herstellen 
van de veroorzaakte schade. Met andere woorden, om vertrouwen volledig te 
herstellen tot het niveau van voor de vertrouwensbreuk zou het noodzakelijk kunnen 
zijn dat de overtreder het slachtoffer een compensatie aanbiedt die groter is dan de 
geleden schade. Dergelijke compensaties worden in de literatuur omschreven als 
overcompensatie. Omdat overcompensatie extra kosten inhoudt voor de aanbieder 
van de compensatie, rijst de vraag of dergelijke compensaties ook daadwerkelijk 
effectiever zijn om gebroken vertrouwen te herstellen dan compensaties die gelijk 
zijn aan de geleden schade.  
Hoofdstuk 2 
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 2 bestond erin een antwoord te zoeken op de 
volgende vraag: Is het voldoende voor een overtreder om de geleden schade exact 
terug te betalen of kunnen overcompensaties vertrouwen nog meer doen stijgen? In 
dit hoofdstuk werd er uitgegaan van de veronderstelling dat overcompensatie 
interessant is in termen van de “paradigmatische strijd” tussen economie en 
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psychologie. Vanuit een economisch perspectief leidt een overcompensatie tot de 
meest voordelige situatie voor het slachtoffer, terwijl vanuit een psychologisch 
perspectief overcompensatie oneerlijk is omdat het leidt tot ongelijkheid tussen 
slachtoffer en overtreder. De effectiviteit van overcompensatie werd onderzocht aan 
de hand van vier empirische studies. In lijn met een psychologisch perspectief op 
vertrouwen toonden de resultaten van onze studies aan dat overcompensatie geen 
positief effect heeft bovenop gelijke compensatie in termen van samenwerking en 
relatie behoud, en dat overcompensatie zelfs negatieve uitkomsten uitlokt in termen 
van gereduceerd vertrouwen en minder gunstige percepties van de overtreder. Onze 
bevindingen tonen dus aan dat de doeltreffendheid van een overcompensatie 
afhankelijk is van de uitkomstmaat. Overcompensatie is even effectief als gelijke 
compensatie voor meer beredeneerde uitkomstmaten (zoals samenwerking en relatie 
behoud), terwijl overcompensatie minder effectief is dan gelijke compensatie voor 
meer relationele uitkomstmaten (zoals vertrouwen en percepties). Deze bevindingen 
indiceren dan ook dat overcompensatie geen meerwaarde biedt, en zelfs averechts 
kan werken. Het doel van de volgende hoofdstukken was om deze interessante 
bevinding verder te onderzoeken. 
Hoofdstuk 3 
In Hoofdstuk 3 zijn we een stap verder gegaan door te onderzoeken of de 
effectiviteit van een overcompensatie afhangt van het perspectief van de persoon die 
de compensatie evalueert (ontvanger versus waarnemer). Belangrijk hierbij is om op 
te merken dat eerdere overcompensatie studies zich enkel hebben gericht op de 
ontvanger van de compensatie, zonder daarbij rekening te houden met de mogelijke 
positieve invloed die een overcompensatie kan hebben op niet-betrokken partijen die 
de compensatie observeren. Overtreders bieden hun slachtoffer vaak een 
overcompensatie aan, niet alleen om hun relatie met het slachtoffer te herstellen 
maar ook om reputatieschade te voorkomen en om het “algemene publiek” positief 
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te beïnvloeden. Daarom werd in dit hoofdstuk aan de hand van een lab experiment 
onderzocht of een overcompensatie ook daadwerkelijk als positief wordt gezien door 
de ogen van waarnemers. In lijn met de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 2 bleek dat voor 
de ontvanger van de compensatie een overcompensatie leidt tot lagere niveaus van 
vertrouwen dan een gelijke compensatie. Voor waarnemers resulteren beide vormen 
van compensatie in een vergelijkbaar niveau van vertrouwen. De bevindingen van 
Hoofdstuk 3 tonen dus aan dat overcompensatie een kosten-ineffectieve 
herstelstrategie is, en dit zowel voor ontvangers van de compensatie als voor 
waarnemers. 
Hoofdstuk 4 
In Hoofdstuk 4 werd vervolgens onderzocht of het type overtreding een 
invloed heeft op het vertrouwensherstelproces. Vertrouwensbreuken kunnen vaak 
worden toegeschreven aan een gebrek aan competentie of een gebrek aan integriteit 
(zie Kim et al., 2004, 2006). Wanneer een overtreding kan worden toegeschreven 
aan een gebrek aan competentie vormt dit niet noodzakelijk een indicatie dat de 
overtreder een slecht persoon is. Iedereen kan namelijk lage prestatieniveaus 
tentoonspreiden onder ongunstige omstandigheden. Als zodanig kan verwacht 
worden dat het ongedaan maken van de schade door middel van een gelijke 
compensatie voldoende zal zijn om het vertrouwen terug te herstellen na afloop van 
een competentiefout. Echter, als een overtreding kan worden toegeschreven aan een 
gebrek aan integriteit dan signaleert dit wel dat de overtreder een slecht persoon is 
omdat enkel mensen die tekortschieten op bepaalde morele waarden oneerlijk gedrag 
zullen vertonen. We verwachtten dan ook dat in de nasleep van een 
integriteitsovertreding een overcompensatie noodzakelijk zal zijn om vertrouwen 
terug te herstellen. Uit de resultaten van twee studies blijkt dat gelijke compensatie 
en overcompensatie beiden effectief zijn om vertrouwen te herstellen na afloop van 
een competentiefout. In het geval van een integriteitsovertreding blijken zowel 
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gelijke compensatie als overcompensatie niet in staat om vertrouwen te herstellen. 
Bovendien had voor beide soorten overtredingen overcompensatie geen positief 
effect bovenop het effect van gelijke compensatie. 
De resultaten van Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 verschaffen aanvullend bewijs voor 
de vaststelling dat overcompensatie niet superieur is aan gelijke compensatie – en 
deze bevinding geldt ook voor waarnemers en in geval van ernstige overtredingen in 
termen van integriteitsschendingen. Nochtans zijn er een aantal onderzoekers die 
wel positieve effecten van overcompensaties hebben gerapporteerd (zie bijvoorbeeld 
Boshoff, 1997; Gilly & Hansen, 1985; Hocutt, Bowers, & Donavan, 2006). Een 
nadere kijk op deze studies toont echter aan dat de positieve effecten van 
overcompensatie voornamelijk werden verworven met relatief kleine 
overcompensaties, terwijl in de voorafgaande hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift 
consequent werd gekeken naar de effectiviteit van redelijk grote overcompensaties 
(die meestal op zijn minst twee keer zo groot waren als de toegebrachte schade). 
Hoofdstuk 5 
In Hoofdstuk 5 werd daarom onderzocht hoe de grootte van een 
overcompensatie de doeltreffendheid ervan beïnvloed. We voorspelden dat mensen 
positief zullen reageren op kleine overcompensaties omdat dergelijke compensaties 
welwillendheid signaleren door extra kosten te compenseren. Verwacht wordt echter 
dat vanaf een bepaald punt extra overcompensatie zal leiden tot een daling in 
vertrouwen omdat grote afwijkingen van gelijkheid als onaangenaam en oneerlijk 
worden ervaren (zie Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Deze 
voorspellingen werden onderzocht in interacties tussen klanten en bedrijven door het 
uitvoeren van vier studies waarin we ons richten op loyaliteit als uitkomstmaat. Het 
gebruik van financiële compensaties komt vaak voor in dergelijke interacties, want 
voor de meeste bedrijven zijn occasionele productdefecten bijna onvermijdelijk, 
waardoor pogingen om dergelijke fouten te herstellen uiterst relevant zijn. Ook hier 
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kunnen bedrijven ervoor kiezen om ontevreden klanten meer te compenseren dan 
nodig om de schade ongedaan te maken met als doel hun vertrouwen en loyaliteit 
verder te vergroten. In lijn met onze voorspellingen blijkt dat milde vormen van 
overcompensatie inderdaad zorgen voor een stijging in loyaliteit ten opzichte van 
gelijke compensatie. Echter, zodra een bepaalde drempelwaarde overschreven werd 
begon de effectiviteit van overcompensatie af te nemen, wat aansluit bij onze 
eerdere bevindingen dat grote overcompensaties niet goed worden ontvangen. 
Verder toont dit hoofdstuk ook aan dat er robuste individuele verschillen zijn in de 
manier waarop mensen reageren op overcompensaties. 
Hoofdstuk 6 
In Hoofdstuk 6 werd vervolgens de effectiviteit van overcompensatie als een 
reclamestrategie onderzocht. De belofte om klanten meer dan het prijsverschil te 
betalen indien een andere winkel precies hetzelfde product verkoopt voor een lagere 
prijs is een veelgebruikte reclamestrategie. In een eerste studie onderzochten we of 
marketeers en winkeliers denken dat het overcompenseren van prijsverschillen een 
effectieve strategie is. Deze studie toont aan dat de meerderheid van de marketeers 
en winkeliers in onze steekproef dacht dat het overcompenseren van een 
prijsverschil inderdaad effectiever is dan het exact compenseren van een 
prijsverschil. Echter, uit de vier daaropvolgende studies bleek dat overcompensatie 
niet effectiever is dan gelijke compensatie om nieuwe klanten aan te trekken en 
bestaande klanten te behouden. Onze resultaten toonden verder aan dat deze 
bevindingen kunnen worden toegeschreven aan de lagere gepercipieerde eerlijkheid 
van overcompensaties. Ondanks dat het overcompenseren van prijsverschillen extra 
kosten inhoud, lijkt het exact compenseren van prijsverschillen dus even effectief te 
zijn. 
Hoofdstukken 5 en 6 tonen aan dat wanneer de aanbieder van een 
compensatie een bedrijf is (in plaats van een andere persoon) overcompensatie 
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eveneens niet leidt tot meer positieve resultaten dan gelijke compensatie. 
Concluderend kan dan ook gesteld worden dat overcompensaties niet enkel kosten-
ineffectief zijn in interpersoonlijke relaties, maar ook in zakelijke relaties tussen 
bedrijven en klanten. 
 
Vertrouwensherstel: De effectiviteit van verontschuldigingen 
In de volgende twee hoofdstukken werd de focus verlegd naar het 
onderzoeken van de effectiviteit van non-materiële vertrouwensherstelstrategieën, 
want een vertrouwensbreuk houdt vaak ook een schending in van allerlei relationele 
verwachtingen. Dit suggereert dat vertrouwensherstel in een financiële context 
mogelijk ook kan worden bereikt door middel van verbale 
vertrouwensherstelstrategieën. Een prominent voorbeeld van een verbale 
herstelstrategie is het aanbieden van verontschuldigingen (Lazare, 2004; Kim, Dirks, 
& Cooper, 2009). Verontschuldigen komen tegemoet aan de relationele behoeften 
van het slachtoffer omdat ze de waardigheid van het slachtoffer herstellen alsook 
respect signaleren voor het slachtoffer (Barclay & Skarlicki, 2008; Scher & Darley, 
1997). 
Hoofdstuk 7 
In Hoofdstuk 7 werd vertrokken vanuit de constatering dat hoewel uit eerder 
onderzoek is gebleken dat financiële compensaties en verontschuldigingen effectief 
zijn om gebroken vertrouwen te herstellen, onderzoek tot op heden heeft nagelaten 
om het simultane effect van beide strategieën te bestuderen. Daarom werd in twee 
empirische studies het gecombineerde effect van financiële compensaties en 
verontschuldigingen onderzocht op vertrouwensherstel. Meer specifiek werd hier 
nagegaan of in de nasleep van een financiële vertrouwensbreuk een 
verontschuldiging nog een toegevoegde waarde biedt bovenop de impact van een 
financiële compensatie. Uit de resultaten van deze studies blijk dat 
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verontschuldigingen een additionele positief effect hebben op vertrouwensherstel 
wanneer de verstrekte compensatie te laag is om de schade ongedaan te maken; dus 
in het geval van een zogenaamde ondercompensatie. Dit resultaat sluit aan bij eerder 
onderzoek dat het belang van relationele motieven benadrukt voor het 
vertrouwensherstelproces (zie Bottom et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2009). 
Hoofdstuk 8 
In Hoofdstuk 8 werd de focus verlegd naar het onderzoeken van de 
effectiviteit van verontschuldigingen in relaties op het werk. Op bijna dagelijkse 
basis moeten leidinggevenden beslissingen nemen die hun ondergeschikten kunnen 
schaden in het geval van een foutieve beslissing. Echter, geen eerdere studies 
onderzochten hoe de timing van een foutieve beslissing invloed heeft op de 
effectiviteit van verontschuldigingen als vertrouwensherstelstrategie. In vijf studies 
onderzochten we hoe een negatieve beslissingsuitkomst gegenereerd door een 
leidinggevenden op een haastige, tijdige of vertraagde manier van invloed is op het 
vertrouwensherstelproces. Uit de resultaten van onze studies blijkt dat bij 
ondergeschikten de noodzaak aan een verontschuldiging het hoogst was wanneer een 
foutieve beslissing werd uitgesteld door een leidinggevende, terwijl 
verontschuldigingen net het minste effectief waren in de context van uitgestelde 
beslissingen. Dit hoofdstuk toont dan ook aan dat vertrouwensschendingen vooral 
moeilijk te herstellen zijn wanneer leidinggevenden uitstelgedrag vertonen. 
 
Een neurowettenschappelijke kijk op vertrouwensherstel 
In de voorgaande empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift werd het 
vertrouwensherstelproces onderzocht met behulp van gedragsmethoden. In dit 
laatste empirische hoofdstuk werd er gebruik gemaakt van een neuropsychologische 
aanpak. Een toenemend aantal onderzoekers is gestart met het verkennen van de 
neurobiologie van vertrouwen. Opmerkelijk is echter dat deze studies uitsluitend 
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gericht zijn op het in kaart brengen van de neurale substraten die geassocieerd zijn 
met vertrouwen en wantrouwen, terwijl de neurale mechanismen die gerelateerd zijn 
met vertrouwensherstel nog niet empirisch zijn onderzocht. Het gebruik van 
beeldvormende technieken zoals fMRI (functionele kernspintomografie) vormt dan 
ook een belangrijke aanvulling op het gedragsonderzoek naar vertrouwensherstel. 
Hoofdstuk 9 
In Hoofdstuk 9 werden de neurale correlaten van vertrouwensherstel 
onderzocht met behulp van een fMRI studie. Het uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek 
was de constatering dat hoewel de eerdere studies van dit doctoraat hebben 
aangetoond dat een gelijke compensatie het meest (kosten)effectief is om 
vertrouwen te herstellen, het nog steeds onduidelijk is waarom dergelijke 
compensaties nu precies zo effectief zijn. De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk tonen aan 
dat het ontvangen van een gelijke compensatie leidt tot de activatie van 
hersengebieden die gerelateerd zijn aan vergeving en sociale beloning. Aanvullende 
analyses tonen aan dat activatie in vergeving gerelateerde gebieden de relatie tussen 
compensatie en vertrouwensherstel medieert. Op basis van deze bevindingen kan 
dan ook geconcludeerd worden dat vergeving een noodzakelijke stap is voor het 
effectief herstel van vertrouwen. 
 
Algemene discussie 
In deze algemene discussie worden kort de resultaten van het huidige 
doctoraatsonderzoek bediscussieerd. In de empirische hoofdstukken van dit 
proefschrift werd (met uitzondering van Hoofdstuk 8) de effectiviteit van een 
vertrouwensherstelstrategie onderzocht die veelvuldig wordt toegepast in de 
praktijk, maar nog weinig is onderzocht in de wetenschappelijke literatuur. Eerder 
onderzoek naar vertrouwensherstel heeft zich namelijk bijna uitsluitend gericht op 
het onderzoeken van de effectiviteit van verbale vertrouwensherstelstrategieën (zie 
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Kim et al., 2004, 2006; Tomlinson et al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006). Hoewel we 
erkennen dat dergelijke strategieën effectief kunnen zijn om vertrouwen te 
herstellen, veroorzaken vertrouwensbreuken ook vaak financiële schade voor het 
slachtoffer. Onder dergelijke omstandigheden zijn verbale reacties mogelijk 
onvoldoende om vertrouwen te herstellen, dit omdat de materiële schade ook moet 
worden aangepakt (Bottom et al., 2002). Een non-verbale herstelstrategie die door 
overtreders kan worden toegepast, is het betalen van een financiële compensatie. 
Ondanks dat financiële compensaties vaak worden gebruikt door overtreders is er 
nog maar weinig bekend over de factoren die de doeltreffendheid ervan beïnvloeden.  
In de eerste vijf empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift hebben we ons 
expliciet gericht op het onderzoeken van de effectiviteit van financiële 
overcompensaties. De kritische vraag die we poogden te beantwoorden met ons 
onderzoek was of kostelijke overcompensatie gunstige effecten heeft bovenop 
minder kostelijke gelijke compensatie. Uit Hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6 is echter 
gebleken dat (grote) overcompensatie niet superieur is aan gelijke compensatie, wat 
gedeeltelijk kan worden toegeschreven aan de lagere gepercipeerde eerlijkheid van 
overcompensatie. Belangrijk is dat de constatering dat overcompensatie niet 
superieur is aan gelijke compensatie van toepassing is op verschillende 
uitkomstmaten (meer beredeneerde en meer relationele uitkomstmaten; Hoofdstuk 
2), perspectieven (ontvangers en waarnemers van de compensatie; Hoofdstuk 3), en 
soorten overtredingen (competentiefouten en integriteitsschendingen; Hoofdstuk 4). 
Soortgelijke bevindingen werden gerapporteerd voor de effectiviteit van 
overcompensatie als compensatiebeleid en als reclamestrategie in relaties tussen 
klanten en bedrijven (Hoofdstukken 5 en 6). In het licht van deze bevindingen stelt 
het huidige proefschrift dan ook vraagtekens bij de populaire assumptie dat meer 
geld ook automatisch beter is. Vanuit een praktisch oogpunt kan op basis van de 
resultaten van dit proefschrift het advies worden geformuleerd om de omvang van 
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compensaties best te beperken tot het louter herstellen van de schade (en eventueel 
een klein beetje extra). 
Het ontbreken van positieve overcompensatie effecten toont aan dat niet 
enkel financiële motieven het proces van vertrouwensherstel aandrijven. Anders 
gezegd, de financiële waarde van een compensatie is slechts één aspect van hoe 
mensen reageren op schadeherstel. Dit is ook in overeenstemming met de resultaten 
van Hoofdstukken 7 en 8. Uit deze hoofdstukken blijkt namelijk dat zelfs in het 
geval van een puur financiële schade, een verontschuldiging ervoor kan zorgen dat 
vertrouwen toeneemt, en dit zelfs boven het niveau dat wordt bereikt met een 
financiële compensatie. Daarnaast toont de fMRI studie die werd uitgevoerd in 
Hoofdstuk 9 aan dat een financiële compensatie leidt tot de activatie van 
hersengebieden die gerelateerd zijn met vergeving en sociale beloningservaringen. 
Deze activeringen werden zelfs gevonden na correctie voor het ontvangen van geld 
op zich, wat aangeeft dat vertrouwensherstel door middel van een financiële 
vergoeding ook als sociaal prettig ervaren wordt. De bevindingen van deze laatste 
hoofdstukken bieden dan ook verdere evidentie voor de vaststelling dat niet alleen 
geld van belang is. Huidig proefschrift benadrukt dus dat er naast financiële 
motieven ook allerlei andere overwegingen zijn waarmee rekening moet worden 
gehouden bij het onderzoek naar vertrouwensherstel. 
 
Conclusie 
De psychologische literatuur werd voor lange tijd gedomineerd door een 
nogal negatieve en pessimistische visie op de mogelijkheid tot vertrouwensherstel. 
In het huidige doctoraatsonderzoek werd uitgegaan van een meer positieve kijk die 
inhoudt dat onder bepaalde omstandigheden gebroken vertrouwen wel degelijk kan 
worden hersteld. We combineerden gedragsmethoden met hersenonderzoek. Dit 
heeft ons in staat gesteld om het proces van vertrouwensherstel in meer detail te 
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onderzoeken. Als zodanig draagt dit proefschrift belangrijke nieuwe inzichten bij 
aan het complexe en fascinerende onderzoeksgebied van vertrouwensherstel. 
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Data Storage Fact Sheets 
 
In this Appendix, a data storage fact sheet for each empirical chapter of the 
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 2 (Studies 1-4) 
 
% Name/identifier study: What Money Can’t Buy: The Psychology of Financial 
Overcompensation 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 12/09/2014 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T., 
Van Hiel, A., Reinders Folmer, C., & De Cremer, D. (2014). What money can’t buy: 
The psychology of financial overcompensation. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
42, 83-95.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1, Study 2, 
Study 3, and Study 4 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
Appendix: Data Storage Fact Sheets  
 
 
366 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntaxt files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 3 (Study 1 – this chapter consists of only one 
study) 
 
% Name/identifier study: More Money, More Trust? Target and Observer 
Differences in the Effectiveness of Financial Overcompensation to Restore Trust 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 12/09/2014 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T., 
Reinders Folmer, C., & Van Hiel, A. (2014). More money, more trust? Target and 
observer differences in the effectiveness of financial overcompensation to restore 
trust. Psychologica Belgica, 54, 389-394.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
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  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntaxt file  
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data file (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output file  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 4 (Studies 1-2) 
 
% Name/identifier study: Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of Financial 
Compensation for Repairing Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 16/12/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T., 
Reinders Folmer, C., & Van Hiel, A. (2015). Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of 
Financial Compensation for Repairing Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust 
Violations. PLoS ONE, 10(12), e0145952. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 and Study 2 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
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  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntaxt files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data)  
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files  
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify:  
 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
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  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 5 (Studies 1-4) 
 
% Name/identifier study: How Much Compensation is Too Much? An Investigation 
of the Effectiveness of Financial Overcompensation as a Means to Enhance 
Customer Loyalty 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 03/01/2017 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T.,  
Van Hiel, A., Pandelaere M., Bostyn, D., & De Cremer, D. (in press). How much 
compensation is too much? An investigation of the effectiveness of financial 
overcompensation as a means to enhance customer loyalty. Judgment and Decision 
Making. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1, Study 2, 
Study 3, and Study 4 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
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* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Data files (with recoded data) 
  - [ ] file(s) containing analyses. 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify:  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO  
(Note that the data analyses for Studies 2, 3 and 4 have been conducted by one of the 
co-authors; Bostyn D. (Study 2) & Pandelaere M. (Studies 3 and 4)) 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 6 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 6 (Studies 1-3) 
 
% Name/identifier study: Low-Price Guarantees as Advertisement Strategy and 
Compensation Policy: The More, the Better? 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 03/01/2017 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T., 
Van Hiel, A., Onraet, E., Joosten, A., & De Cremer, D. (in press). Low-price 
guarantees as advertisement strategy and compensation policy:  The more, the 
better? Journal of Consumer Behaviour. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1, Study 2a, 
Study 2b, Study  3a, and Study 3b 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
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  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntaxt files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data file (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify:  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO  
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 7 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 7 (Studies 1-2) 
 
% Name/identifier study: Money isn’t all that Matters: The use of Financial 
Compensation and Apologies to Preserve Relationships in the Aftermath of 
Distributive Harm 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 05/05/2014 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T., 
Reinders Folmer, C., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2013). Money isn't all that 
matters: The use of financial compensation and apologies to preserve relationships 
in the aftermath of distributive harm. Journal of Economic Psychology, 35, 95-107.  
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 and Study 2 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
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  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntaxt files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data files (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 8 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 8 (Studies 1-5) 
 
% Name/identifier study: The Impact of Decision Timing on the Effectiveness of 
Leaders’ Apologies to Repair Followers’ Trust in the Aftermath of Leader Failure 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 16/12/2015 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T., 
Joosten, A., Reinders Folmer, C., Lerner, L., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2016). 
The impact of decision timing on the effectiveness of leaders’ apologies to repair 
followers’ trust in the aftermath of leader failure. Journal of Business and 
Psychology, 31, 533-551. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1, Study 2, 
Study 3, Study 4, and Study 5 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
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* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ... 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: 
SPSS syntaxt files 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS data file (with recoded data) 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: SPSS output files 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify:  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [X] research group file server 
  - [ ] other: ...     
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [X] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [ ] other (specify): ...     
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
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Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 9 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet Chapter 9 (Study 1 - this chapter consists of only one 
study) 
 
 
% Name/identifier study: Understanding the Effects of Financial Compensation on 
the Repair of Interpersonal Trust: Evidence from fMRI in Favor of Forgiveness and 
Social Reward 
% Author: Tessa Haesevoets 
% Date: 03/01/2017 
 
 
1. Contact details 
=========================================================== 
 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Tessa Haesevoets 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: tessa.haesevoets@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP)  
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alain Van Hiel 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
- e-mail: alain.vanhiel@ugent.be 
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send an 
email to data-ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies  
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Haesevoets, T., De 
Cremer, D., Van Hiel, A., & Van Overwalle, F. Understanding the effects of 
financial compensation on the repair of interpersonal trust: Evidence from fMRI in 
favor of forgiveness and social reward. Manuscipt under revision. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Study 1 (fmri data) 
 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
=========================================================== 
 
 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [X] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
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  - [X] researcher PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other (specify): PC of co-author (Van Overwalle F.) and external hard drive 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): co-author (Van Overwalle F.) 
    
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: ... 
  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: Processed fmri data 
  - [ ] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
  - [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should 
be interpreted. Specify: ...  
  - [ ] other files. Specify:  
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* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other: PC of co-author (Van Overwalle F.)   
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 
  - [X] other (specify): co-author (Van Overwalle F.) 
 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [X] NO  
(Note that the data analyses for this fmri Study have been conducted in close 
collaboration with one of the co-authors; Van Overwalle F.) 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name:  
   - address:  
   - affiliation:  
   - e-mail:  
 
